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mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte (GEMA), C-117/15, 
EU:C:2016:379. 
SARL Reims Bio (French Competition Council, Decision 04-D-26 
of 30 June 2004). 
SBS Belgium NV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, 
Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM), C-325/14, 
EU:C:2015:764. 
Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v 
Rafael Hoteles SA, C-306/05, EU:C:2006:479. 
Sociedade Portuguesa de Autores CRL v Ministério Público and 
Others, C-151/15, EU:C:2015:468. 
Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso, C-
135/10, EU:C:2012:140 (“SCF”); Phonographic 
Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland and Attorney 
General, C-162/10, EU:C:2012:141. 
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v 
Bell Canada 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 SCR 326. 
Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems, also trading under the 
name Filmspeler, C-527/15, EU:C:2017:300.  
Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, C-610/15, 
EU:C:2017:456. 
United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v 
Commission of the European Communities [1978] ECR I- 
00207.  
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko 
540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
ix 
 
Viacom International, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc. 676 F.3d 19, United 
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, decision of 5 Apr. 
2012. 
VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der Urheber- und 
Leistungsschutzrechte von Medienunternehmen mbH 
v Google Inc, C-299/17 
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This thesis considers how South Africa and Nigeria can apply 
copyright and competition laws to regulate the open and freemium 
music business model that involves the use of copyright-protected 
music content to generate revenue from advertising.  
To enhance their competitiveness and escape copyright 
infringement liability, the firms that deploy the business model 
impose contractual terms to explain their use of protected content 
and direct the actions of platform users. Using case law from the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the thesis argues 
that although these terms result in free and wider distribution of 
copyright content, some aspects of their implementation may be 
unaligned with the regulatory framework. The thesis finds that 
these misalignments exist because the non-payment of royalties to 
copyright owners and their exclusion from revenue-sharing 
arrangements may adversely affect their viability of copyright 
owners as small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) while their 
inclusion necessitates the imposition of restrictions that may 
prevent innovative uses of copyright products. Further, the thesis 
finds that the misalignments are caused by legal uncertainties 
regarding the exclusive rights of the copyright holders and the 
scope of their limitations and exceptions, as well as unavailability of 
competition law enforcement criteria that protect the economic 
freedom of SMEs including copyright owners. Because of the 
copyright covering the music content and its use in the economic 
activity of advertising, which is regulated by competition law, the 
thesis argues for aligning the business model with the regulatory 
frameworks. Further, the thesis argues that by ratifying 
international copyright treaties in ways that provide exclusive rights 
limited by compulsory licensing, and by amending and enforcing 




anticompetitive, copyright and competition laws may be used to 
regulate the open and freemium music business model.  
By adopting a South African and Nigerian perspective and 
proposing competition law solutions, this study aims at filling a gap 
in the academic literature, which does not appear so far to have 
attempted a pro-Africa assessment of the business model and/or 
considered the complementary role of competition law in copyright-
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A business model explains the processes and strategies adopted 
by a business entity (firm) to generate revenue in the business 
environment. 1  It is widely recognised that business models are 
tools with which firms compete with other firms to gain competitive 
advantage. Defined as a representation or description of the 
rationale of how a firm “creates, delivers and captures value”,2 
business models constitute a fundamental component of trading 
and economic behaviour.3 Economic behaviour is exhibited in the 
creation, production, distribution, provision and use of goods and 
services. 
 With the advent of the Internet and the development of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), the discourse 
on the concept and deployment of the business model has 
expanded. 4  For example, there is significant literature on the 
strategies, processes and activities constituting “internet-based 
business models” or “e-business models” which encompasses 
firms that rely on the Internet and ICTs to create, to deliver and to 
capture value.5 These internet-based business models have also 
                                                 
1 See Weill, P, Malone, T and Apel, T (2011). The business models investors 
prefer. MIT Sloan Management Review, 52(4), 17-19 (hereinafter, “Weill, Malone 
and Apel). 
2  Osterwalder, A. and Pigneur, Y. (2010). Business model generation: a 
handbook for visionaries, game changers, and challengers. John Wiley & Sons, 
p.19 (hereinafter, Osterwalder and Pigneur). Value may involve what a firm 
delivers to the customer or the needs of the customer which the firm seeks to 
satisfy. Value may be created through offering new products, customization, 
price reduction etc. See p. 25. 
3 See Teece, D.J. (2010). Business models, business strategy and innovation. 
Long range planning, 43(2), pp.172-194.   
4  See Zott, C., Amit, R. and Massa, L. (2011). The business model: recent 
developments and future research. Journal of management, 37(4), p.1025 
(hereafter, Zott, Amit and Massa 2011).  
5 See generally, Ghaziani, A. and Ventresca, M.J. (2005). Keywords and cultural 
change: Frame analysis of business model public talk, 1975–2000. In 
Sociological Forum 20(4), pp. 523-559, Springer Netherlands; Yip, G.S. (2004). 





gained prominence in the distribution of music content.6 Instead of 
traditional tangible music distribution such as cassettes and CDs, 
the reproduction and distribution of music is presently undertaken 
largely in digital forms involving downloads and “streams”.7 
 This thesis focuses on one of these internet-based business 
models deployed in the distribution of music content - the open and 
freemium music business model.8 In the open and freemium music 
business model, firms9 which own and operate internet platforms10 
(platform firms) offer music content on the Internet to the general 
public free-of-charge or at zero price, either on a revenue-based 
licence or based on a gratis licence, to create, deliver and capture 
value through advertising services.11  Basically, platform firms in 
                                                                                                                        
Review, 15(2), pp.17-24; Shafer, S.M., Smith, H.J. and Linder, J.C. (2005). The 
power of business models. Business horizons, 48(3), pp.199-207. 
6 “Music content” is used in this thesis to mean a collective of sound recordings 
and films embodying musical and/or literary works as defined in the applicable 
copyright laws of Nigeria and South Africa. As Rae-Hunter explains each music 
content comes with those categories and number of copyright owners. See Rae-
Hunter, C. (2012). Better mousetraps: Licensing, access, and innovation in the 
new music marketplace. J. Bus. & Tech. L., 7, pp.45-46 (“Rae-Hunter 2012”). 
7 Streaming is the transmission of audio in real time over the Internet. See Kopp, 
S.W. and Suter, T.A. (1998). Developments in copyright policy and network 
technologies: The first generation. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, p.306. 
8 Other business models include the iTunes business model where songs are 
sold as ‘protected, non-interoperable files’  on online distribution platforms and 
the net label business model where music is sold on the internet and artists on 
the ‘net label’ are supported by a share in concert fees and merchandising 
revenue. For examples of music business models especially in the digital scene, 
see Bourreau, M., Gensollen, M. and Moreau, F. (2008). The digitization of the 
recorded music industry: Impact on business models and scenarios of evolution. 
1st ed. France: Department of Economics and Social Sciences Telecom Paris, 
14. (“Bourreau 2008”). 
9  Examples include Google (owners of Youtube.com); Facebook.com; 
NotJustok.com; SoundCloud.com. See Fouché, J.A. (2015). Crafting the 
commons: modern approaches to music as product (Masters dissertation, 
University of Cape Town), pp. 20-24 (hereafter, Fouché 2015). 
10 A platform may be defined as physical or virtual place such as a physical 
store, a website, a digital download website, a streaming website and even, a 
concert stage, that enables firms to sell their products. See Evans, D.S. (2016). 
Multisided platforms, dynamic competition and the assessment of market power 
for internet-based firms. Competition Policy International Journal, 10(2), p. 6 
(hereafter, Evans 2016). 
11 As discussed in Chapter three of this study, the definition of the open and 
freemium music business model is the subject of intense debate. The definition 





this context use copyright-protected music content as a tool to 
generate profits and increase the number of platform users for their 
advertising service.12 Generally, users of the platform can access 
and consume music without the requirement or expectation of 
payment. The music consumption comes with specialised functions 
and services such as an unlimited music catalogue, 
advertisements alongside the music, and extended search 
features. The thesis explores the application of copyright law as 
complemented by competition law to regulate the open and 
freemium music business model. In promoting competition, 
copyright law strives to maintain a balance between the rights of 
copyright owners13 and those of users14 of copyright works.15  In 
regulating economic activities including those that involve the 
dissemination of copyright products, competition law complements 
copyright law. 
To enable a focused examination in terms of copyright law, 
                                                                                                                        
of this definition are adapted from the definition of “open content” by Chitu Okoli 
and Ken Carillo. See Okoli, C. and Carillo, K. (2013). Beyond open source 
software: A framework, implications, and directions for researching open 
content, pp. 2 and 5. SSRN Journal. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1954869 accessed 3 March 2015. (hereafter, Okoli and 
Carillo 2013).  
12 See Evans 2016 supra at 7. 
13 “Copyright owners” in this thesis refers to the person or entity who holds/owns 
the copyright, and may unless otherwise indicated, include not only authors such 
as artists), but also intermediaries or entities who have acquired rights from the 
authors. 
14  “Users”, “users of copyright products” or “copyright users” are used 
interchangeably to include any person or entity, other than the copyright owner 
who may need the copyright work for any purpose. Accordingly, it envisages 
persons or entity that merely “consume” or enjoy the copyright work. However, 
the more appropriate term “consumer” is used where the relevant person or 
entity is merely enjoying or listening to the music, without more. See for 
example, Elkin-Koren, N. (2017). Copyright in a digital ecosystem: A user rights 
approach. In: R. Okediji, ed., Copyright law in an age of limitations and 
exceptions. New York: Cambridge University Press, p.137 (hereafter, Elkin-
Koren 2017a). 
15  “Copyright work” generally refers to any work eligible for copyright. See 
Section 1(1) of the Copyright Act, Cap. C28, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2004. (hereafter, “Nigerian Copyright Act”), Section 2(1) and 3(1)(a) and (b) of 





music content protected by copyright law in South Africa and 
Nigeria and used by platform firms has been selected as this 
thesis’ focal point. The justification for, and significance of, this 
sectoral context is presented below (at section 1.4) after the 
description of the relationship between copyright law and 
competition law and the interaction with the open and freemium 
music business model at section 1.2 and 1.3, respectively. Suffice 
to emphasise, at this juncture, that platform firms are primarily 
users of music content authored and/or produced by others 
(copyright users). Therefore, although this thesis considers the use 
of the music content by producers and uploaders 16  of music 
content, its principal focus is on the import of how the music 
content is used by the platform firms in generating revenue from 
advertising. As shown in this thesis, these platform firms are 
multisided platforms, which create value by enabling interactions 
between two or more customer segments. 17  The focus of the 
literature on use of music content in advertising has largely been 
on platform users and their actions in reproducing the music 
content. 18  Because such reproduction of music content is 
                                                 
16  To “upload” means “to transfer (data, files, etc.) from a computer to the 
memory of another device (such as a larger or remote computer)”. An uploader 
would be a person who carries out such action. See Merriam–Webster, (2017). 
[online] Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upload 
[Accessed 11 Nov. 2017]. 
17 See section 5.3.1, below. See also, Evans 2016 supra at 6. On the regulatory 
implications of multisided platforms, see Gürkaynak, G., İnanılır, Ö., Diniz, S. 
and Yaşar, A.G. (2017). Multisided markets and the challenge of incorporating 
multisided considerations into competition law analysis. Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 5(1), pp.100-129. 
18 See Högberg, S.K. (2006). The search for intent-based doctrines of secondary 
liability in copyright Law. Columbia Law Review, pp.909-958; Bartholomew, M. 
and Tehranian, J. (2006). The secret life of legal doctrine: The divergent 
evolution of secondary liability in trademark and copyright law. Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, pp.1363-1419; Ginsburg, J.C. (2008). Separating the 
Sony sheep from the Grokster goats: Reckoning the future business plans of 
copyright-dependent technology entrepreneurs. Ariz. L. Rev., 50, p.577; 
Bartholomew, M. and McArdle, P.F. (2011). Causing infringement. Vand. L. 
Rev., 64, p.675; Llewelyn, D. (2012). Intellectual property liability of consumers, 
facilitators and intermediaries: concepts under common law. In: A Kamperman 
Sanders and C. Heath, eds., Intellectual property liability of consumers, 
facilitators and intermediaries. Kluwer Law International, p. 26; Elkin-Koren, N. 





undertaken by a large number of anonymous and possibly indigent 
users, who are usually spread across multiple jurisdictions outside 
the easy reach of the copyright owner, it is difficult to enforce the 
reproduction rights against them. Accordingly, the copyright owners 
attempt to enforce the reproduction right against platform firms on 
the grounds that they authorized or induced the unlicensed 
reproduction by their users. In this regard, the argument or cause 
of action seems to be that the business model is based on users’ 
actions per se. However, a different approach consists in looking at 
the platform firm’s actions and the import of such actions. The use 
of copyright products in advertising affects the revenue that may 
accrue to the copyright owner by virtue of copyright protection and 
may also affect the uses of copyright-protected music content that 
may be outside the scope of copyright protection. 
Previous research on the open and freemium music 
business model appear to have largely focused on the activities of 
platform users and how such may have been induced or authorised 
by the platform firm within the context of the European Union (EU) 
and the United States (US) laws.19 This has created a gap in the 
literature, 20  which has failed to, or neglected to examine the 
business model from the perspective of the actions or activities of 
the platform firms (as copyright users) instead and from a pro-
Africa perspective. This is significant given that the money flow 
comes from the activities of the platform firms even though 
undertaken to attract the attention of potential and actual users of 
the platform. Also, greater attention has been paid to the 
application of copyright law to regulate the business model without 
                                                                                                                        
Frankel and D. J. Gervais, eds., The evolution and equilibrium of copyright in the 
digital age. Cambridge University Press, p.29. 
19  Ibid. See also Aganga, O. (2013). The indirect liability of mobile service 
providers in South Africa: a comparative study. (Masters dissertation, University 
of Pretoria). 
20  Other gaps exist in the paucity of research that consider the role of 




recognising the complementary role of competition law in 
copyright-related industries. This thesis therefore seeks to address 
this gap in the literature by applying a jurisdiction-specific and 
copyright work-specific approach to the regulation of the open and 
freemium music business model. Further, it contributes to the 
literature by considering the role that competition law can play in 
the regulation of business models involving the use of and 
distribution of copyright-protected music content.21 
1.2 The relationship between copyright and competition law 
Copyright law grants copyright holders and authors an exclusive 
bundle of rights in their works upon fulfilment of specified criteria 
depending on the nature of the work.22 Further depending on the 
copyright work, copyright law defines an author to mean “the 
creator of the work” and “the person who made arrangements for 
the making of the work or in whose name the work was made”.23 
For music content, several categories of copyright works are 
protected - the lyrics of the song (eligible for protection as “literary 
work”), the music composition or the music of the song (eligible for 
protection as “musical work”), the sound recording embodied in a 
CD or other format and containing a reproduction of the musical 
work (eligible for protection as “sound recording”), the photographs 
                                                 
21 See Fagin, M., Pasquale, F. and Weatherall, K. (2002). Beyond Napster: using 
antitrust law to advance and enhance online music distribution. BUJ Sci. & Tech. 
L., 8, p.451; Drexl, J. (2013). Copyright, competition and development. [online] 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/copyright_competition_development.pdf [Accessed 10 
Nov. 2015] (hereafter, Drexl 2013). See also, Heinemann, A. (2017). The 
competition law framework: Online platforms and intermediaries in copyright law, 
paper presented to the University of Munich & GRUR Munich, 23-24 March, 
2017. However, the focus was on the EU and/or international angle. 
22 The expression of the idea encompassing the work must be original and the 
work must be in a fixed medium. The author of the work must also be eligible for 
protection in that country as a citizen or person domiciled in that country. Section 
1(2)(a) and (b) and 2(1)(i) and (ii) of the Nigerian Copyright Act, Section 2(1) and 
3(1)(a) and (b) of the South African Copyright Act. 
23 See Section 51(1) of the Nigerian Copyright Act, Section 1(1) of the South 




and images used as cover art24 (eligible for protection as “artistic 
work”) and the music videos and DVDs containing a reproduction 
of the sound recording and moving images (eligible for protection 
as “cinematograph film”). 25  The copyright holders, authors or 
assignees of these copyright works (collectively, “copyright 
owners”) enjoy the exclusive right to reproduce the work; perform 
the work in public; publish the work, make a cinematograph film or 
a record in respect of the work; distribute the work for commercial 
purposes and communicate or broadcast the work to the public.26 
 Generally, the main purpose of copyright law in granting 
these exclusive rights to copyright owners is to provide them with a 
“commodity” 27  or “something to sell or licence” 28  to generate 
revenue. Put differently, the essence of rights granted exclusively 
under copyright law is to ensure that the copyright owner’s option 
to exploit his/her/its exclusive rights using its preferred business 
model is intact. The exercise or exploitation of these rights is 
expected to incentivise further creation by authors and thereby 
result in the dissemination of copyright works to the public. 29 
Consequently, copyright law makes provisions for the copyright 
owner to exclusively exploit the protected work and balances this 
exclusivity with provisions aimed at ensuring that users are able to 
                                                 
24 Cover art may be described as an artwork or photograph on the outside of a 
music single or album which is used to promote the music content it is displayed 
on. See Brochu, E., De Freitas, N. and Bao, K. (2003). The sound of an album 
cover: Probabilistic multimedia and information retrieval. In Artificial Intelligence 
and Statistics (AISTATS). 
25 See Section 1(a), (b) and (e) as well as Section 51 of the Nigerian Copyright 
Act. See also, Section 2(1)(a), (b) and (e) and Section 1 of the South African 
Copyright Act. 
26 For a delineation of each of the exclusive rights available for the mentioned 
categories of copyright works, see Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Nigerian Copyright 
Act; Section 6(1)(a)-(g) South African Copyright Act.  
27 See Cross, J. and Yu, P. (2007). Competition law and copyright misuse. Drake 
L. Rev., 56, 433. (henceforth, Cross and Yu 2007). 
28 See Kretschmer, M. (2010). Regulating creator contracts. J. Intell. Prop. L., 
18, 144 (hereafter, Kretschmer 2010); Watt, R. (2010). Copyright and contract 
Law: Economic theory of copyright contracts. J. Intell. Prop. L., 18, 173 at p. 181. 




access and enjoy the works. 30  This approach ensures that 
copyright law promotes competition 31  as authors and potential 
copyright owners strive to respectively create and procure the 
creation of new works to also enjoy the benefits of copyright 
protection. Further, the ability of copyright owners to restrict 
competition through the exclusive nature of their rights is 
constrained by provisions that limit the boundaries of exclusivity in 
the interests of competition. 32  In this regard, the interests of 
competition is served by users who are able to operate outside the 
scope of the exclusive rights and within the copyright limitations 
and exceptions to deploy business models aimed at further 
creativity as well as wider dissemination of copyright products. 
Competition law complements copyright law by creating and 
protecting competitive and efficient distribution markets for 
copyright-protected products. Its prohibition of restrictive 
agreements and abuse of dominance serve as tools that help to 
ensure the proper functioning of copyright markets. In recognition 
of this point, Drexl opined that33:  
Copyright law is designed to provide the author of works with fair 
remuneration for his or her creative work. Yet it is not the exclusive right 
in itself that produces such income but the willingness of consumers to 
pay. This requires that consumers actually have access to works they 
prefer. Hence, copyright law essentially depends on the functioning of 
                                                 
30  See Schönwetter, T. (2009). Safeguarding a fair copyright balance - 
contemporary challenges in a changing world: Lessons to be learnt from a 
developing country perspective, p.31. PhD. University of Cape Town (hereafter, 
Schönwetter 2009). 
31 The promotion of competition is the enhancement of the ability of firms to 
compete in a given market. Such is within the competence of competition policy. 
See Maskus, K.E. and Lahouel, M. (2000). Competition policy and intellectual 
property rights in developing countries. The World Economy, 23(4), pp.595-600 
(hereafter, Maskus and Lahouel 2000). See also, Dimgba, N. (2006). 
Introduction to competition law: a sine qua non to a liberalised economy, pp. 7 – 
8, Lecture delivered at Rules Watch: Competition Legislation & the New World 
Order (hereafter, Dimgba 2006). Competition policy covers copyright law, 
competition law, bankruptcy law, contract law etc.  
32 Corbett, S. (2011). Creative Commons licences, the copyright regime and the 
online community: Is there a fatal disconnect?. The Modern Law Review, 74(4), 
503 – 504, 528 (hereafter, Corbett 2011); Cross and Yu 2007 supra at 429-430. 
Drexl 2013 supra at 5-6.  




the distribution channels and of copyright‐related markets on different 
levels of distribution. If these markets for authorised use do not work 
properly, consumers will even be incited to switch from legal copies to 
illegal ones. Competition law plays a crucial role in creating and 
maintaining competitive and efficient distribution markets… Competition 
law practice is abundant with regard to distribution cases. This is mostly 
due to the fact that, while works are usually highly diverse and have the 
potential to compete most effectively for consumers, copyright‐related 
markets often have to rely on the bundling of works in the form of 
attractive repertoires and the use of centralised platforms for licensing 
and distribution. Both needs produce the tendency of market power in 
the hands of the intermediaries that control such repertoires and 
platforms. …competition law should not at all be understood as the 
“enemy” of copyright law but rather as a most important tool of a 
modern, more holistic copyright policy on the national and international 
level. 
However, some competition statutes exempt intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) including copyright from the application of competition 
law.34 In the case of South Africa, the Competition Act35 provides 
that  firms can apply to the Competition Commission to exempt “an 
agreement or practice, or category of agreements or practices, that 
relates to the exercise of intellectual property rights, including a 
right acquired or protected in terms of the…Copyright Act, 1978 
(Act No. 98 of 1978)…”.  An exemption granted by the Competition 
Commission ensures that even when an agreement or practice 
falls within the prohibited or restricted acts in Chapter two of the 
Act, such agreement or practices will be deemed not to have 
offended the provisions of the Competition Act, particularly Chapter 
two.36 However, in the absence of the grant of an exemption either 
because an application was refused 37  or the specified term of 
                                                 
34 Examples include Poland, Mexico, Peru. It is to be noted that even in these 
countries, there may be room to interpret the exemption provisions to permit 
competition law scrutiny on matters regarding the exercise of intellectual 
property rights. See Drexl 2013 supra at 45-47.  
35 Section 10(4) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 (hereafter, “South African 
Competition Act”), Hartzenberg, T. (2005). Competition policy and practice in 
South Africa: Promoting competition for development symposium on competition 
law and policy in Developing Countries. Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus., 26, 667 (hereafter, 
Hartzenberg 2005). 
36 Chapter 2 of the South African Competition Act deals with situations where an 
agreement restricts competition to the extent prohibited by the Act as well as 
situations where a firm abuses its dominant position in a defined market.  




exemption has lapsed38 or an exemption granted was revoked,39 
the agreement or practices that fall within the prohibited or 
restricted acts will bear the brunt of the Competition Act. More 
importantly, the fact that an exemption needs to be specifically 
sought may be evidence that the Act is intended to apply in the first 
instance to agreements or practices relating to the exercise of 
copyright. Where intellectual property rights are not exempt, 
competition law plays a “restrictive” role by limiting the exercise of 
copyright. 40  In such cases, competition law may compel the 
copyright owner to grant a license.41   
Competition law may apply its prohibition against restrictive 
agreements and abuse of dominance to prevent firms that control 
the distribution of copyright products from anticompetitive conduct. 
Such anticompetitive conduct may derail the dissemination of 
copyright products or adversely affect the economic freedom of 
small businesses such as copyright owners by unduly preventing 
them from generating revenue from the distribution of their works. 
As Chapter three of this thesis explains, there is a prevalence of 
copyright owners (independent record labels and music 
publishers), who are by virtue of their size, small businesses/small 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in the South African and 
Nigerian music industry. 42  Small businesses are separate and 
distinct business entities managed by one owner or more and are 
usually characterized according to industry, number of employees, 
total turnover and total asset value.43 In South Africa, the National 
Small Business Act categorises small businesses into 
                                                 
38 Section 10(4A) of the South African Competition Act. 
39 Section 10(5) of the South African Competition Act. 
40 See Drexl 2013 supra at 40. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Section 3.5, below; Coetzer, B.L. (2009). A business model for the digital 
distribution of music in the South African context (Masters dissertation, 
University of Pretoria), p. 41 (hereafter, Coetzer 2009). 




microenterprises, very small enterprises, small enterprises and 
medium enterprises. A cursory look at these categorisation and the 
size of majority of record companies and music publishers in the 
two countries reveal that most fall into the category of small and 
medium enterprises. 44 As much-needed drivers of industrial 
transformation and development in any given country, 45  small 
businesses are an important constituency for competition law in 
many jurisdictions. 46  
The above point is imperative especially in regulating the 
use of copyright-protected music content within the open and 
freemium music business model. In this regard, copyright law 
ought not to be used as the sole platform to pursue the goals of 
incentivizing owners and providing access to users of copyright 
works. This thesis takes cognisance of this argument to address 
the gap in previous literature that has largely overlooked this role of 
competition law in copyright-related industries and/or analysed 
copyright works generally. Although this approach has been 
considered in some recent research,47 it has not been applied to a 
specific business model within a specified copyright environment. 
1.3 The open and freemium music business model 
Like other business models used in the copyright industries, the 
open and freemium music business model highlights the significant 
role of copyright protection and competition law in providing 
regulation for business models. It serves as one of the mediums of 
exploitation of copyright and provides a mechanism for public 
                                                 
44 See the Schedule to the Act. See also, Fouché 2015 supra at 50-5. 
45 Abor, J. and Quartey, P. (2010). Issues in SME development in Ghana and 
South Africa. International research journal of finance and economics, 39(6), 
pp.223-4 (hereafter, Abor and Quartey 2010). 
46 See Section 3.5 and Chapter 5, below. 
47 For instance, Drexl 2013 supra, Correa, C. (2007). Intellectual property and 
competition law: exploration of some issues of relevance to developing 
countries. ICTSD IPRs and sustainable development programme issue paper, 




access to or dissemination of copyright works in the marketplace.48 
Firms deploying the open and freemium music business model 
generate revenue directly and indirectly through the use of music 
content as a tool to serve advertisement purposes.49 Accordingly, 
the open and freemium music business model also generates 
employment opportunities that positively influence other standard-
of-living metrics in a country such as the poverty rate and personal 
disposable income. Music content has generated much socially 
beneficial and culturally significant interaction amongst nations50 
and in that context, the open and freemium music business model 
enhances these public interests. 
In the copyright ecosystem,51 the open and freemium music 
business model operates within the vagaries of the national 
copyright and related regulatory frameworks applicable to the 
music content industry. Conversely, the open and freemium music 
business model is deployed based on advertising and consumer 
demands and the peculiarities of the environment where the 
business model is deployed. Accordingly, in relation to copyright 
works, the nature of deployment of business models in each 
                                                 
48 For example, YouTube has over one billion users with music content making 
up a large proportion of their use. See International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI), (2015). Charting the Path to Sustainable Growth, 
7. Digital Music Report. (hereafter, IFPI 2015). See also, Viswanath, B., Mislove, 
A., Cha, M. and Gummadi, K.P. (2009). On the evolution of user interaction in 
Facebook. In 2nd ACM Workshop on Online Social Networks, pp. 37-42.  
49 See IFPI (2017). Global music report 2017. [online] IFPI, p.24. Available at: 
http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017.pdf [Accessed 5 Aug. 2017]; 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), (2014). Lighting up 
new markets, 7. Digital Music Report. (hereafter, “IFPI 2014”). Also, see IFPI 
2015 supra at 7. 
50  For instance, music was the theme of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation’s IP Day 2015. See WIPO (2015). World IP Day 2015 – Get up, 
Stand up. For music. Available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-outreach/en/ipday/ 
[Accessed 1 May 2015]. 
51 This term is inspired by Professor Tussey’s book, Tussey, D. (2012). Complex 
copyright: Mapping the information ecosystem. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp.24 to 
25. “Copyright ecosystem” includes the whole environment in which copyright 
law operates, taking in publishers, authors and consumers— a realization should 
that should inform policy and condition the way in which future research is 




jurisdiction as well as the unique norms of the industry where they 
are deployed should significantly align with the copyright law 
regime and other complementary law regimes. No matter how 
prevalent, a business model that is not properly aligned with the 
objectives of its regulatory framework may have adverse effects on 
copyright and related investment decisions.52 In such a case, there 
is need to regulate the business model to ensure a fit with the 
overarching purposes of the regulatory framework.53
 
 
As earlier stated, a business model is a description of how a 
business entity or an individual engaged in a business activity, 
derives revenue from providing solution(s) to an identified need or 
problem.54 A business model deployed by a copyright owner in the 
distribution of copyright works will describe how the copyright 
owner derives revenue by exploiting his exclusive rights and also 
resolving the demand for the relevant copyright works. For 
instance, the business model of the copyright owner of a sound 
recording may involve the production and sale of music CDs 
embodying the sound recording.55 Business models involving the 
use and distribution of copyright-protected products will therefore 
affect the author of the copyright work, copyright owners and the 
users of the copyright work. Business models will determine the 
revenue (if any) that authors and owners of copyright works derive 
from exploiting their rights. They can also indicate and/or determine 
the level of access that users of copyright works may have to any 
given work. Copyright owners will understandably be keen on 
extracting as much as they can from the deployment of the 
business models while consumers are equally keen to have as 
                                                 
52 Corbett 2011 supra at 527-8. 
53 Ibid at 530- 531. 
54 See Weill, Malone and Apel 2011 supra at 17-19. 
55 This is the traditional business model of the music industry especially prior to 
the Internet and digitization. See Gallaugher, J. M., Auger, P., and Barnir, A. 
(2001). Revenue streams and digital content providers: an empirical 




much access as they can to copyright works. 
In the open and freemium music business model, the music 
content produced and uploaded by other persons or firms other 
than the owner of the platform on which the music content was 
uploaded, is used to serve advertisements. Accordingly, the focus 
here is on the implication of this unique way of exploiting music 
content from the perspective of copyright law as complemented by 
competition law.56 This clearly excludes the safe harbour regime,57 
which relies on the activities of platform users as a foundation for 
establishing the role of the platform firms and, which in certain 
circumstances exempts or limits the liability of platform firms for the 
activities of the said users of their platform. The distinction made in 
this study correlates to the business model concept – a 
representation of the ways in which firms create and capture 
value.58  
Other legal regimes, which this thesis does not explore, are 
those relating to human rights and privacy issues arising in the 
context of the open and freemium music business model. Such 
focus falls outside the scope of this thesis and its discussion may 
have the effect of making the thesis unwieldy. Due to the impact of 
digital technology on the way in which copyright works are 
produced and accessed, there is increased active user interaction 
with copyright-protected content particularly in terms of user-
generated content.59 This is also the case in the context of the 
                                                 
56 See Rosati, E. (2017). The CJEU Pirate Bay Judgment and its impact on the 
liability of online platforms. European Intellectual Property Review. [Forthcoming] 
Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006591 [Accessed 6 Sep. 2017] 
(hereafter, Rosati 2017); Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV, C-
610/15, EU:C:2017:456 (“The Pirate Bay”, or “Pirate Bay”). 
57 Lemley, M.A. and Reese, R.A. (2004). Reducing digital copyright infringement 
without restricting innovation. Stanford Law Review, 56(6), 1345 at 1367 
(hereafter, Lemley and Reese 2004).  
58  See Facebook.com. (2017). Terms of service. [online] Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [Accessed 12 Nov. 2017]. 
59  See Lee, Y.H. (2015). Copyright and freedom of expression: A literature 





open and freemium music business model where there are user-
uploads and platform firms’ use of music content in advertising. 
These raise issues of the appropriate balance between the right to 
freedom of expression and copyright protection.60 In many cases, 
there are arguments that users’ interaction with copyright-protected 
works in the business model context requires a shift in the 
approach to protecting the freedom of expression.61  
In the case of privacy regimes, it is acknowledged that the 
ability of platform firms to leverage on consumer demand for free 
music content to deliver targeted ads has raised concerns for 
consumer privacy due to the amount of information obtained on 
consumers’ preferences.  There are calls for privacy-based 
regulations to address the potential for and the instances of 
breaches of consumer privacy by firms who use consumers’ 
information to deliver targeted ads.62 Again, for similar reasons as 
the human rights approach, privacy concerns are not further 
explored in this thesis. 
Against this background of the business model context, the 
open and freemium music business model underscores the need 
for the application of the copyright law and competition law 
regulatory regimes. Corollary to the foregoing, while the law does 
not set out specific or detailed business models for copyright 
owners or users of copyright products to deploy, copyright law and 
competition law interface to provide the regulatory frameworks 
                                                                                                                        
https://zenodo.org/record/18132/files/CREATe-Working-Paper-2015-04.pdf. 
[Accessed 21 Nov. 2016] (hereafter, Lee 2015). 
60  For a discussion on the interaction between copyright and freedom of 
expression, see Lee 2015 supra. 
61 See for example, Balkin, J.M., 2004. Digital speech and democratic culture: A 
theory of freedom of expression for the information society. NyuL rev., 79, p.1.  
62 For some discussion of privacy issues, see Gal 2015 supra. Recently, the 
activities of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica in using data obtained from 
consumers’ preferences in influencing elections in many countries have 
engendered massive demands for stricter privacy regimes. See Cadwalladr, C. 





within which business models can be designed and deployed.63 In 
other words, business models relating to copyright products have 
legal backing so long as they do not upset the balance of rights 
sought to be maintained by copyright law and complemented by 
competition law. 
1.4 Music content 
There are several sectors in which the general principles of the 
open and freemium business model have been regularly applied. 
However, this study does not seek to address all the various 
aspects of the deployment of the open and freemium business 
model. Instead, it is limited exclusively to one significant aspect of 
the open and freemium business model: music content. The 
reasons for this focus can be explained in both economic and legal 
terms. 
In economic terms, the focus on music content is a 
response to its significance for the development of national 
economies around the world. The discourse on the music industry 
has mostly focused on the music content from developed countries 
where the major music record companies are domiciled. However, 
it is to be acknowledged that, in recent times, music content has 
become a very important asset for economic growth and 
development. Particularly in Africa, music content and the music 
industry have contributed significantly to the increase in the GDPs 
of many African countries.64 Also, due to the emergence of Internet 
and digital technology, music content can be distributed globally at 
practically zero cost and as such, responds to the needs of 
developing countries with low income levels.65 Accordingly, music 
content and the music industry have immense potential for the 
                                                 
63 Newman, J. (2013). Copyright freeconomics. Vand. L. Rev, 66, 1451 - 1456. 
(hereafter, Newman 2013). 
64 Ouma, M., 2004. Copyright and the music industry in Africa. The Journal of 
World Intellectual Property, 7(6), p.920 (hereafter, Ouma 2004). 




economic development of all nations, particularly for African 
nations.66  
From a legal perspective, music content forms a significant 
part of a wide range of creative subject‐matter protected by 
copyright law.67 However, while there exists similarities between 
these categories of works, certain specific differences result in 
different industry calibrations.68 Accordingly, the manner in which 
the open and freemium business model is deployed in the 
copyright industry depends on the nature of the copyright-protected 
product.69 Even with respect to works protected under the same 
category, for example, books, journals, software, and the like 70 
protected as literary work, 71  the open and freemium business 
model is deployed differently, rendering a general analysis of its 
deployment, untenable. The distribution of music content differs 
from distribution of other copyright works in several ways.72 For 
instance, unlike software that requires regular updates flowing 
                                                 
66 Ibid. 
67 Since the Berne Convention in 1979, music content has always been part of 
creative content protected by copyright law. See art 2, Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1979. 
68 See Elkin-Koren, N. (2006). Creative Commons: A skeptical view of a worthy 
pursuit. In: P. B. Hugenholtz & L. Guibault, eds., The future of the public domain. 
Kluwer Law International, p. 18. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=885466 [Assessed 19 Nov. 2016] (hereafter, Elkin-
Koren 2006). 
69 The way the open and freemium business model is deployed in the copyright 
industry depends on the nature of the copyright-protected product. See Russi, G. 
(2011). Creative Commons, CC-plus and hybrid intermediaries: A stakeholders' 
perspective. International Law and Management Review, Spring, p.170 
(hereafter, Russi 2011); Klebanow, A. (2015). Is music the next eBooks-An 
antitrust analysis of Apple's conduct in the music Industry. Colum. JL & Arts, 39, 
p.128 (hereafter, Klebanow 2015). 
70 Books are protected as literary works, software as computer programs and 
artwork as artistic works. See section 51(1) of the Nigerian Copyright Act. 
71  South Africa protects software as computer programs under a specific 
category. See section 2(1)(i) of the South African Copyright Act. 
72 See Polverino, F. (2012). Hunting the wild geese: Competition analysis in a 
world of 'free'. Concorrenza e Mercato., p.7-8 (hereafter, Polverino 2012); 
Klebanow 2015 supra at 154-155; Russi 2011 supra at 128. See also Wang, Y., 
2009. Fair use and file sharing in research and education (Doctoral dissertation, 




from/connected to the original software, music content does not 
require such update. Accordingly, open business model used for 
software distribution in the form of GNU General Public Licence73 
that has a “viral” 74  nature may be an unsuitable form of open 
business model for music content.75 
Moreover, while the same medium has been utilized for the 
dissemination of all categories of copyright works, music content 
remains of heightened relevancy in the open and freemium 
business model context. The multiplicity of rights and categories 
and owners inherent in a single unit of music content 76  in 
comparison to other categories of copyright products has combined 
well with the easy content dissemination and social production 
enabled by the Internet to turn music content into the one of the 
most popular products in the open and freemium business model 
context.77 
Accordingly, an investigation that treats copyright works 
generally within an international context will not adequately 
address the peculiarities of each category of copyright work and 
                                                 
73 The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for software and 
other kinds of works. See Gnu.org. (2017). The GNU General Public License 
v3.0- GNU Project - Free Software Foundation. [online] Available at: 
https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html [Accessed 12 Nov. 2017]. 
74 Viral licences require that any derivative work created from the original must 
be issued under the same open licence. See Erickson, K. and Kretschmer, M. 
(2014). Research perspectives on the public domain: Digital conference 
proceedings. In Research perspectives on the public domain: Digital conference 
proceedings (February 1, 2014). CREATe Working Paper (Vol. 3), at p.27 ( 
hereafter, Erickson and Kretschmer 2014). 
75 Some Creative Commons Licenses have some “viral” character. For instance, 
the share-alike licence and the no-derivatives licence can attach to a work and 
make it difficult for further creativity and/or distribution of future works. See 
Forsythe, L.M. and Kemp, D.J. (2008). Creative commons: for the common 
good. U. La Verne L. Rev., 30, p.365. See Erickson and Kretschmer 2014 supra 
at p. 24. 
76 See Rae-Hunter 2012 supra at 39-40. 
77  The Telegraph (2017). Top 10 most watched YouTube video of all time. 
[online] Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/most-watched-




the uniqueness of practices in each jurisdiction of the world.78 For 
these reasons, this study focuses exclusively on music content to 
the exclusion of other categories of protected works. However, 
such focus will not exclude taking account of other categories of 
copyright-protected subject matter where they appear useful. Such 
categories may be particularly useful if there are no music content-
related cases and if these cases indicate how the issues 
concerning music content may be addressed in the future.79 
1.5 Jurisdictional focus 
Given that laws are territorial and business models operate within 
the environment, the application of the regulatory frameworks 
provided by copyright law as complemented by competition law 
ought to be undertaken by focusing on specific jurisdictions. A one-
size-fit-all approach to such assessment or process would be 
inappropriate as each jurisdiction’s regulatory framework; socio-
economic status, developmental goals and business practices 
have to be taken into account. 
Corollary to the foregoing, the analysis in this thesis is also 
limited in its jurisdictional scope. In this regard, the jurisdictional 
focus is on South Africa and Nigeria. This choice is based on 
several compelling factors. Both countries are somewhat large 
developing countries within the African region. South Africa is a 
predominant force in the Southern Africa region (specifically 
Southern African Development Community– SADC) while Nigeria 
occupies a similar position within the Western Africa and the 
                                                 
78  See Rajan, M.T.S. (2010). Creative Commons: America's moral rights. 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. LJ, 21, 905, 931 – 934 (hereafter, Rajan 
2010). See also, Dörr, J., Wagner, D. V., Benlian, A., and Hess, T. (2013). Music 
as a service as an alternative to music piracy? Business & Information Systems 
Engineering, 5(6), 385 (hereafter, Dörr, Wagner, Benlian, and Hess); Rizk, N. 
(2010). Stories from Egypt’s music industry: De facto commons as alternatives 
to copyright. Access to Knowledge in Egypt, p.92 (hereafter, Rizk 2010). 
79  See section 4.2.1(a), below. For an earlier version of this approach, see 
D'Agostino, G. (2010). Copyright, contracts, creators: new media, new rules. 




Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS). There 
are also similarities in the socio-economic measures within the two 
countries. High levels of poverty, unemployment and inequalities 
exist within the two countries. Accordingly, both countries can 
serve as credible representatives as they present features 
reflective of most countries within the African continent. 
 Further, Nigeria’s copyright law shares a common heritage 
with the South African copyright regime. The two copyright law 
regimes were adapted from the UK’s Imperial Copyright Act of 
1916. Also, both countries are currently in the process of amending 
their respective copyright statutes and the proposed amendments 
have not detracted from the commonality, which the two copyright 
regimes share.80 These similarities may allow for some interesting 
convergence in the regulatory behaviour of the two countries. 
Notwithstanding these similarities, there are some material 
differences between the two countries. 
 In terms of the economy, the most recent GDP per capita 
(adjusted for purchasing power parity) ranking by the World Bank, 
South Africa’s GDP of $12.8 million is quite ahead of Nigeria’s 
GDP of $5.9 million.81 In terms of the state of the music market, 
South Africa’s music industry is more developed than its Nigerian 
counterpart.82 
Institutionally, South Africa has a more advanced copyright 
legislative framework than Nigeria. For instance, while South Africa 
                                                 
80  See Draft Copyright Bill 2015 prepared by the Nigerian Copyright 
Commission. For South Africa, see Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 presented to 
the National Assembly through the Minister of Trade and Industry. A comparison 
of the two Bills show that their central objective is to make the law more suited to 
the digital age.  
81 South Africa’s GDP per capita of $5,273.6 million is quite ahead of Nigeria’s 
GDP of $2,178 million. See Data.worldbank.org. (2017). GDP per capita (current 
US$) | Data. [online] Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZA&name_de
sc=false [Accessed 12 Nov. 2017]. 




joined the developed economies in recognising the need to protect 
internet intermediaries from copyright infringement liability given 
the nature of their services and the way in which the internet 
operates, Nigeria is yet to do so.83 In this regard, South Africa’s 
Electronic Communications Transactions Act exempts hosting, 
caching, linking and conduit intermediaries from copyright 
infringement liability upon fulfilment of stated conditions.84 These 
differences should reveal some pertinent variation in the regulatory 
behaviour of the two countries. Also, South Africa has features of 
both developed and developing economies especially in terms of 
institutional development as evidenced by its membership of the 
economic bloc comprising of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (BRICS) and its accepting developed nation status during 
negotiations for the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Agreements.85 On the other hand, Nigeria has the characteristics 
of developing and least-developed countries due to the state of its 
institutions and the income level of its citizens. Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) are based on United Nations (UN) classification 
looking at indexes such as population, markets, institutions, 
infrastructure, GDP, life expectancy and the like. Generally, 
markets in LDCs have weaker institutional support in terms of 
political stability, financial stability, lower levels of protection for 
property rights. 86  While Nigeria does not fall under the UN 
classification of LDCs, it does possess LDCs features such as lack 
of political and financial stability affecting markets, high population 
                                                 
83 The proposed amendment to the Copyright Act now provides for the safe 
harbour regime. See Sections 47 - 54 of the Bill. 
84  In this regard, South Africa’s Electronic Communications Transactions Act 
2002 exempts hosting, caching, linking and conduit intermediaries from 
copyright infringement liability upon fulfilment of stated conditions. See Chapter 
XI, Sections 70-79. 
85 See Fasan, O. (2007). Compliance with WTO law in developing countries: A 
study of South Africa and Nigeria. (Doctoral Dissertation, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom). 
86 See Makino, S., Beamish, P.W. and Zhao, N.B. (2004). The characteristics 
and performance of Japanese FDI in less developed and developed countries. 




growth and environmental degradation, amongst other 
similarities. 87  This mix of developed, developing and least-
developed nation status represents the economic status of the 
countries within the African continent. Such mix makes it 
permissible to make some suggestions that may influence the 
regulatory approach of other African countries. 
Also, it is noted that amidst the scholarly and related 
activities in the context of the open and freemium music business 
model, one significant lacuna lies in the analysis of the issues from 
an African context.88 It is this lacuna that this thesis also seeks to 
bridge by assessing the open and freemium music business model 
from the perspective of these two countries. In doing so, the thesis 
advocates for a jurisdiction-specific discourse on the regulation of 
the open and freemium music business model as a one-size-fit-all 
approach to such process would be inappropriate. Given this 
jurisdiction-specific focus, the thesis as explained in Chapter three, 
does not explore possible choice of law and jurisdictional questions 
that may arise from the transnational nature of majority of copyright 
owners in both South Africa and Nigeria. 89  This thesis takes 
cognisance of the argument against a one-size-fit-all approach to 
address the gap in previous literature that has largely overlooked 
the position of the South African and Nigerian regulatory framework 
on the open and freemium music business model.  
Although this thesis focuses on a specific sector in two 
                                                 
87  See United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2016). 
Industrialization in Africa and Least Developed Countries: Boosting growth, 
creating jobs, promoting inclusiveness and sustainability. [online] Vienna: United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). Available at: 
https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2016-
09/G20_new_UNIDO_report_industrialization_in_Africa_and_LDCs_0.pdf 
[Accessed 25 Sep. 2017]. 
88 Faturoti’s work applies more to the “authorisation regime” that implicates the 
safe harbour regime. See Faturoti, B. (2017). Re-importing the concept of 
‘authorisation’ of copyright infringement to Nigeria from the UK and Australia. 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 31(1), pp.4-25. 




comparable jurisdictions, the music content industries in Nigeria 
and South Africa, it is important, at this point, to consider the 
possible application of the thesis’ main claims to similar 
investigations in other developing economies in Africa. 90  The 
consideration of how copyright law and the complementary 
competition law framework in Nigeria and South Africa may be 
applied to regulate the open and freemium music business model 
is made from the perspective that considers the copyright 
ecosystem vis-à-vis the regulatory framework, making it possible to 
put up the arguments as a model for other developing economies 
in Africa and also add a developing country dimension to future 
international copyright and competition debate. 91  However, as 
Chapters four and five of this thesis reveal, the application of the 
thesis’ claims as a developing economy argument is limited by the 
specific nuances of the respective music content industries and the 
differences in the legal and socio-economic environment within 
which such business models are deployed. Nevertheless, it is 
argued that the need to advance a pro-Africa, developing country 
perspective to the regulation of the open and freemium music 
business model may counterbalance such limitations.92 
Finally, it is to be noted that whilst this thesis’ primary focus 
                                                 
90  There is no universal, agreed-upon criterion for what makes an economy 
developing or developed and which countries fit these two categories, although 
there are general reference points such as a nation's GDP per capita compared 
to other nations. Developing economies are economies with an underdeveloped 
industrial base, and a low Human Development Index (HDI) relative to other 
economies. See Evenett, S.J. (2015). Competition law and the economic 
characteristics of developing countries. In: M. Gal, M. Bakhoum, J. Drexl, E. Fox 
and D. Gerber, ed., The economic characteristics of developing jurisdictions: 
Their implications for competition law, 1st ed. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, 
pp. 15-6 (hereafter, Evenett 2015); O'Sullivan, A. and Sheffrin, S. (2003). 
Economics. Needham, Pearson Prentice Hall, 471. 
91  While the copyright regulatory framework is country-specific, international 
copyright treaties such as WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 and TRIPS Agreement 
usually constitute a rallying point for local statutes. See Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) 1869 UNTS 299; 33 ILM 1197 
(1994), Correa 2007 supra at 2. 





is Nigeria and South Africa, it also considers the position in the EU, 
the United Kingdom (UK) and the US, in particular. Both the UK 
and the US represent one of the leading music markets in the 
world.93 Moreover, the copyright laws of both Nigeria and South 
Africa were derived from the UK’s Copyright Act and the two 
jurisdictions share common law jurisdictions. This makes the 
consideration of the UK approach and the EU approach, given the 
UK’s prior membership of the EU 94  and its consequent 
harmonisation of the EU Copyright Directive, particularly 
persuasive for Nigeria and South Africa.95 Such consideration may 
be particularly useful if there are no music content-related cases in 
the two jurisdictions and if the UK and EU cases provide an 
indication on how such issues may be addressed in the two 
countries. 96  In terms of competition law, the EU and the US 
represent the oldest competition law jurisdictions in the world and 
accordingly, they lead the way in the application of competition law 
to the analysis of issues related to businesses based on the 
concept of “free” such as the open and freemium music business 
model. For the purpose of this thesis, “free” in relation to music 
content or copyright works is used to identify music content or 
copyright works provided without charging any price. 
                                                 
93 See generally, British Record Industry. (2011). BPI response to the Digital 
Copyright Exchange call for evidence, p.8, available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/dce-c4e-bpi.pdf  (accessed 10 June 2015); Consumer 
Focus (2011). Competition, copyright and collective rights management: A 
consultation on growth and innovation in the creative and digital technology 
industries. Consumer Focus (hereafter, Consumer Focus 2011); IFPI 2017 
supra. 
94 Britain voted to leave the EU but the departure process is yet to be concluded. 
95 The copyright law in both South Africa and Nigeria has its roots in the English 
copyright legal system. See Ola, K. (2014). Evolution and future trends of 
copyright in Nigeria. Journal of Open Access to Law, 2(1), pp. 7-8 (hereafter, Ola 
2014); Schönwetter 2009 supra at pp. 11-12. 
96 See Adetoun Oladeji Nig Ltd v NB Plc (2007) 5 NWLR Pt 1027 p 415 at 443-




1.6 Research questions 
This thesis addresses one key question: How may South Africa 
and Nigeria apply copyright law and the complementary legal 
framework of competition law to regulate the open and freemium 
music business model?  
To answer this key question, it is important to address further 
issues. Firstly, the nature of the relationship between copyright law 
and competition law must be examined. Secondly, the open and 
freemium music business model needs to be appropriately 
described. The notion of open and freemium music business model 
has been classified in various ways, thus the open and freemium 
music business model at issue must be distinguished. It is also 
important to analyse the copyright-based contractual terms 
(copyright terms) developed by platform firms to explain their use 
of copyright-protected music content, escape copyright 
infringement liability and enhance their competitiveness. Moreover, 
it is important to identify and examine the issue of whether these 
copyright terms developed in the open and freemium music 
business model align with the objectives of the copyright law and 
competition law regulatory framework. Where they are not aligned, 
there is also the need to suggest viable means of applying the 
copyright and competition law to regulate the business model. To 
sum up, the main research question comprises of the following 
specific questions: 
(a) What are the respective goals of copyright law and 
competition law? How are these goals related? 
(b) How can the open and freemium music business model be 
defined and classified? What are the processes and 
copyright terms within the business model regarding the 
copyright protection inherent in the music content used?  
(c) Is the open and freemium music business model aligned 
with the objectives of copyright law and competition law? 




copyright and competition law to regulate the business 
model? 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the objective of this thesis is 
two-pronged. One, the aim is to consider the ways in which the 
open and freemium music business model may be unaligned with 
the copyright law system as complemented by competition law. 
The other objective is to propose how those regulatory frameworks 
may be applied to regulate the open and freemium music business 
model. Such objective entails an in-depth understanding and 
assessment of the ways in which the open and freemium music 
business model uses and applies copyright-protected music 
content in the business model context.97  
1.7 A brief note on motivation for the research  
Both Nigeria and South Africa are going through what are arguably 
the most significant changes ever in their respective copyright 
regimes presently with South Africa’s Copyright Amendment Bill 
201798 and Nigeria’s Copyright Bill 2015 respectively.99 Common to 
both countries’ efforts at shaping a copyright act fit for purpose in a 
digital environment, is the influence over the past few years of new 
forms of digital trade in the form of new business models. Open 
and freemium business models generally have flourished across a 
                                                 
97 Solo, A. (2014). The role of copyright in an age of online music distribution. 
Media & Arts Law Review, 19, p.169. Available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462006 [Accessed 14 Oct. 2016] (hereafter, Solo 
2014). Also, see Reed, C. (2013). Making laws for cyberspace. 1st ed. Oxford, 
U.K.: Oxford University Press (hereafter, Reed 2013); Scassa, T. (2013). 
Acknowledging copyright’s illegitimate offspring: user-generated content and 
Canadian copyright law. The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of 
Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law, pp.431-454. 
98 South Africa commenced with an amendment Bill in 2015 but that bill faced 
much criticism and was reworked and presented again for comments in March, 
2017. 
99 Both countries invited submissions on the Bills from the public. See Copyright 
Amendment Bill: Draft 2015 available at http://www.gov.za/documents/copyright-
amendment-bill-comments-invited-27-jul-2015-00000 [accessed 30 August 
2015]. Also, Copyright Bill 2015 available at Nigeria 
http://reform.copyright.gov.ng/imges/COPYRIGHTBILLCIRCULATIONCOPY021




wide spectrum of the digital landscape, in particular as far as music 
content is concerned – the open and freemium music business 
model leading the way in this regard. There is little debate as to the 
enormous impact that technology has had on the trade in music 
content, driving it from the analogue days of sheet music through to 
computer files that is prevalent today in the form of downloading, 
streaming and sharing of such files.100 Music content has never 
been as ubiquitous as it is today and as has occurred previously 
over time, copyright law has had to try and keep up with 
technological change. This characterizes the effect felt by Nigerian 
and South African lawmakers as well as the challenges faced by 
authors, copyright owners and users of music content.  
While authors and owners of copyright works should not be 
denied due recognition and reward and remuneration for their 
efforts, users should also be entitled to easily access and make 
certain uses of copyright works. Business models involving the use 
of copyright-protected works should recognise and embrace these 
ideals. As argued above, both the business models and the 
regulatory framework in any economy ought to be sensitive to 
prevailing socio-economic conditions. The open and freemium 
music business model has gained popularity as a means of 
securing wider dissemination of music content and therefore both 
copyright owners and platform firms ought to be certain as to 
permissible and impermissible conduct as well as licensable and 
unlicensed uses.101 
Moreover, to further ensure the achievement of the 
objectives of copyright law, it is important to acknowledge the role 
that a competition policy approach can play in copyright-related 
industries. In the case of South Africa and Nigeria, majority of the 
                                                 
100 See Coetzer 2009 supra at pp.14-15.  
101 See Quinn, A. (2017). Are online music platforms undermining the principles 





copyright owners in the music industry such as record companies 
and music publishers are small businesses/small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) referred to as “independents”.102  SMEs 
are a special focus group for the application of competition law in 
many jurisdictions. The recognition of the role of competition law 
generally and specifically from this perspective in the open and 
freemium music business context is crucial but appears to be 
absent from previous research. 
1.8 Research method  
This study relies entirely on written texts. The key primary sources 
consulted include national statutes and policies, international 
treaties and declarations, as well as other official documents. The 
main secondary sources relied upon include books, journals, 
newspaper articles, research reports and theses in law, music and 
business management. No new empirical research was undertaken 
or relied upon for this study. It is acknowledged that empirical data 
regarding the nature of the relationship between copyright owners 
and the platform firms and the actual revenue (if any) received 
within the open and freemium music business model would most 
likely have produced some, if not more, pertinent data. However, 
this method was ruled out because of the confidential nature of the 
subject matter. It is well known that platform firms and even, most 
copyright owners are reluctant to provide information regarding 
their commercial and business transactions.103 While this approach 
may omit some relevant factors regarding the open and freemium 
music business model, the high level of trust required for other 
forms of data collection make it the best approach in the 
circumstances. Therefore, to avoid any ethical impediments and to 
ensure reliability and validity, the thesis ruled out empirical 
                                                 
102 See section 3.5, below. 
103 See Priest, E. (2015). Copyright and free expression in China's film industry. 




research. Instead, the study relies on the information presented or 
admitted by platform firms in the suits instituted against them in 
some jurisdictions, particularly at the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) and in the US. The information from these 
cases and the originating processes filed therein are used in 
Chapter three of this thesis to describe the processes and 
copyright terms involved in the open and freemium music business 
model. It is noted that there have been significant activities by the 
Copyright Society of Nigeria (COSON) and Musical Copyright 
Society of Nigeria and the South African Music Rights Organisation 
(SAMRO) in ensuring mechanical royalty payments from firms 
deploying a subscription-based business model. 104  However, as 
Chapter three of this thesis reveals, such activities, while insightful, 
are outside the scope of this thesis.105 As explained above, the 
subscription-based freemium business model, which involves 
uploads by platform firms themselves, the procurement of licences 
by the platform firms and the receipt of subscription fees from 
users, is outside the scope of this thesis.106 
By undertaking the study from a doctrinal perspective, this 
thesis proposes suitable approaches to applying the regulatory 
framework. The value of such approach lies in its ability to assess 
the preparedness of the regulatory framework for the questions 
that may arise.107  Further, the analysis from the perspective of 
copyright law as complemented by competition law 
                                                 
104  For instance, in 2016, COSON instituted a suit against MTN Nigeria for 
infringement of copyright by virtue of MTN’s use of music content in its 
subscription-based streaming service without obtaining relevant mechanical 
licence from COSON. See Suit No. FHC/L/CS/619/2016 COSON v MTN Nigeria. 
See also, 7 Digital (2015). 7digital announce pan-African licensing agreement 
through CAPASSO. [online] Available at: http://about.7digital.com/news/7digital-
announce-pan-african-licensing-agreement-through-capasso [Accessed 5 Jul. 
2017]. 
105 See section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, below.  
106 See section 1.3, above. 
107 See generally, Chynoweth, P. (2008). Legal research. Advanced Research 




(“complementarity theory”108) provides food for thought and raises 
“theories” of harm and gains which would be available to both 
policymakers and potential complainants in considering the 
application of copyright and competition law to the regulation of the 
open and freemium music business models.109  
 Although the thesis considers the application of copyright 
law and competition law frameworks in South Africa and Nigeria, 
comparative law is not the goal in this thesis. 110  Comparative 
analysis are usually undertaken to understand foreign law or for the 
purposes of applying the researcher’s understanding of the 
differences and similarities and the reason for such.111  Neither is 
the position in this current study. Comparative law studies the 
relationship between one national legal system and one or more 
other national systems. 112
 
It is usually applied to scrutinise the 
nature of such a relationship including the similarities and 
differences of each legal system, the reasons for the similarities 
and differences and the degree to which such similarities and 
differences are significant or insignificant.113  
This study merely conducts an independent examination of 
the regimes in the two countries as credible representatives of the 
                                                 
108 See Drexl 2013 supra at 37. 
109 Such analysis takes into account, the economic rationale of copyright – a 
prerequisite in pursuing overall development goals. Anderson reflects that the 
application of competition rules on IPRs was a major concern of developing 
countries during the negotiations leading up to TRIPs. See Anderson, R. (2008). 
Competition policy and intellectual property in the WTO: More guidance 
needed?. In: Research handbook on intellectual property and competition Law. 
1st ed. J. Drexl, Ed. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, at 457, 459 and 473 (hereafter, 
Anderson 2008). 
110 This is a descriptive comparative law in the sense that any comparison is 
confined to an analysis of variations between the laws of the two countries. See 
Gutteridge, H.C. (2015). Comparative law: an introduction to the comparative 
method of legal study and research (Vol. 1). CUP Archive, pp. 7-9. 
111  Reitz, J. (1998). How to do comparative law. The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 46(4), 628- 629. (hereafter Reitz 1998).   
112  Glendon, M., Carozza, P. (1994). Comparative legal traditions, texts, 
materials and cases. 2nd ed, West, p.6. Also, Reitz 1998 supra at 618 – 619. 




African continent. The aim is to identify the points of friction and 
concord between the legal framework and the open and freemium 
music business model and then propose how the legal framework 
may be applied to provide an appropriate regulatory framework for 
the business model. 
1.9 Research structure 
Having appropriately delineated the scope of the research 
question, how this shall be applied in practice to propose how 
copyright law and competition law may be used to regulate the 
open and freemium music business model may now be analysed. 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  
Chapter two will consider the objectives of copyright law and 
how they promote competition.  By providing for exclusive rights, 
copyright law encourages firms to compete and strive to get the 
benefit of those exclusive rights. This is because the exclusive right 
provides something to sell or license to generate pecuniary 
benefits. Also, by limiting the scope of the exclusive right, copyright 
promotes competition by ensuring that the copyright owner does 
not operate as a monopoly and that he will be “compelled” to 
disseminate his work. So, on one hand, copyright protects 
exclusivity and on the other hand, it promotes access and 
distribution. 114  Competition law prohibits both anti-competitive 
agreements and anti-competitive conduct in any given market, 
including copyright-related markets. From this perspective, 
competition law complements copyright law in achieving its 
(copyright law’s) objectives. Chapter two will examine this 
“complementarity” in the two fields of law to understand how such 
may be applied to regulate the use of copyright-protected products 
in the business model context. In South Africa and Nigeria, the 
Copyright Act of 1978 and the Copyright Act of 2004 respectively 
                                                 
114 These objectives may sometimes raise conflicts because of the private nature 




are the principal statutes that regulate copyright and the use of 
copyright-protected products. While South Africa has a Competition 
Act that provides a general framework to protect competition 
across a wide range of economic activities, Nigeria does not 
presently have any statute that deals specifically with competition 
law issues. 115  Nevertheless, the Federal Competition and 
Consumer Protection Bill 2016 is presently undergoing 
parliamentary consideration and was recently passed by the 
Nigerian Senate. 116  It is that Bill that will provide the Nigerian 
competition legal framework to be examined for the present 
purposes. In the case of South Africa, the thesis will only evaluate 
the Competition Act and will not consider the recent Competition 
Amendment Bill proposed in 2017. 
Chapter three will explore the concept of the open and 
freemium music business model and its possible classifications. 
The approach taken here shall be an expository and descriptive 
one, relying on information from case law and the literature to 
describe the current state of the open and freemium music 
business model.117 The platform firms that deploy that business 
model operate largely in the advertising sector and they need a 
large mass of consumers that they can serve advertisements to 
obtain revenue. To attract the consumers, the platform firm needs 
content that will attract and sustain consumers’ attention – in this 
case, music content. Accordingly, the platform firm creates and 
operates a platform that allows the public to upload music content, 
which anyone can listen to on the platform. To ensure that they 
                                                 
115  This is not for want of trying. Between 2003 and 2007, 3 different Draft 
Competition Bills were prepared but none has been signed into law till date. See 
Dimgba 2006 supra at 15-9. 
116 See Placng.org. (2017). Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Bill, 
2017. [online] Available at: http://placng.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/Report-on-a-Bill-for-an-Act-to-repeal-the-Consumer-
Protection-Act.pdf [Accessed 13 Nov. 2017]. 
117 See Burton, D. (2000). Using literature to support research. Research training 




operate within the confines of copyright law, the platform firm does 
not usually upload the music content by itself and in fact, denies 
responsibility for and knowledge of copyright infringement arising 
from the users’ uploads (in line with the safe harbour regime). It 
sets out a copyright policy containing provisions regarding the 
place of copyright in their business model. Three main copyright-
based terms can be identified at this level. These are: terms 
relating to licensing, access and use of the copyright-protected 
music content. So, on one hand, the business model strives to 
respect exclusivity and on the other hand, it strives to promote 
access and distribution. Chapter three also explains the stakes in 
issue for the market participants (artists and copyright owners, the 
platform firm, the consumers and the advertising companies) in the 
open and freemium music business model context in South Africa 
and Nigeria. The explanation of the stakes from a South African 
and Nigerian perspective is significant as it explains the local 
perspective of a business model that operates on a global scale. 
Chapter three also explains that majority of copyright owners 
(record companies and music publishers) in these two countries 
are in fact, small businesses. This position as small businesses 
casts light on an important issue in competition law discussed in 
Chapter five: the protection of the economic freedom of small 
businesses. 
The exposition in Chapter three paves the way for the 
analysis in Chapters four and five. In this regard, the aim is to 
identify and analyse whether the copyright terms identified in 
Chapter three are aligned with the objectives of copyright law as 
complemented by competition law. Indeed, there are concerns 
regarding “value gap”118 and “scraping”119 said to be perpetuated 
                                                 
118 As explained by the IFPI, “the value gap describes the growing mismatch 
between the value that user upload services, such as YouTube, extract from 
music and the revenue returned to the music community – those who are 




by the copyright terms within this business model.120 Generally, 
both concerns relate to the use of an automated process to 
efficiently collect and use a significant number copyright-protected 
content from different copyright owners with little or no payment to 
them. Also, there are concerns regarding restrictions on copyright 
user rights inherent in the copyright terms set up by the platform 
firms to account for their use of copyright-protected content and to 
“respect” exclusivity.121 The applicability of the solutions proposed 
by the literature to address these concerns and regulate the 
business model will also be discussed in relation to both South 
Africa and Nigeria. While Chapter four undertakes the analysis in 
relation to the copyright law frameworks of both South Africa and 
Nigeria; Chapter five undertakes the exercise in relation to the 
competition law in South Africa and the competition bill in Nigeria. 
In both cases, the question relates to the fit between the business 
model and the objectives of the copyright and competition law 
regulatory framework. Chapter four will also consider briefly, the 
recent proposed copyright reform currently going on in the two 
countries and how the Bills respond to the open and freemium 
music business context. Chapter five particularly explores the small 
business status of copyright owners and the protection of the 
economic freedom of smaller market participants as an objective 
pursued by competition law. The consideration in these two 
chapters raises important points about the need for the regulation 
the business model. 
                                                                                                                        
119 Scraping is usually described as an automated process that firms can use to 
efficiently collect large amounts of targeted data from different websites hosted 
by another company. See Goldfein, S. and Keyte, J. (2017). Big data, web 
‘scraping’ and competition law: The debate continues. New York Law Journal, 
258(49), p.1 (hereafter, Goldfein and Keyte 2017).  
120 See section 4.2, below. 
121  The use of the expression, “rights” to describe the range of permissible 
actions that users of copyright-protected works may validly undertake without the 
consent of the copyright owner is prevalent in the literature. See Elkin-Koren 
2017a supra at 137; Geist, M. ed. (2013). The Copyright Pentalogy: How the 
Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of Canadian Copyright Law. 




Chapter six concludes the thesis with a summative 
evaluation of the alignment between the open and freemium music 
business model and the copyright and competition law framework. 
It also canvasses competition- promoting approaches that may be 
adopted in the copyright and competition law regulation of the 




Chapter Two: Copyright and competition 
2.1 Introduction 
Competition is a struggle or battle for superiority.1 As stated in the 
Draft Competition and Consumer Policy Paper prepared by the 
Nigerian Government, “…through competition among suppliers, 
consumers have access to the widest possible range of choice of 
goods and services at the lowest possible prices and highest 
possible quality”. 2  Hence, competition between firms may be 
considered as a necessary instrument for the promotion of 
efficiency and consumer welfare in the marketplace. 
In the context of business models, competition may be seen 
as a process in which firms strive with other firms through 
strategies and economic activities aimed at satisfying the needs of 
customers and capturing value or revenue therefrom. 3  In this 
regard, firms which are efficient and which have a business model 
with the appropriate value proposition are able to rise above their 
competitors and dominate the marketplace in satisfying consumer 
needs. Accordingly, the process of competition can lead to a firm 
becoming the most preferred by the consumers because of its 
business model, efficiency, innovative products, quality of its goods 
and/or lower prices.4 
To promote and protect competition, the law provides a 
regulatory framework to ensure that economic activities do not 
stifle or restrict competition by illegitimate acquisition and/or 
                                                 
1  Whish, R. and Bailey, D. (2012). Competition law. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.4 (hereafter Whish and Bailey 2012). 
2  Federal Government of Nigeria (2014). Draft competition and consumer 
protection policy, paragraph 14, p.8. Other governments have expressed similar 
views. See UK Department of Trade and Industry (2002). White Paper, 
Productivity and enterprise: A world class competition regime, section 1.1. 
3  See UK Competition Commission, “Merger references: Competition 
Commission guidelines” (June 2003, CC 2), section 1.20; Market investigation 
references: Competition Commission guidelines (June 2003, CC 3), section 
1.16, available at www.competition-commission.org.uk.  




exercise of market power. Several legal regimes such as 
competition law, copyright law, property law, contract law, 
bankruptcy law amongst others, are considered as one of the 
regulatory frameworks to promote and/or protect competition 
between firms and for enhancing efficiency in the marketplace.5 
However, while competition law provides a general overarching 
framework to protect competition across a wide range of economic 
activities, each of the other regulatory frameworks applies to 
regulate competition in a specific sector or industry. In this regard, 
copyright law provides a regulatory tool for the protection and 
promotion of competition in the copyright sector.6 
Copyright law regulates the exercise of rights of copyright 
owners and the use of copyright-protected products by users and 
the general public. Competition law provides a complementary 
regulatory framework that may be interpreted as serving the 
interests of copyright law. Accordingly, as a basis for the evaluation 
of the use of copyright law and the complementary competition law 
framework to regulate the open and freemium music business 
model, this chapter examines the nature of the relationship 
between the two fields of law. 
The conclusions of this chapter are particularly relevant, as 
they will guide the analysis of the functioning of the open and 
freemium music business model in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis. There, the significance of copyright and the promotion of 
competition and how competition law may be applied to support 
such goals, will be scrutinised with a focus on the South African 
and Nigerian open and freemium music business model contexts. 
In other words, this chapter, by focusing on how copyright law itself 
                                                 
5 Maskus and Lahouel 2000 supra at 596-600. 
6 Ibid. See also, Stadler, S.K. (2007). Copyright as trade regulation. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, pp.899-960 (hereafter, Stadler 2007); Katz, A., 
(2013). Copyright and competition policy. In: Towse, R. and Handka, C. eds., 
2013. Handbook on the digital creative economy. Edward Elgar Publishing, 




contains provisions that aim at protecting competition and how 
competition law complements the efforts of copyright law, aids the 
cause of this study which seeks to inter alia explore ways in which 
the two legal frameworks may regulate the deployment of the open 
and freemium music business model. 
This chapter is divided into 4 parts. Section 2.1 deals with 
the introduction and section 2.2 identifies the objectives of 
copyright law by looking at the interface between copyright and 
income generation, and between copyright’s limitations and 
exceptions and how they help to promote competition in copyright 
markets. In particular, section 2.2 shows that the exclusive rights 
granted under copyright law are key resources for the promotion of 
competition in copyright markets. It focuses on the music industry, 
drawing links between copyright and income generation. Also, this 
section evaluates other aspects of copyright law in South Africa 
and Nigeria that aim to promote competition: it discusses the 
import of the dichotomy between ideas and expression, the limited 
term of copyright protection, limitations on copyrightable subject 
matter, fair dealing and the like. Section 2.3 compares the 
objectives of copyright law with that of competition law and shows 
the role that competition law plays in complementing and serving 
the objectives of copyright law. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Copyright and the promotion of competition  
It has been often held that copyright protection is a tool used to 
promote competition and the public interest from two distinct but 
interconnected perspectives. From an ex ante point of view, prior to 
making investments in creative works, copyright law promotes 
competition and rivalry as firms are incentivized to compete to 
enjoy the benefits of copyright protection. From an ex post 
perspective, copyright protection comes with constraints and 




greater creativity, 7  access to and dissemination of copyright 
products.  
In recognising the link between copyright law and 
competition, several aspects of copyright law have been put 
forward in the literature to explain and conceptualise how copyright 
law promotes competition principles. Corollary to the foregoing, it 
becomes necessary to briefly review these approaches that explain 
the relationship between copyright and competition in the context 
of South Africa and Nigeria.8 
One of the central questions relates to the underlying 
meaning and purpose of copyright protection. The various 
approaches to copyright protection render the concept capable of 
being designed and interpreted to address a variety of issues.9 In 
relation to this study, two main justification theories deserve careful 
attention.10 
The first one, utilitarianism posits that copyright products 
possess the non-exclusivity and non-excludability nature of public 
goods. 11  In other words, the use of copyright products by one 
                                                 
7  See Fishman, J.P. (2014). Creating Around Copyright. Harv. L. Rev., 128, 
p.1333 (hereafter, Fishman 2014). See also, section 4.2.2, below. 
8 For a similar exercise in relation to US copyright law, see Cotter, T.F. (2006). 
The procompetitive interest in intellectual property law. Wm. & Mary L. Rev., 48, 
p.483 (hereafter, Cotter 2006); Katz 2013 supra; Samuelson, P. (2017). 
Justifications for copyright limitations & exceptions.  In: R. Okediji, ed., Copyright 
law in an age of limitations and exceptions. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, p.35-7 (hereafter, Samuelson 2017). See also, Katz, A. and Veel, P.E. 
(2013). Beyond refusal to deal: a cross-Atlantic view of copyright, competition, 
and innovation policies. Antitrust Law Journal, 79(1), pp.141-142 (hereafter, Katz 
and Veel). 
9 Giblin, R. and Weatherall, K. (2017). If we redesigned copyright from scratch, 
what might it look like? In: R. Giblin and K. Weatherall, eds,.  What if we could 
reimagine copyright? Australia National University Press, p.1. 
10  Other justifications include personality rights theory and “democratic right” 
theory”, the “cultural argument”, the “freedom of expression argument” and the 
like. See Schönwetter 2009 supra at p. 30;  Fisher, W. (2001). Theories of 
intellectual property. In Munzer, S.R. ed., 2001. New essays in the legal and 
political theory of property. Cambridge University Press, 168; Zemer,L. (2006). 
On the value of copyright theory. IPQ, 1, p.55. 




person does not reduce another person’s use (non-exclusivity) nor 
would it be easy or possible to prevent someone else’s use (non-
excludability).12 As a result, it may be difficult, in the absence of 
regulation, to recoup the investments and cost of producing such 
public goods. In other words, the utilitarian theory highlights the 
role of copyright in incentivising copyright owners to invest in the 
creation of further copyright works.13 The rationale in this case is 
that the exclusive nature of copyright protection enables monetary 
or economic gains and that in the absence of copyright protection 
and the resultant economic gains; there would be little or no 
incentive to create.14 This would explain the monopolistic nature of 
copyright.  
The second theory usually referred to as the natural rights 
theory is grounded on the author’s natural property rights in his 
work and his entitlement to reap the reward of his creative labour.15 
From a historical perspective, this view emanates from John 
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government written in 1690.16 John 
Locke’s argument is that every person is entitled to the natural 
property rights resulting from their own labour but such rights are 
                                                 
12 Ibid.  
13 For a seminal work on the utilitarian theory for copyright, see Landes, W.M. 
and Posner, R.A. (1989). An economic analysis of copyright law. The Journal of 
Legal Studies, 18(2), pp.325-363. 
14 Cohen, J.E., Loren, L.P., Okediji, R.L. and O'Rourke, M.A. (2015). Copyright in 
a global information economy. Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, p.7; Hugenholtz, 
P.G.B. (2013). International copyright. Principles, law, and practice, 3rd ed.  
Oxford University Press, p.3; Harms, L.T.C. (2012). The enforcement of 
intellectual property rights: a case book. 3rd ed., World Intellectual Property, p.28 
(hereafter, Harms 2012). 
15  See Craig, C.J. (2002). Locke, labour, and limiting the author’s right: A 
warning against a Lockean approach to copyright law. Queen's Law Journal. 
28(1), pp. 18-20 (hereafter, Craig 2002). Hughes, J. (1988). The philosophy of 
intellectual property. Geo. LJ, 77, 287, p.305; Ginsburg, J. (2017). The role of 
the author in copyright. In: R. Okediji, ed., Copyright law in an age of limitations 
and exceptions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 60, p.69-70 (hereafter, 
Ginsburg 2017). 




limited by the rights of others to the “common stock of property”.17 
In this regard, copyright protection is to be seen as a reward for 
labour. Natural rights theory differs from the utilitarian theory in that 
it prioritises the property rights of the author to reap the fruits of 
their creation18 and satisfy the innate need to create.19  
Even without deeper reflection, a cursory examination of 
these theories shows that they are inextricably interwoven, and 
ultimately explain the import and desirability of copyright for the 
society. Indeed, it is now well established from a variety of studies 
that the differences between so-called utilitarian oriented copyright 
systems and the natural law based jurisdictions have become 
blurred in the wake of globalization and current international 
copyright treaties such as the Berne Convention, the 1994 
Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS Agreement), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.20  
The preamble to the WCT, which incorporates the elements 
of the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, is instructive. 
The Contracting Parties…desiring to develop and maintain the 
protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works in a 
manner as effective and uniform as possible, emphasizing the 
outstanding significance of copyright protection as an incentive for 
literary and artistic creation,  
[and] 
                                                 
17 See for example Gordon, W.J. (1993). A property right in self-expression: 
Equality and individualism in the natural law of intellectual property. The Yale 
Law Journal, 102(7), 1533, 1544-45. 
18 Craig 2002 supra at pp. 20-21. 
19  See Schönwetter 2009 supra at p. 33. Also, Bently, L. and Sherman, B. 
(2014). Intellectual property law. Oxford University Press, USA, pp. 36-8 
(hereafter, Bently and Sherman 2014). 
20  See Schönwetter 2009 supra at p. 37; Senftleben, M. (2004). Copyright, 
limitations, and the three-step test: an analysis of the three-step test in 
international and EC copyright law (Vol. 13). Kluwer Law International, 17 




…recognizing the need to maintain a balance between the rights of 
authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, research 
and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention…21  
This, notwithstanding, various objections have been raised against 
copyright justifications. One of the foremost criticisms contends 
that there is no proof that the exclusivity of copyright results in 
more creativity or incentivises further creation of new products.22 
Some argue that other non-exclusionary systems may provide 
incentives to create and as such, consider the exclusivity of 
copyright protection as a threat to the public interests and outside 
the fundamental objectives of copyright. 23  Furthermore, the 
distribution of copyright works using open business models has 
been presented as evidence that monetary or economic incentive 
is not required for the creation or availability of copyright works in 
the marketplace.24  As an example, they point out the (relative) 
success of open source software projects such as Linux, the 
Mozilla internet browser, Google Android and the like in which 
copyright owners participate in the development and creation of 
software whilst offering a gratis licence of their copyright in the 
software. 25  Another argument put forward against copyright 
protection is that it inhibits competition and wider distribution of 
                                                 
21  Preamble to the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. 
CRNR/DC/94, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295157.  
22  See, for example, Vaver, D. (1994). Some agnostic observations on 
intellectual property. Intellectual Property Rights, (1), pp.240-42; Zimmerman, 
D.L. (2011). Copyrights as incentives: Did we just imagine that?. Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law, 12(1), pp.38-40 (hereafter, Zimmerman 2011). Also, Bently and 
Sherman 2014 supra. 
23  Gürel, B. (2009). An external method for establishing the balance in 
intellectual property rights' scope: Article 102 of the TFEU. Global Antitrust 
Review, 10, p.53.. 
24 See Creativecommons.org, (2015). About - Creative Commons. Available at 
http://creativecommons.org/about accessed 13 May 2015. Also, Rizk 2010 supra 
at 124-7. 
25 See generally, Lessig, L. (2008). Remix: Making art and commerce thrive in 
the hybrid economy. Penguin; Stallman, R. (2002). Free software, free society: 
Selected essays of Richard M. Stallman. Free Software Foundation Inc.; Boldrin, 
M. and Levine, D. (2002). The case against intellectual property. American 




copyright products, all of which may not be in the public interest.26  
While these criticisms may hold in certain respects, they are 
not of general application. Copyright protection has clearly been 
used as a leverage to receive economic rewards even when 
creation and distribution have taken place outside economic 
negotiations particularly in the open business model deployed by 
authors and copyright owners.27 Here, the protected work is given 
away for free using an express or implied licence, and revenue is 
derived albeit indirectly from the “enhanced reputation and market 
share” which the copyright owner enjoys from giving out the work 
for free.28 Further, copyright protection has a significant impact on 
the willingness to engage in creative and productive activities for 
the enjoyment of the public. 29  Indeed, as explained in Chapter 
three of this study, freemium business models have a strong 
fixation on advertising revenue made possible by the same 
enhanced reputation and market share. 30  As held by the US 
Federal Circuit Court in Jacobsen v Katzer, 31  the fact that the 
copyright owner elects to waive some of his rights does not obviate 
the economic interests in the copyright work.32 
In any event, no copyright theory is without criticisms and 
differences in theories and national approaches to copyright 
protection may be more a question of emphasis than outcomes.33 
                                                 
26 See Davies, G. (2002). Copyright and the public interest. Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, 2nd ed, 250. 
27 See Shagall, Y. (2008). Jacobsen v. Katzer: Federal Circuit affirms economic 
Interest of open source copyright holder, Slip Opinion. Jolt.law.harvard.edu. 
Available at http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/software/jacobsen-v-katzer 
[Accessed 15 June 2015].  
28 Ibid. 
29 Waelde, C., Kheria, S., Cornwell, J. and Brown, A. (2016). Contemporary 
intellectual property: law and policy.. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
p.41. 
30 Section 3.2.2. 
31 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 17161 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
32 Ibid. 





Further, even in jurisdictions that are said to share similar 
approaches or justification, there are still significant differences 
between their copyright laws.34 The debate on the justifications for 
copyright protection inevitably applies to the scope of copyright 
protection and highlights the need for set boundaries. In this 
context, there is need to ensure that the protection of the interests 
of the copyright owner does not adversely affect the public 
interests.35   On the one hand, there is need to incentivize the 
author to create and the copyright owner to invest in the production 
of copyright works by providing effective legal protection. On the 
other hand, it must be ensured that the public has access to these 
products. Put differently, it is essential to guarantee that the public 
is ultimately able to access creative outputs. Where such access 
does not exist or is unduly constrained, the society would not be 
able to benefit from the creative nature of copyright works.  
To reach a reasonable balance between public and private 
interests, 36  provisions are made for the duration of copyright 
protection (resulting in the notion of the “public domain”37) and for 
limitations and exceptions to copyright protection. 38  Such 
provisions are geared towards ensuring that the much-sought 
balance between the interests of copyright owners and that of 
users of copyright works can be maintained. This internal 
mechanism has contributed to defining the boundaries of the scope 
of copyright and the markets for copyright products.39 However, as 
                                                                                                                        
Oxford University Press, USA, p. 10. See also Cornish, J. (1993). Sound 
recordings and copyright. International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, 24, 306 at 307. 
34 Schönwetter 2009 supra at p. 30. 
35 Cross and Yu 2007 supra at 429. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Corbett 2011 supra at 528.  
38 Cross and Yu 2007 supra at 429. Sections 12, 13 and 14 of South African 
Copyright Act create certain exceptions to copyright protection including using 
the work for the purpose of criticism or review. 




this chapter shows, other factors such as the application of 
competition law, may play a significant role in achieving this 
objective. Before discussing the role and application of competition 
law, the next section looks at the copyright law environment. 
2.2.1 The relationship between copyright protection and 
competition  
As stated earlier, copyright law is a legal system that protects the 
creative outputs of authors and copyright owners by granting them 
exclusive rights to control the use of their creations for a limited 
time, subject to certain limitations, 40  exceptions and statutory 
licensing arrangements allowing use and exploitation without 
consent. 41 The exclusive rights common to the categories of works 
protected under copyright law in respect of music content include 
the right to reproduce the work; perform the work in public; publish 
the work, make a cinematograph film or a record in respect of the 
work; distribute the work for commercial purposes and 
communicate or broadcast the work to the public.42 
Copyright law grants copyright owners rights in exclusivity 
meaning that other persons cannot exercise those rights in relation 
                                                 
40 For example, where the work in question fails to meet the requirement of 
originality, copyright protection may not enure to it. Use of such work would not 
require licence. See the case of Moneyweb (Pty) Limited v Media 24 Limited and 
Another (31575/2013) [2016] ZAGPJHC 81; [2016] 3 All SA 193 (GJ); 2016 (4) 
SA 591 (GJ) (5 May 2016) where the court accepted the defendant’s argument 
that four of Media24’s articles which were simply rehashes of press releases or 
transcripts of telephone interviews, did not meet the originality requirement and 
hence no copyright existed in the said works. 
41 See Second Schedule to the Nigerian Copyright Act. See also sections 12 to 
19B of the South African Copyright Act. In each of the afore-mentioned 
countries, these provisions state that copyright protection does not extend to fair 
dealing with any protected work. See generally, Wang, J. (2013). Copyright: 
rebalancing the public and private interests in the areas of education and 
research (Doctoral dissertation, Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University); Ekpa, 
F.O., and Kure, B.R. (2014). Fair dealing as an exception to the infringement of 
copyright: an obstacle to the effective enforcement of copyright claims in Nigeria. 
Idah Bar Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, (2), pp. 245 – 270 (hereafter, 
Ekpa and Kure 2015). 
42 For a full description of each of the exclusive rights available for the mentioned 
categories of copyright works, see Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Nigerian Copyright 




to the copyright work without their permission or licence. In the 
case of any given music content, any person or entity other than 
the copyright owner proposing to use the music content in any 
manner envisaged by the extant copyright laws, would require the 
permission or the licence of the relevant copyright owner in respect 
of the literary work, the musical work and the sound recording, to 
do so.   
The exclusive nature of these rights enable income 
generation by necessitating requests for prior authorisation 
(license) from the relevant copyright owner from any person 
wishing to exercise any of the rights. The request for license may 
result in payment of license fees while failure to obtain a license for 
uses outside those statutorily permitted, may result in the payment 
of damages for copyright infringement. 43  In other words, these 
rights are secured through the provisions for appropriate remedies 
where they are exercised without the license of the copyright 
owners. Most copyright law cases relate to the application of 
copyright infringement rules. This is typically due to the fact that 
copyright infringement rules envisage the possibility of the 
copyright owner generating revenue from exclusively exercising his 
rights to reproduce, distribute and/or license its copyrighted 
works. 44  These rights together with the possibility of obtaining 
monetary remedies for their infringement form the basis for the 
design and deployment of business models in the copyright 
marketplace. 45  Even in so-called pure open business models 
                                                 
43 See sections 16 to 18 of the Nigerian Copyright Act; see also, section 24 of 
the South African Copyright Act, Olubiyi, I.A. (2014). A comparative analysis of 
copyright enforcement provisions in Nigeria: Maximising the current legal 
regime. Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and 
Jurisprudence, 5, p.90 (hereafter, Olubiyi 2014); Angelopoulos, C. (2016). 
European intermediary liability in copyright: A tort-based analysis. Ph.D. Institute 
Institute for Information Law (IViR), p.14 (hereafter, Angelopoulos 2016).  
44 Olubiyi 2014 supra at 89; Ouma supra at p.921; Ginsburg 2017 supra at 81-
82. 
45 See Coetzer 2009 supra at 41. Also, see Rethink Music, 2015. Fair music: 





where licence to use the protected work is granted for free, the 
economic rights are activated once the licensee operates outside 
the terms of licence. Further, at the heart of the copyright 
infringement suits against platform firms that use copyright-
protected content in advertising, is the question of who is entitled to 
what share of the advertising revenue from using such content.46 
As such, from the moment the copyright work is created, the author 
or the right-holder may be perceived as an entrepreneur or firm 
who has a “product” to sell or license for revenue generation.47  
The monetization of music content has historically rested on 
two primary economic rights being 1) the performing right and 2) 
the reproduction right, with the capacity of having “something to 
sell or license” or to monetize each of these rights being driven by 
technology. Prior to any significant technological development, 
revenue or value could only be generated from the performance of 
music by assembling people at a specific place and time to listen to 
the music being performed at that time. When the music 
performance ended, there was no way to monetize or create value 
from the music thereafter, except to arrange for another music 
performance. Reproducing music was, prior to the Gutenberg 
Press in 1454, by copying music on a sheet (“sheet music”) and 
distributing the sheet music for a fee. This was, of course, a 
laborious and time-consuming process with relatively low output. 
With the arrival of the Gutenberg Press, the capacity to reproduce 
music into copies was greatly enhanced as the ‘reproduced’ sheet 
music was available and accessible to anyone who could, or 
                                                                                                                        
Creative Entrepreneurship. Accessed, 23, p.5. Available at: 
https://www.berklee.edu/sites/default/files/Fair%20Music%20-
%20Transparency%20and%20Payment%20Flows%20in%20the%20Music%20I
ndustry.pdf  [Accessed 13 Nov. 2017] (hereafter, Rethink Music 2015). 





wished to learn, a musical instrument, at a time of their choosing 
and with the sheet music at hand, the music could be performed.48  
With more technological advancements, the reproduction 
right migrated from generating revenue through sheet music to 
generating revenue through piano rolls, acetates and then vinyl 
and then on to tapes to cassettes49 to CDs and now to digital files 
and streaming. These mediums represented the means of 
exploiting the reproduction right to generate revenue. Similarly, 
technological advancements ensured that revenue could be 
generated from performing rights without the requirement of 
assembling the audience in one place and at a specific time. 
Instead, revenue was generated from the performing right through 
the public performance, the broadcast, the transmission through 
diffusion services and the communication to the public 50  of the 
music content. In this regard and leveraging on the statutory 
provision that reproduction of any copyright work can be “in any 
manner or form”,51 digitisation and technology have necessitated 
the expansion of the exercise of the reproduction right to include 
performance52 of the reproduced work through “broadcast” rights, 
                                                 
48 See Coetzer 2009 supra at 14-19; Towse, R. (2013). The economic effects of 
digitization on the administration of musical copyrights. Review of economic 
research on copyright issues, 10(2), pp.55-67; Towse, R. (2016). Copyright and 
music publishing in the UK. In The Artful Economist (pp. 133-151). Springer 
International Publishing (hereafter, Towse 2016a). 
49 The piano roll, acetates, vinyl and cassettes were the old ways of listening to 
recorded music. The piano roll, for instance, is a music storage medium used to 
operate a player piano, piano player or reproducing piano. See Barnet, R.D. and 
Burriss, L.L. (2001). Controversies of the music industry. Greenwood Publishing 
Group. 
50 See section 9(e) of the South African Copyright Act. This right is not applicable 
in Nigeria presently. It is however provided for in the current Copyright 
Amendment Bill 2015. 
51 See Sections 6(d), 8(1)(c) and 9(c) of the South African Copyright Act. 
52 See the following provisions of the South African Copyright Act: Sections 6(d), 
8(1)(c) and 9(c) for broadcast rights; Sections 6(e), 7(d) and 8(1)(d) for the 
transmission through a diffusion service rights; Section 9(e) for the 
communication to the public rights. Apart from the right of communication to the 
public, corresponding provisions in the Nigerian Copyright Act may be found in 




“transmission through a diffusion service” rights and 
“communication to the public” rights and have also evolved to 
include the ‘”publishing rights and ‘”adaptation” rights. 53 
Accordingly, apart from public performance in a live format, the 
reproduction right became the most recognised value metric or 
revenue generator for the recorded music copyright sector because 
it involved the many ways in which music content may be 
perceived. 
From a copyright law perspective, the revenue received 
from sale of music CDs and DVDs, licences for the streaming of 
music, digital downloads and the like is said to be directly 
attributable to the exercise and enforcement of the statutorily 
protected reproduction rights and rights ancillary thereto. 54 
Accordingly, copyright law requires the authorization of the person 
or entity who owns the reproduction right in the music content 
before the right may be exercised or exploited in any manner.55 
The exploitation by the copyright owner or the implied or express 
authorisation of the exploitation of the reproduction right and/or 
other ancillary right is reflected in the business model.56 However, 
the law does not set out the specifics or details of business models 
                                                 
53 “Publishing”, in the context of music content involves the acquisition of musical 
compositions from composers and songwriters, the subsequent transformation 
of the musical composition from manuscript to performance, recording and 
subsequent uses. See Towse, R. (2017). Economics of music publishing: 
copyright and the market. Journal of Cultural Economics 41(4), pp.404-5 
(hereafter, Towse 2017). 
54 Kretschmer, M. (2005). Artists’ earnings and copyright: A review of British and 
German music industry data in the context of digital technologies. First Monday, 
10(1). See also Future of Music Coalition (FMC) Report on music industry 
revenue streams. FMC refers to this income stream as “songwriter and 
composer revenue”. Money.futureofmusic.org. (2017). Artist revenue streams. 
[online] Available at: http://money.futureofmusic.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/revenue-streams-handoutlist.pdf [Accessed 17 Nov. 
2017]. 
55  As earlier stated, the exception to this rule may be “fair dealing” under 
Nigerian and South African copyright regimes, with the music content. Licensing 
obligations may not exist when the music content is either in the public domain 
or not eligible for copyright due to subsistence challenges or for private 
enjoyment or use of a small portion of the work. Also see, section 2.2.2, below. 




for the use and exploitation of copyright products. Rather, copyright 
law provides the regulatory framework within which business 
models consisting of the exercise of and control of the exclusive 
rights can be designed and deployed.57 
Therefore, copyright is to be understood as one of the 
essential institutional mechanisms, which has helped facilitate the 
creation and dissemination of cultural and creative works through 
business models, by providing a framework to manage the need for 
the public to have access to copyright-protected products.58  As 
such, it is much more than a mechanism for protecting the revenue 
or royalties derived from an intellectual resource; it is part of the 
institutional framework that helps define a marketable product as 
well as reliable income flows (through royalties and related 
income).59  
In a related manner, copyright law, by necessitating the prior 
license of the copyright owner before exercising any of the 
exclusive bundle of rights, protects the right holder from others 
taking over and reaping the rewards from his or her intellectual 
efforts, that is, from free riding on these efforts through the copying 
of another’s expression (imitation). By prohibiting the use of 
copyright works without the permission of the copyright owner, 
copyright law “excludes competition by imitation” and “forces the 
investors in creative production to rely on their own creativity, or 
the creativity of people they employ, to come up with different 
products that may please consumers”.60 Therefore, the exclusivity 
                                                 
57 See Stadler 2007 supra at p.910; Newman 2013 supra at 1451 – 1456. 
58 See Drexl 2013 supra at pp. 5-6. 
59  Andersen, B., Kozul-Wright, Z. and Kozul-Wright, R. (2000). Copyrights, 
Competition and Development (No. 145). UNCTAD Discussion Paper (hereafter, 
Andersen and others 2000). 
60 See Drexl 2013 supra at p. 39. See the case of Mandla‐Matla Publishing (Pty) 
Ltd v Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd, (48/CR/Jun04) [2006] ZACT 84 (6 
November 2006), para. 54 (hereafter, Mandla‐Matla Publishing). See also 





of copyright is to be interpreted as encouraging competition by 
substitution in the long-term benefit of the consumers.61  
Due to the exclusive nature of the rights conferred by 
copyright law, the copyright owner may now possess “something to 
sell or license” to generate revenue. 62  In this regard, copyright 
owners design and deploy business models based on these 
exclusive rights. 63 Therefore, copyright law is said to encourage 
firms to compete in the kind of works they create so as to enjoy 
copyright protection. Furthermore, inasmuch as copyright 
protection and exploitation is expected to yield sales and/or 
licensing revenue, the provision of remedies for the unlicensed 
exercise or exploitation of those exclusive rights promotes 
competition and enables firms obtain and retain competitive 
advantage.  
Accordingly, by creating rights that may help to guarantee 
returns on creative investments, copyright law encourages 
competition amongst potential authors to create new works. 64 
Indeed, the promotion of competition through the grant of exclusive 
rights is so sacrosanct that courts are quite reluctant in interfering 
with that right even under the guise of competition law. In this 
regard, the application of competition law to the exercise of this 
right is said to be prima facie prohibited and may only be 
                                                                                                                        
Joseph P. Fishman, Creating around Copyright, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1333 (2015). 
Harv. L. Rev. F., 128, p.118. 
61 See US Department of Justice and US Federal Trade Commission, (2017). 
Antitrust Guidelines for the licensing of intellectual property. para. 1.0. Available 
at https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download [Accessed 20 May 2017] 
[Henceforth, “US Antitrust Guidelines 2017”]. 
62 See Kretschmer 2010 supra at 144. Also see Corbett 2011 supra at 433, 
referring to copyright as “a commodity”; Andersen and others 2000 supra at 6, 
23. 
63 Towse 2016a supra at 135-8; Rajan 2010 supra at pp.931-2; Drexl 2013 supra 
at 5. 
64 See Van Aswegen, P.F. (2003). Right to exclude others from using claimed 
intellectual property: A perspective from competition law, The. Stellenbosch L. 




undertaken “in exceptional circumstances”.65  
2.2.2 Beyond exclusive rights: the promotion of competition 
Apart from the role of exclusive copyright protection in promoting 
competition in copyright markets, copyright law contains other 
provisions and adopts other doctrines to encourage competition in 
the copyright market. These provisions aim at providing a balance 
between the exclusive rights and control of copyright owners, and 
the rights of access by copyright users. Further, such provisions 
may also constitute the basis for designing and deploying business 
models that aid increased access to copyright products as 
exemplified in the case of Google Books (developed on the basis 
of the US fair use exception).66  
Corollary to the foregoing, the succeeding paragraphs of this 
sub-section examines the provision for a limited term of copyright 
protection resulting in the notion of “public domain” 67 , the fair 
dealing provision, and other provisions for limitations and 
exceptions to copyright protection, 68  the originality requirement, 
and the idea-expression dichotomy.69 While copyright owners may 
exercise their exclusive rights to encourage competition by 
substitution, copyright users can also rely on these provisions or 
“internal safeguards”70 to compete by creating copyright-protected 
products which may act as substitutes for other protected products. 
Such internal safeguards may also prevent copyright owners from 
restricting the public from finding satisfactory market substitutes. 
Each of these elements is briefly explained below. 
                                                 
65 See Drexl 2013 supra at 36. Also, Van Aswegen 2003 supra at 125-6.  
66 See Stadler 2007 supra at 903; Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 13-4829 (2d 
Cir. 2015). 
67 Corbett 2011 supra at 528.  
68 Cross and Yu 2007 supra, note 26 at 429. Sections 12, 13 and 14 of South 
African Copyright Act. 
69 See Cross and Yu 2007 supra at 429. Also, Katz 2013 supra at 212. 




Limitations regarding the subject matter of protection 
Copyright protects only original expressions and does not protect 
ideas, procedures and the like. According to the TRIPs Agreement 
to which both South Africa and Nigeria are signatories to, 
“copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, 
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as 
such”.71 Even when copyright subsists in a work, copyright applies 
only to copying the expression or substantial part thereof, but it is 
not an infringement to copy any facts contained therein or any idea, 
process, system, and so on that the work describes.72 As a result, 
copyright protection is designed in such manner as to not prevent 
others from selling competing substitutes, 73  which may include 
those based on ideas or information copied from the first.  
Indeed, by removing facts and ideas from the exclusive 
preserve of copyright protection, copyright law applies to ensure 
that any person or firm may freely apply such facts and ideas to 
several other uses.74 By implication, the copyright owner may still 
exercise his exclusive rights but such would not be at the detriment 
of other competitive uses of the ideas or facts underlying the 
product protected by copyright.75 The author’s work competes with 
other works in the market for the underlying idea. The focus in this 
case is not on the specific work itself, rather it is for the original 
expression in each work.76 
On a related matter, copyright law requires that for a work to 
be eligible for copyright under the Copyright Act, sufficient effort 
                                                 
71  Article 9(2) TRIPs Agreement. 
72 Indeed, the fact that the making of a work involved some form of copyright 
infringement would not alone constitute grounds for ineligibility. See section 1(4) 
of the Nigerian Copyright Act. See also, Ola 2014 supra at p. 12. 
73 Breyer, S. (1970). The uneasy case for copyright: A study of copyright in 
books, photocopies, and computer programs. Harvard Law Review, pp.281-351. 
74 Katz 2013 supra at 213. 
75 Ibid. 




must have been expended on the work to give it an original 
character and it must have been fixed in a definite medium directly 
perceivable or perceivable with the aid of any device or machine.77 
In essence, the originality requirement demands that the work is an 
independent creation of the creator and that some exertion is 
expected from the author. In South Africa a work is considered 
original if, in addition to independent creation, “sufficient skill and 
effort” have been expended in creating it. 78 The originality 
requirement is interpreted in substantially the same way in 
Nigeria.79  
By protecting only original expressions, copyright protection 
will by implication, be unavailable to works that do not measure up 
to such standards. Copyright owners may therefore be incentivised 
to create quality, original works to be sure to enjoy the benefit of 
copyright protection. Users are, by extension, able to have access 
to quality copyright products.  
Limited term of protection 
Copyright protection does not exist in perpetuity. Rather, the 
protection lasts for a stated period. In the case of Nigeria, the term 
of copyright protection in a musical work is life of the author plus 70 
years.80 Upon the expiration of the term of protection, the protected 
work is said to enter the public domain.81 A work created in 1900 
whose author died in 1930, will enter the public domain in 2000. 
Once a given work enters the public domain, there is no risk of 
                                                 
77 See section 1(2)(a) and (b) of the Nigerian Copyright Act. Also, see the South 
African case of Waylite Diary CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645. 
78 See Harms 2012 supra at 201-9. Also, Juta & Company. Dean, O.H. (2006). 
Handbook of South African copyright law, loose-leaf updates. Juta, Cape Town, 
1-15 - 1-17. 
79 Nwogu, M.I.O. (2015). Copyright Law and the menace of piracy in Nigeria. JL 
Pol'y & Globalization, 34, pp.114-5. 
80 See Section 2(2) and the First Schedule to the Nigerian Copyright Act. The 
duration of protection in the case of South Africa is 50 years. See section 3(2) of 
the South African Copyright Act. 




infringement and no need for permission or licence to use the work. 
As a result, the public domain generates further creativity and 
wider dissemination of copyright works to the public as consumers 
can freely enjoy public domain works and (other) authors can build 
upon such works to create new works.82  
The limited term of copyright serves to increase the chances 
that the work in the public domain will generate more competitive 
pricing for similar works that still enjoy copyright protection. 83 
Limited term also serves to reduce the cost of future works that 
seeks to build on existing works. 84  Likewise, to successfully 
compete with works and attract higher prices, new works have to 
offer something better, or at least different, than the said works.85 It 
must be noted that the benefits of a limited term of protection may 
have been substantially whittled down by the length of the term of 
protection. The initial 14 years term provided for in the Statute of 
Anne has now given way to protection for the life of the author plus 
70 years.86 As Katz rightly notes: “…the public benefit arising from 
current copyright terms that can easily exceed a century is highly 
doubtful”.87 
                                                 
82 Erickson and Kretschmer 2014 supra at 6. Deazley, R (2006). Rethinking 
copyright: history, theory, language. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
118. Also, Greenleaf, G. and Bond, C. (2013). Public rights in copyright: What 
makes Up Australia's public domain? Australian Intellectual Property Journal, 23, 
132. 
83 Katz 2013 supra at 211-2. 
84 Erickson, K., Heald, P., Homberg, F., Kretschmer, M. and Mendis, D. (2015). 
Copyright and the Value of the Public Domain. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/56
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85 Katz, A. (2009). Substitution and Schumpeterian effects over the life cycle of 
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What contracts cannot do: The limits of private ordering in facilitating a creative 
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open licensing, see Frosio, G (2014). Open access publishing: A literature 
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Another internal safeguard within the copyright law system for the 
protection of competition is the exception regarding fair dealing in 
both South Africa and Nigeria. Fair dealing extends the rights of 
users by allowing them to use substantial parts or the whole of a 
copyright-protected work without incurring liability for copyright 
infringement liability. In South Africa, the fair dealing exceptions in 
the Copyright Act apply to literary (which includes dramatic) and 
musical works, artistic works, cinematographic films, sound 
recordings, broadcasts, programme-carrying signals, published 
editions and computer programs.88 The fair dealing provisions in 
the current Act permits dealing with the work for research and 
private study, personal or private use, criticism and review, and 
reporting current events. The Act does not define the notion of 
fairness and as such the court has a wider discretion to consider 
everything relevant to the copyright owner’s rights and the public 
interest, in the specific context of the facts of each case, before 
reaching a decision as to whether an infringement occurred.  
 The Nigerian situation is quite similar to the scenario in 
South Africa. The Nigerian fair dealing exception like its South 
African counterpart permits research and private study, personal or 
private use.89 The second schedule to the Nigerian Copyright Act 
deals generally with exceptions to copyright infringement, 
particularly, paragraph (a) provides for fair dealing as follows: 
The doing of any of the acts mentioned in the said section 6 
by way of fair dealing for purposes of research, private use, 
criticism or review or the reporting of current events, subject 
to the condition that, if the use is public, it shall be 
accompanied by an acknowledgement of the title of the work 
and its authorship except where the work is incidentally 
included in a broadcast. 
                                                 
88 For the full bouquet of the fair dealing exception, see sections 12 to 19B of the 
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Similar to South Africa, there is no clear definition of what the 
concept of fairness means in relation to the term “fair dealing” 
under the Nigerian Copyright Act. Again, for the meaning and 
criteria to be applied in determining fairness in dealing with a given 
work falls within the discretion of the courts. However, courts may 
look at whether an objective viewer would consider that, the person 
is genuinely using the material for one of the purposes set out in 
the Act; and their use of it is fair in that context.90 Factors that may 
be considered in working out whether a use is “fair” include 
whether the person using the material is doing so for commercial 
purposes, and whether the copyright owner is financially prejudiced 
because of the use. The mere fact that the person using the 
material is not making a profit does not make it fair. 
Typically, the fair use model applicable in the US, Israel and 
the Philippines is widely considered as more expansive and flexible 
because of its open-ended nature, while the fair dealing model is 
considered narrow because of its closed, specific nature. However, 
it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the advantages 
and/or disadvantages of the approach to the definition of the fair 
dealing exception. For the purposes of this chapter, it is only 
pertinent to note that because of the fair dealing exception, 
copyright-protected works are used as a basis for further creativity, 
which will in turn compete with the first protected work in the 
copyright marketplace.91 
Based on the discussion of these two significant ways in 
which copyright law protects competition (that is, exclusivity and 
limitations), the utilitarian theory as justification for copyright 
protection may be understood. The next section now looks at the 
role of competition law in copyright policy. 
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2.3 The role of competition law 
As already stated, competition law provides a general regulatory 
framework to ensure the promotion and protection of competition in 
the marketplace. Competition law prohibits concerted conduct in 
terms of agreements that have the effect of substantially 
preventing, or lessening, competition in a market (“restrictive 
agreements”). It also prohibits unilateral conduct by firms in 
dominant market position where such unilateral conduct affects 
competition in the market place. In these circumstances, 
competition law may act as a complementary framework to 
guarantee that copyright owners are able to get the expected 
returns for investments made in creativity. Competition law may 
also complement copyright law by ensuring that neither concerted 
nor unilateral conduct restricts the wider distribution of copyright-
protected products. In achieving this purpose, competition law is 
applied to the creation of a fair and competitive market for creative 
works.92  
Restrictive agreements may be between firms in either a 
horizontal relationship or a vertical relationship. Specifically 
prohibited restrictive agreements include formation of price cartels - 
agreements in which firms (including copyright owners) use 
copyright for sharing markets or in entering into market‐foreclosure 
agreements; exclusivity agreements regarding the distribution of 
works, resale‐price maintenance, and the like. Sections 4 and 5 of 
the Competition Act in the case of South Africa and s 60 of the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Bill in the case of Nigeria 
cover such prohibited restrictive agreements. Where copyright 
owners or copyright users enter into agreement or contractual 
arrangements that have the effect of restricting competition by 
                                                 
92 Consumer Focus 2011 supra at p.2; Cross and Yu 2007 supra at 429 and 
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foreclosing the distribution of copyright products, such may be 
addressed by the relevant competition statute. Such application of 
competition law complements the goal of copyright law in ensuring 
wider distribution of copyright-protected products. 
 Competition law may also apply to unilateral conduct by 
firms (whether copyright owners, copyright users, distributors), 
which enjoy a dominant position in the market for distribution of 
creative works, to prohibit them from abusing their dominant 
market positions to the detriment of the market.93 In the case of 
conduct by the relevant copyright owner, competition law may 
apply to restrict the exercise of copyright protection.94 Indeed, the 
so-called interface between copyright and competition law has 
been the attempts to apply competition law to address what is 
perceived as the undue exercise of copyright or other intellectual 
property rights. The exclusive nature of the copyright owner’s rights 
is interpreted as conferring the copyright owner with market power 
in the competition law sense. 
Specifically, based on the right to exclusivity conferred on 
the copyright owner under the Copyright Act, such copyright owner 
may, where he has the requisite dominant position, contravene s 8 
of the South African Competition Act that deals with the “abuse of a 
dominant position”. Section 8 provides that: 
It is prohibited for a dominant firm to: 
(a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers; 
(b) refuse to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is 
economically feasible to do so; 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph 
(d), if the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive, gain; or 
(d) engage in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm 
concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive, 
gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act: 
(i) requiring or inducing a supplier or customer to not deal with a 
competitor; 
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(ii) refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying 
those goods is economically feasible; 
(iii) selling goods or services on condition that the buyer purchases 
separate goods or services unrelated to the object of a contract, or 
forcing a buyer to accept a condition unrelated to the object of a 
contract; 
(iv) selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable 
cost; or 
(v) buying-up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources 
required by a competitor. 
Any such conduct will constitute a contravention of the Competition 
Act. Similarly, other firms outside the copyright owner may be 
subject of competition law enforcement under this provision, in the 
interest of the distribution of copyright products. However, as 
earlier stated, the copyright owner or some other relevant firm may 
be able to escape the brunt of this section if he/she/it qualifies for 
an exemption in terms of s 10(4) of the Act.95 
In Nigeria, there is no provision for a specific list of conduct 
prohibited as abuse of dominance. However, a copyright owner 
who “enjoys a position of economic strength enabling it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market and 
having the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently 
of its competitors, customers and ultimately of the consumers” will 
be considered to have abused its dominant position96 and may be 
liable to comply with the directives of the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Commission97 and/or “a fine of not less than 
ten per cent of its turnover in the preceding business year or such 
higher percentage as the court may determine under the 
circumstances of the particular case”.98 This is also the case where 
the activities of such copyright owner “have the effect of 
unreasonably lessening competition in a market; and impeding the 
                                                 
95 See Section 1.2, above. 
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transfer or dissemination of technology”.99  
In this regard, the abuse sought to be addressed is that 
implemented by the copyright owner who may be allegedly acting 
outside the scope of the copyright protection.100  There is much 
emphasis placed on the unilateral conduct of the copyright owner 
in what would be the exercise of its exclusive rights as copyright 
owner. Harrison explains this in the context of online music:101 
…Licensing practices seem to fall into three ranges. In the first range, 
the copyright holder uses its power simply to preclude free riding. Efforts 
of this sort find a safe haven within copyright laws. At the next level, the 
effort is to expand the effect of exclusivity beyond that granted by 
copyright but not to the point of having an impact on an economically 
significant market. Finally, the use of the exclusivity may have a 
sufficient impact on an economically significant market to raise an 
antitrust issue. 
However, as stated above, such application and indeed, other 
external doctrines are largely applied when copyright protection is 
regarded as a monopoly right, which may be abused to the 
detriment of competition. In such instances, competition law may 
be applied to restrict the exercise of copyright and direct the 
issuance of a compulsory licence in the interest of competition. 
In Magill, 102  the European Commission’s decision, which 
was upheld by the Court of First Instance and Court of Justice, 
required the broadcasters for television programme listings to grant 
a license to third parties willing to publish a comprehensive weekly 
guide. The courts found that the firms under investigation enjoyed 
                                                 
99 Section 73(4)(a) and (b) of the Nigerian Competition Bill. 
100 For instance, the copyright misuse doctrine in the US is invoked when a 
defendant in an infringement suit argues that the copyright owner’s action is 
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a de facto monopoly over the information used to compile listings. 
It was also found that their refusal to license was an abuse of their 
dominant position, as the refusal prevented the appearance of a 
new product for which there was a potential consumer demand 
(“new product test”). The “new product test” primarily focuses on 
the development of new products for consumers in the downstream 
market.103 This interpretation was also supported by the fact that 
there was no actual or potential substitute to the product, and that 
there was no objective justification for a refusal. Rather, the IPRs 
owners were reserving for themselves the secondary market of 
weekly guides by refusing to license IPRs that were indispensable 
for operating in the secondary market. All these factors 
represented “exceptional circumstances”, which ultimately led the 
Commission to apply competition law and impose a compulsory 
license. 
While Magill was unclear as to whether the “exceptional 
circumstances test” was cumulative or separate,104 the test itself 
strongly influenced further decisions of the EU courts especially in 
the cases of IMS Health105 and Microsoft106. These later cases 
contributed to expand the scope of Magill. 
In IMS Health, the CJEU substantially followed Magill and 
also stated that the tests proposed in the Magill case was to be 
applied cumulatively and that both tests must be satisfied for the 
                                                 
103  Colston, C. and Galloway, J. (2010). Modern Intellectual Property Law. 
Taylor & Francis, p.432. 
104 Other criticisms of the decision related to the absence of guidance on the 
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finding of a competition violation. Specifically, the court took the 
view that a compulsory license should not be issued where the 
competitors only propose “clones” of the main product. Only the 
advancement of innovative processes, through development of 
new products, may justify a limitation of IPRs through the grant of a 
compulsory license (“innovation balance test”).107  
In Microsoft, the court further expanded on the tests 
proposed in the Magill and IMS Health cases. The court broadened 
the “new product test” by interpreting it as a “limitation to technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers under Article 
102(b)”.108 In the court’s view, a compulsory license was justified 
where the complainant has shown that the refusal to license is 
likely to harm consumers.109 Here, consumer harm for this purpose 
is primarily interpreted in terms of consumer choice, or lack of it.110 
This interpretation has been criticised as capable of discouraging 
investments into innovative but costly research.111 
In all, these EU cases show the role of competition law in 
the exercise of copyright. The application of competition law to 
restrict the exercise of IPRs can only be made in “exceptional 
circumstances” and mere existence of IPR will not confer 
                                                 
107 See Anderman, S. (2004). Does the Microsoft Case offer a New Paradigm for 
the ‘Exceptional Circumstances’ Test and Compulsory Copyright Licenses under 
EC Competition Law. The Competition Law Review, 1(2), p.13. Also, Park 2010 
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dominance. The decision in these cases especially as to the test to 
be applied in determining what would constitute “exceptional 
circumstances” in which a competition authority would interfere 
with the exercise of copyright and issue a compulsory licence; is 
noteworthy for the direction it provides on the relationship between 
IP generally and competition law.112 It is also significant for the 
direction it offers on when competition law will impose compulsory 
licence. That said, it is important to note that this thesis is based on 
a different perspective: its focus is on the conduct of the platform 
firm rather than the conduct of the copyright owners as explored in 
those cases and in the South African cases discussed, below. The 
competition law approach to compulsory licences may however, 
influence policy considerations that may lead to statutory 
compulsory licences under copyright law as argued in Chapter six, 
below.113 
Notably, the application of competition law to restrict the 
exercise of copyright per se has rarely yielded the expected result 
of interfering with copyright protection.114 Two South African, two 
cases are instructive.115  
In DW Integrators CC and SAS Institute (Pty) Ltd116 decided 
by the South African Competition Tribunal, the defendant, a large 
software firm, which holds IPRs on software program was alleged 
to have abused its dominant position. SAS had an arrangement 
with DWI and had licensed DWI to use the IPRs in its business of 
supporting other firms using the SAS software programs. SAS, 
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however, refused to continue this agreement and DWI sought an 
“interim relief”117 on the grounds that the refusal of SAS was anti-
competitive. DWI argued that inter alia that SAS’s software 
constituted an essential facility and, therefore, SAS was under a 
duty to license to DWI. While the Tribunal did not consider whether 
the software indeed constituted an essential facility since DWI had 
failed to establish the relevant market,118 the Tribunal suggested 
that there were other suppliers of similar software.119 Furthermore, 
the Tribunal refused to accept the market definition proposed by 
DWI because DWI had narrowly defined the market to make SAS a 
dominant market operator. Specifically, the Tribunal did not accept 
DWI’s argument that SAS’s IPRs constituted a proper market and 
that SAS’s refusal to license was an attempt to leverage market 
dominance to the service market. 120  Rather, the Competition 
Tribunal advised that, “caution is particularly well‐advised when 
dealing with the interface between anti‐ trust and intellectual 
property”.121 In this regard, the Tribunal relied on the decision of 
the US Federal Circuit court in the case of Atari Games Corp. v. 
Nintendo of America, Inc.,122 where the court warned that: 
…the danger of disturbing the complementary balance struck by 
Congress is great when a court is asked to preliminarily enjoin conduct 
affecting patent and antitrust rights. A preliminary injunction entered into 
without a sufficient factual basis and findings, though intended to 
maintain the status quo, can offend the public policies embodied in both 
the patent and the anti‐ trust laws. 
In Mandla‐ Matla Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Independent Newspapers 
                                                 
117 See section 59 of the South African Competition Act. 
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(Pty) Ltd,123 the complainant argued that the respondent’s action in 
holding back information on the distribution of the IsiZulu 
newspaper and in insisting on providing the information only if the 
complainant and its business partner entered into distribution 
agreements for certain districts, was anti-competitive.  
The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Competition 
Commission against the complainant. The Tribunal found that 
instead of restricting distribution, the respondent’s conduct actually 
resulted in broader circulation and more sales. Accordingly, the 
Tribunal held that such situation was pro-competitive as the 
complainant was compelled to build up its own distribution network 
in response to the respondent’s competitive advantage. The 
Tribunal took the view that the claim could only be justified under 
essential‐facilities doctrine.124 Therefore, the Tribunal considered 
the claim to grant access to respondent’s distribution system as 
“anti ‐ competitive” as the refusal had even promoted 
competition. 125  Further, although the Tribunal found that the 
respondent had exercised market dominance in convincing 
distributors not to sell the complainant’s newspaper, 126  such 
conduct had no anti ‐ competitive effect as required for a 
competition law infraction.127 For this reason, the complaint was 
dismissed.128  
In summary, the application of competition law in cases 
outside the “internal safeguards” has traditionally been undertaken 
to curtail the copyright owner’s undue exercise of his exclusive 
rights. The possible anti-competitive effects of conduct relating to 
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the exercise of copyright may result in the application of 
competition law to restrict the exercise of the exclusive rights. With 
its rules on monopoly and abuse of market dominance, competition 
law can be applied to cases where a copyright owner refuses to 
issue a licence and may be applied to restrict the exclusivity of 
rights where the exercise of such right appears excessive and 
detrimental to consumer welfare. 129  However, such restrictive 
application of competition law to the exercise of copyright by the 
copyright owner is typically unsuccessful due to the availability of 
substitutable copyright products that whittle down the required 
market power of the copyright owner. Moreover, as Chapter five 
will argue, such approach constitutes an incomplete consideration 
of the role of competition law in copyright and copyright-related 
industries. The prohibitions stipulated within competition law may 
apply to the conduct of any firm so long as such conduct restricts 
competition and/or the relevant firm is in a market dominant 
position in terms of the competition statute. This argument may be 
particularly apposite for the open and freemium music business 
model where the focus is on the import of the actions and activities 
of the platform firms as distributors and users of copyright-
protected music content. 130  Its point of divergence from the 
traditional copyright and competition law interface relates to its 
application to the conduct of other persons or firms (outside the 
copyright owner exercising its exclusive rights), which deal with 
content or product protected by copyright law. Here, competition 
law applies as a distinct body of law and there is no conflict in the 
traditional sense between the two fields of law.131 Section 2.3.1 
below, highlights another perspective to the application of 
                                                 
129 Consumer Focus 2011 supra at 6-8. See also, Drexl 2013 supra at 40- 41. 
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competition law to the exercise of copyright as well as another 
significant role which competition law may play in the achievement 
of the goals of copyright law. 
2.3.1 The complementarity theory 
The acknowledgement that competition law can complement the 
role of copyright law in incentivising creativity and encouraging the 
wider dissemination of copyright works is encapsulated in the 
theory of complementarity.132 In this regard, competition law is not 
applied to restrict the exercise of copyright but rather, competition 
law uses its legal tools in a complementary manner to serve the 
same goals of incentivising creativity and enhancing consumer 
welfare. 133  Nevertheless, the existence of other complementary 
paradigms for incentivising creativity does not mean that copyright 
should be jettisoned. Rather, copyright is complemented with these 
regimes so that they can co-exist. 134  As Drexl explains, 135  the 
theory of complementarity was first recognised in 1995 in the US IP 
Licensing Guidelines and reiterated in the EU Technology Transfer 
Guidelines of 2004. 136  Notably, the recent US IP Licensing 
Guidelines issued in 2017 reiterates similar provisions as the 1995 
                                                 
132 See Santos, A. (2013). Nurturing creative industries in the developing world: 
The case of alternative systems of music production and distribution. Mich. St. 
U. Coll. L. Int'l L. Rev., 21, p.623 (hereafter, Santos 2013). 
133  Consumer Focus 2011 supra at 2, 18. Also, Russi 2011 supra at 170; 
Polverino 2012 supra at p.1, Newman 2013 supra at 1443; Santos 2013 supra at 
624; Gal, M. and Rubinfeld, D. (2015). The hidden costs of free goods: 
Implications for antitrust enforcement. UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper 
No. 2529425., p.40. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2529425. 
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134 See Santos 2013 supra at 624, 628. 
135 See Drexl 2013 supra at p. 38. 
136 Commission Notice ‐ Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty to technology transfer agreements OJ No. 2004/C 101/02, paragraph 7. 
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and US Federal Trade Commission, (1995). Antitrust Guidelines for the licensing 
of intellectual property. p.2. Available at 
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version in recognising the theory of complementarity.137 Likewise, 
similar provisions are made in the revised EU Technology Transfer 
Guidelines of 2014.138 
Copyright law encourages creativity by granting the 
copyright owner an exclusive bundle of rights for a limited 
period.139 Exclusive rights safeguard the creative efforts and the 
investments of the copyright owner by restricting imitation 
(copying), which may reduce the commercial value of the copyright 
work. In a case where the commercial value of a copyright work is 
reduced by copying, the copyright owner is unable to recoup his 
investments and may be discouraged from further creativity – 
ultimately affecting the consumers. Consumer welfare or public 
interest is further enhanced by provisions that permit limited and 
specific uses of a copyright work during its term of protection 
without the consent of the copyright owner, provision of a limited 
term of protection during which the exclusive rights of the owner 
may be exercised and the use of copyright-inspired tools such as 
collecting societies and blanket licensing 140  to ensure wider 
opportunities for the availability and dissemination of copyright 
works. In the same vein, competition law promotes creativity and 
enhances consumer welfare by prohibiting concerted and/or 
unilateral conduct where it may distort or harm competition in the 
                                                 
137 US Antitrust Guidelines 2017 supra at p.2. 
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OJ No. 2014/C 89/03), paragraph 7. [Henceforth, “EC Technology Transfer 
Guidelines 2014”]. 
139 See US Antitrust Guidelines 2017 supra at p.2.. 
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Collecting Societies and Digital Rights: Is there a case for a Centralised Digital 
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(copyright) marketplace.141  
Based on this theory of complementarity, the competition 
law assessment of the conduct of the copyright owner in the 
copyright marketplace may involve checking whether such conduct 
accomplishes or prevents the achievement of the objectives of 
incentivising creativity and enhancing consumer welfare. 142 
Usually, such checks do not apply the same parameters as 
copyright law. 143  Indeed, the conduct of the copyright owner in 
exercising exclusive rights may ordinarily appear restrictive of 
competition, but is encouraged on the grounds that the pro-
competitive effects of such conduct outweighs the anti-competitive 
effects. 144  For example, the exercise of copyright may be anti-
competitive in that it restricts competition by preventing competitors 
from competing with the copyright owner in respect of his rights. 
The same exercise of copyright can be pro-competitive in the 
sense that it forces competitors to create their own works and 
compete on the basis of their works rather than compete by 
imitating or copying another’s creative efforts.145 Kolstad explains 
this in economic terms: 
But the key issue is not to maximise static and dynamic efficiency, 
respectively, but to maximise the sum of both static and dynamic 
efficiency. If the overriding goal is an efficient use of society’s scarce 
resources, the task is to find the interpretation of Articles 81 and 82146 
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[Accessed 4 Nov. 2015] (hereafter, Haunss 2013); Klebanow and Wu 2015 
supra at 34-5. 
145 See Consumer Focus 2011 supra at 6, 9 and 18. Also, Russi 2011 supra at 
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that gives the best overall result...The challenge is to develop an 
analytical framework that includes the effects on dynamic competition 
and dynamic efficiency in the analysis of conduct alleged to be contrary 
to articles 81 and 82. This is especially important for the analysis of 
conduct based on IPRs. IPRs promote innovations and technological 
progress, and if this is not recognised in competition analysis one risks 
prohibiting conduct that may have a positive effect on dynamic 
efficiency. When assessing whether conduct based on IPRs is contrary 
to Articles 81 and 82, the effects of the conduct on both static and 
dynamic efficiency must be taken into account. Only if the sum is 
negative is the conduct contrary to the efficiency goal of Articles 81 and 
82.147 
This application of competition law extends to conduct by persons 
or entities other than the copyright owner. In the case of provision 
of music content “free-of-charge” to the consumers, there may be 
real benefits to consumers and as such may be considered pro-
competitive.148 However, this is not always so. Depending on the 
modalities of providing the music content free-of-charge, there may 
be significant anti-competitive effects.149 Indeed, despite the fact 
that the consumer does not pay a direct price for free music 
content, there are indirect “prices” (such as the free music content 
reducing the ability of at least some firms to provide competing 
works) that reflect the opportunity cost associated with the 
consumption of free music content. Despite this opportunity cost, 
the provision of free music content can improve consumer welfare. 
In relation to the deployment of the open and freemium music 
business model and indeed conduct in the copyright marketplace, 
the theory of complementarity, therefore, advocates the 
consideration of both the pro- and anti-competitive effects of such 
business models. 
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The open and freemium music business model is an 
increasingly popular business model applied in the distribution of 
music content in Nigeria and South Africa. This thesis weighs both 
the pro and anti-competitive effects of conduct involved in the open 
and freemium music business model as represented by the 
copyright terms. By doing so, this thesis deploys the 
complementarity framework to the consideration of how the 
business model may be regulated by copyright law as 
complemented by competition law.150  
Accordingly, given the importance of copyright protection for 
the larger copyright market and the way in which competition law 
prohibits both anti-competitive concerted and unilateral conduct, it 
becomes clear that competition law may play a significant role in 
relation to the use of copyright-protected content in the course of 
economic activities. Where the conduct of any person or entity 
involved in the deployment of copyright-based business models 
(including the open and freemium music business model) harms or 
distorts the functioning of copyright markets, such conduct is 
opposed to the very objectives of copyright law. In such case, 
competition law may also be applied to maintain the proper 
functioning of such copyright market.151 Competition law will apply 
to treat any conduct that harms the functioning of copyright 
markets, regardless of whether such conduct is initiated by 
copyright owners, and/or distributors of copyright products. 
Especially when initiated by distributors, the harm to competition is 
highlighted by the fact that such conduct may encourage or 
increase the chances of piracy and/or copyright infringement.152 
Further, piracy and copyright infringement may dislodge copyright 
owners who are small businesses from participating in the market 
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for the production and distribution of copyright products. A lack of 
authors, entrepreneurs, and SMEs who churn out creative products 
will be to the detriment of consumers, as there is reduced 
availability of creative products. Competition law can protect the 
economic freedom of market participants in the interest of the 
competitive process.   
In the above regard, it is evident that the theory of 
complementarity aligns with the incentive theory of copyright law. 
Both approaches assert that the economic incentives offered by 
the exclusion of third parties from dealing with the copyright work, 
are required to incentivise creativity and encourage recoupment of 
cost of creativity.153 However, protected works may sometimes be 
produced for reasons other than financial or economic gains and 
there seems to be no compelling evidence that copyright protection 
is the reason for creativity. These, regardless, the complementary 
role of competition law is about weighing both the pro-competitive 
and anti-competitive effects of conduct that involve the use of 
copyright-protected content. Such consideration ensures that the 
application of the prohibition against anti-competitive concerted 
and/or unilateral conduct works in favour of the goals of copyright 
law. 
Given a choice between the application of copyright law and 
competition law to conduct involving the use of copyright-protected 
content as applicable in the open and freemium music business 
model, there may be some preference for one or the other. Indeed, 
there is some debate among scholars and governmental bodies as 
to the appropriate manner in which such question is to be resolved 
and how copyright and competition law and policies should 
interact.154 Although it seems clear that greater weight is now given 
to complementary rather than conflicting application, there is no 
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definitive answer or consensus on the matter. However, by taking 
both incentive and complementarity theory into the consideration of 
how to apply copyright law and competition law in the open and 
freemium music business context, this thesis smoothens the areas 
of divergence.  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the relationship between copyright law and 
competition and some of the ways through which copyright law 
itself works to advance competition policy goals. It showed that the 
grant of exclusive rights promotes competition, as firms are 
incentivised to compete by substitution rather than by imitation or 
copying. It also showed how the exclusive rights provide a 
framework, consisting of revenue generation as a product of the 
response to the access and consumption needs of users and 
consumers, can explain some key elements of the law, and provide 
guidance in its further development. The chapter also 
demonstrated how the limited term of copyright, limitations on 
subject matter, fair dealing and other limitations and exceptions to 
copyright protection apply to ensure that the copyright protection 
may not unduly constrict the interests of copyright users in 
accessing and enjoying copyright products.  
The principle under which copyright protection generates 
competition as firms strive to create more to obtain the benefit of 
copyright protection may theoretically find application also in the 
context of the open and freemium music business model. Beyond 
creating value, the business model is meant to capture value 
through revenue generation from business activities and 
processes. Revenue generation furnish the main incentive for 
rights-holders to distribute and/or control the dissemination of their 
music products. Here, indeed, the use of the copyright-protected 
music content generates revenue for platform firms exclusively 
despite their taking advantage of the copyright-protected music 




raises the question of how this conduct may be assessed. In this 
regard, questions arise regarding whether such conduct should 
form the basis of a claim in competition within the copyright system 
or whether it should be seen as the legitimate exercise of the 
platform owner’s control over its platform.  
 Extending the analysis to competition law, the chapter 
showed that the application of competition rules prohibiting as anti-
competitive; conduct which derail the functioning of copyright 
markets can complement the “efforts” of copyright law. The chapter 
further highlights an attractive feature of using competition law to 
complement the achievement of the goals of copyright law 
particularly in relation to the distribution of copyright products. The 
value of this approach lies principally in its ability to reframe the 
demands for financial incentives as a reality rather than an ideal for 
copyright owners. Further, it reframes public demands for access 
to copyright products as valid statutorily recognised entitlements 
similar to those accorded to copyright owners. Such language shift 
can help to restructure legal norms and negotiating strategies. 
Indeed, such a reframing encourages copyright reform advocates 
to engage with international competition law forums to clarify 
ambiguous treaty texts and evaluate copyright laws and policies 
from a competition-based perspective. 
As it will be better explained in the next chapters, the 
deployment of copyright to gain competitive advantage is central to 
the functioning of open and freemium music platforms, whose main 
aim is to generate revenue from advertising fuelled by unique uses 
of copyrights. The provision of an avenue for legitimate access to 
music content is central in the deployment of the open and 
freemium music business model, given that it deals with products 
protected by copyright law.155  Consent of and remuneration for the 
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copyright owner constitute a significant basis of the legitimacy of 
the access provided by the open and freemium music business 
model. Accordingly, the complementarity approach presents a 
veritable, apposite approach with which to consider and the 
interests of all relevant stakeholders in the model. The premise 
here is that there needs to be, and there is, a possibility of 
safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders for the proper 
functioning of the open and freemium music business model as a 
market for copyright goods. Lessons learnt from such approach will 
inform the suggestion in the thesis regarding how to address the 
challenges brought about by the open and freemium music 
business model and indeed, other internet-based business models 
dealing with copyright-protected products. 
The open and freemium music business model alters the 
ways in which music content is created, disseminated, and 
controlled, and like the print revolution of the Gutenberg era, may 
bring about significant economic, social, and political changes. In 
this regard, the instinctive reaction may be to further strengthen the 
rights of authors and copyright owners. But such reaction would be 
ineffective if there is insufficient attention to what the actual realities 
of the business model indicate for owners’ interests and also, how 
users’ interests might be equally essential for achieving copyright 
law’s ultimate purposes. To regulate the deployment of the open 
and freemium music business model, it is suggested that copyright 
law complemented by competition law may offer useful tools. To 
apply this regulatory framework, it is pertinent to understand the 
business model itself and how it addresses the interests and 
position of the copyright owners and the copyright users. As stated 
in Chapter one, above, this understanding is provided in the next 
chapter. This relates to the thesis’ primary question of how the 
copyright and competition law framework may be used to regulate 
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Chapter Three: Copyright terms in the open and 
freemium music business model  
3.1 Introduction 
The advent of today’s knowledge-based economy has increased 
the importance of copyright and made it more significant in the 
strategies and processes of many firms. Several firms have started 
to design and deploy new uses and new approaches to the use of 
copyright and have begun to market same, exclusively focusing on 
such new uses to fuel their core business. 1  Platform firms – 
companies that are primarily involved in other ventures but rely on 
music content and other copyright products to offer their services – 
are increasingly interested in generating profits from new, 
innovative ways of using music content rather than from traditional 
ways of selling or licensing music content. 2  In a context of 
increasing attention towards new ways of using and assessing 
copyright-protected content, the open and freemium music 
business model, its processes and copyright terms are of strategic 
importance.3 Digital platforms represent the most common vehicle 
for new uses and new ways of accessing music content in the open 
and freemium music business model. Seen in that light, platform 
firms may be considered as key partners to copyright owners as 
they have the capability to provide a means for artists, music 
publishers and record companies to connect more with fans and 
customers. 4  Through their digital platforms, platform firms also 
enable social interaction amongst other copyright users and also 
                                                 
1 See Towse 2017 supra at p.415-6. 
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provide a means for “social production”.5 The crucial function of 
platforms and platform firms in this context has also been 
recognised in many countries including South Africa and Nigeria 
where the umbrella body for the recorded music industry, the 
International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) noted 
the steady rise in the number of such platforms in the two 
countries.6 Indeed, everyone nowadays seems to be familiar with 
these digital platforms, from the most basic to the most 
sophisticated of them. These digital platforms include 
YouTube.com, SoundCloud.com, Notjustok.com and 
Facebook.com, which are digital platforms that have become 
increasingly popular for being used inter alia, in the sharing and 
creation of music content and other copyright-protected products.7 
Majority of these digital platforms are multinational internet 
companies with footprints across many jurisdictions in the light of 
the global reach of the internet.8 
The popularity and utility of the platform firms also contribute 
to their significance to both copyright owners and users of 
copyright-protected music content. Accordingly, their business 
model as it relates to the use of copyright-protected content 
provides an interesting case study for exploring the promotion of 
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competition through the copyright law framework as complemented 
by competition law. In view of the objective of this study in 
identifying and exploring possible avenues to apply copyright and 
competition law for the purpose of regulating the open and 
freemium music business model, there is need to understand the 
business model itself and the activities undertaken as part of 
deploying the business model.9 
Section 3.2 provides a definition and description of the open 
and freemium music business model. A concise definition has been 
provided in Chapter one, above.10 However, a fuller definition is 
provided in this chapter to aid better understanding of the contours 
of the business model as explored in this thesis. In this regard, 
rather than attempting to cover all aspects of the business model, 
the focus of this chapter is limited to the way music content is used 
and applied by the platform firms themselves and the import of 
such application on copyright owners and users. Sections 3.3 and 
3.4 respectively examine the processes and copyright terms 
implemented in the open and freemium music business model. In 
this regard, given that copyright law protects music content, there 
is much focus on the various uses applied to the music content 
from a copyright law perspective. Section 3.5 briefly reviews the 
nature of the relationships and interests of the various stakeholders 
in the context of the open and freemium music business model. 
The deployment of the open and freemium music business model 
implies the convergence of music content owned and accessed by 
different parties. Such relationships are not easy to manage and 
there are different stakes in issue. Given the fact that the business 
model operates on the Internet, the processes and policies apply 
globally across each jurisdiction. However, their acceptance or 
rejection depends on the nuances of the music industry in each 
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jurisdiction. Accordingly, section 3.5 provides a brief overview of 
the stakeholders in the South African and Nigerian music industry 
as a way of placing the process and policies in better perspective. 
In concluding the chapter, section 3.6 provides the 
foundation for the identification and analysis of the regulatory 
terrain to be discussed in the subsequent chapters.   
3.2 Characterising the open and freemium music business 
model 
Usually, business models are better explained from the context of a 
specific firm or enterprise operating in a stated industry. In other 
words, as conceptual blueprints, business models identify the 
customers and value propositions11  of a particular firm and are 
tools for a firm to convert plans and strategies into operations.12 
However, the notions of “open and freemium” business models are 
not identified in the business model literature as pertaining to any 
specific industry or sector. Instead, within the business model 
literature, open and freemium business models are prototypes of a 
category of activities that may be undertaken by any organisation 
in the creation and delivery of value. 13  These prototypes are 
distinct from the product, organisation, industry, sector or network. 
As prototypes, the description of the open and freemium business 
models may not be centred on a focal organisation but their 
boundaries are determined by those of the firm deploying the 
business model as well as the economic activities within the 
industry or sector in which they are deployed. 14   The “open 
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business model” and the “freemium business model” are 
expressions used in the adjectival sense to explain how 
organisations create and deliver their value proposition as well as 
how they generate revenue.15  
3.2.1 Open vs. Proprietary  
The business model literature distinguishes between proprietary 
and non-proprietary business models, and between open and 
closed business models. These classifications have been subject 
of debate, in particular, regarding the meaning of “open” in relation 
to the business model. Some scholars construe the notions of 
proprietary and openness as being not necessarily incongruous. 
Hence, it is possible to have both a proprietary and open business 
model, depending on the definitions adopted. 16  Other scholars 
posit that proprietary business models are usually closed, as they 
require access to the copyright owner or firm’s intellectual property 
rights (for example, copyright), and link the notion of openness only 
to business models that do not restrict access to such intellectual 
property rights.17 
                                                                                                                        
https://www.cs.duke.edu/courses/cps182s/compsci342s/cps182s/spring05/assig
n/project/fall03/raz3_1/opencontent.pdf (accessed 13 June 2015) (hereafter, 
Preston and Zurer 2003). 
15 Several authors aptly demonstrate this. For instance, Chesbrough in his book 
“Open Business Models: How to thrive in the new innovation landscape”, 
explains how organisations can adopt and maintain an “open” or “more open” 
business model. Chesbrough, H. (2006). Open Business Models: How to Thrive 
in the New Innovation Landscape. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School 
Press. Also, Osterwalder and Pigneur explain “open” and “freemium” as each 
having “specific patterns”, “similar characteristics, similar arrangements of 
business model Building Blocks, or similar behaviors”. These patterns form the 
basis of such business models. See Osterwalder and Pigneur supra at p.49. See 
also, Chesbrough, H.W., 2006. The era of open innovation. Managing innovation 
and change, 127(3), pp.34-41. 
16  Müller, R.M., Kijl, B. and Martens, J.K. (2011). A comparison of inter-
organizational business models of mobile app stores: There is more than open 
vs. closed. Journal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research, 
6(2), pp.63-76; Trott, P. and Hartmann, D.A.P. (2009). Why 'open innovation' is 
old wine in new bottles. International Journal of Innovation Management, 13(04), 
pp.715-736. 
17 Chesbrough, H. (2003). The logic of open innovation: managing intellectual 




In relation to music business models, the notion of “open” 
may be defined in the context of whether the proprietary rights in 
copyright are retained or waived. In such instance, music business 
models would be described as proprietary when the use of the 
music content requires access to and the right to use or exercise 
the exclusive bundle of rights provided by copyright law. 18 
Accordingly, a firm or copyright owner who reserves and exercises 
the entire exclusive rights provided by copyright law and requires a 
(paid) license or exclusive assignment before legitimate use can be 
made, may be said to be deploying a proprietary business model.19 
On the other hand, when the music business model is open or non-
proprietary, it would not be necessary to negotiate a licensing 
agreement, or pay for the purchase of music content or request 
permission to use or modify the music content. The relevant 
copyright owner would have obliterated this need by providing a 
licence and indicating terms which permit many uses of the music 
content. For instance, a copyright owner may provide a Creative 
Commons20  license such as the “Attribution 21 ” and “Attribution-
Share Alike22” licenses with respect to the use of his copyright-
protected music content.  The Attribution license permits other 
persons to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon existing work, 
                                                 
18 Ibid. See also Osterwalder and Pignuer 2010 supra at 49. 
19 Ibid. See also Chesbrough 2003 supra at 35. 
20  Creative Commons is an organization established for the purpose of 
increasing the availability of creative works which the public may legally access 
and build upon. Towards this commitment, the Creative Commons has designed 
a range of licences available to the public free-of-charge and which may be used 
to permit different level of access for users of creative works. See Creative 
Commons. (2017). What we do - Creative Commons. [online] Available at: 
https://creativecommons.org/about/ [Accessed 20 Nov. 2017]. See also, 
Dusollier, S. (2006). The master's tools v. the master's house: Creative 
commons v. copyright. Columbia Journal of Law & Arts, 29, p.274 (hereafter, 
Dusollier 2006); Elkin-Koren, N. (2005). What contracts cannot do: The limits of 
private ordering in facilitating a creative commons. Fordham L. Rev., 74, p.383. 
21 See Corbett 2011 supra at 512; Dusollier 2006 supra at p.275. 
22 This license permits others to remix, tweak, and build upon existing work even 
for commercial purposes, as long as they credit the copyright owner and also 
license their new creations under the identical terms. See Corbett 2011 supra at 




even commercially, provided that such person credits the copyright 
owner for the original creation. 23  Music content may also be 
distributed under the “open music archive” system, which permits 
the use of music held in common by a group as a whole. 24   
Further, the notion of open and freemium music business 
models may be considered from some other perspectives: access 
to the creative process and access to the music content once 
created or produced.25 
First, the creative process refers to the development and 
approval of the music content by the relevant copyright owner.26 
Access to the creative process may then be interpreted as being 
open when: (a) interested persons or firms are not restricted from 
using the music content and the rights inherent in them, to create 
new (copyright-protected) products; 27  and/or (b) there is 
collaboration (inviting external persons or firms or using their 
protected subject-matter) in the creation of a firm’s music content.28 
Many authors and business scholars have confirmed the 
                                                 
23 ibid. 
24  According to the open music archive website, “[T]he Open Music Archive 
concerns itself with the public domain and creative works which are not owned 
by any one individual and are held in common by society as a whole”. See 
Openmusicarchive.org. (2017). Open Music Archive - About. [online] Available 
at: http://www.openmusicarchive.org/about.php [Accessed 20 Nov. 2017]. 
25  Okoli and Carillo 2013 supra at pp. 2-3. See also Domb Krauskopf, A.E. 
(2009). Fire, lights, everything!": Exploring symbolic capital in the Tecnobrega 
dance scene. Master of Science in Comparative Media Studies. Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.; Russi, 2011 supra at 109 - 110. See also, Jarvenpaa, S. 
and Lang, K. (2011). Boundary management in online communities: Case 
studies of the Nine Inch Nails and ccMixter music remix sites. Long Range 
Planning, 44, pp.440 - 457. 
26 Ibid. 
27 This may involve express or tacit permission of cover versions or mash-ups of 
music content. See Rimmer, M. (2005). The grey album: copyright law and 
digital sampling. Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy, 
114(1), pp.40-53 (hereafter, Rimmer 2005). Elkin-Koren 2017a supra at pp.142-
143. 




importance of these elements. 29  For instance, Osterwalder and 
Pigneur describe open business models as business models that:  
“…can be used by companies to create and capture value by 
systematically collaborating with outside partners. This may happen 
from the “outside-in” by exploiting external ideas within the firm, or from 
the “inside-out” by providing external parties with ideas or assets lying 
idle within the firm”30. 
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the underlying principle of 
“openness” may be expressed through external collaborations and 
through explicit or implicit licences.31 The copyright owner as an 
entity may collaborate with persons outside the firm in carrying out 
its key activities32 especially in the creation or development of the 
music content. Within such open music business model, the 
exclusive rights belonging to the copyright owner (“internal 
properties”) and/or the exclusive rights belonging to another 
copyright owner who has waived all or some of the rights (“external 
properties”) are utilised in creating the music content that is 
distributed to users and consumers. Likewise, the copyright owner 
may also grant an explicit licence or permission to the public in 
respect of its copyright in a given music content. Such licences 
specify the uses to which the copyright may be put and is meant for 
users who need access to the music content to create new music 
content. The creative process of the music content and the 
resultant product are expected to be strengthened or unaffected by 
the uses to which the copyright may be put. In other words, the 
author may create a better-received or new product based on ideas 
                                                 
29 Okoli and Carillo 2013 supra at 5; Preston and Zurer 2003 supra; Elkin-Koren, 
N. (2016). The new frontiers of user rights. Am. U. Int'l L. Rev., 32, p.1 
(hereafter, Elkin-Koren user rights); Santos 2013 supra at p.601. 
30 Osterwalder and Pigneur 2010 supra at 80. 
31 See Okoli and Carillo 2013 supra at 5. 
32 Key activities include creation/production of key resources, establishing and 
maintaining channels of distribution and customer relationships, delivering the 
value proposition and solving customer problems. The specific key activities will 
differ with each business model, each industry and each organisation. See 




resulting from “inviting” others to participate in the use of its 
copyright. The copyright owner and any external key partner, which 
the copyright owner may use or rely upon, usually set the “some 
rights reserved” license and the implementation of collaborative 
creative process.  
Secondly, the concept of openness may be appraised based 
on the access to the music content once created or produced. In 
this context, the copyright owner retains the entire exclusive rights 
granted by copyright law but refrains from or waives the right to 
exploit or monetise those rights. Instead, the copyright owner 
explores alternative means of revenue generation, which may be 
attributable to the waiver of the rights in the first place. In this 
context, further differentiation may be made. It is possible to 
distinguish between access for use of the music content in some 
other creative endeavour or for distribution and access for 
consumption of the music content. While access for use refers to 
the ability of distributors, digital platforms and firms to use the 
music content in the operation of their distribution, music 
subscription or other services, access for consumption involves 
persons who require the music content for their listening and 
personal enjoyment only.33 Because copyright law demands that 
access for the purposes of using the music content requires the 
licence of the relevant copyright owner 34  and also, access for 
consumption purposes demands a sale and purchase 
                                                 
33  Stazi, A. (2012). Digital copyright and consumer/user protection: moving 
toward a new framework?. Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property, (2), 
pp.158-174; Ritala, S. (2013). Pandora & Spotify: Legal issues and licensing 
requirements for interactive and non-interactive Internet Radio Broadcasters. 
Idea, 54, 23. (hereafter, Ritala 2013); Teague, J. (2012). Saving the Spotify 
revolution: Recalibrating the power imbalance in digital copyright. ExpressO, 
[online] pp.27 to 28. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jordan_teague/1/ 
[Accessed 4 Feb. 2016]. (hereafter Teague 2012); Richardson, J. (2014). The 
Spotify paradox: How the creation of a compulsory license scheme for streaming 
on-demand music services can save the music industry. UCLA Ent. L. Rev., 
(22), p.45. (hereafter, Richardson 2014). 
34  See Heald 2014 supra at 313; Perel, M. and Elkin-Koren, N. (2016). 
Accountability in algorithmic copyright enforcement. Stan. Tech. L. Rev., 19, 




arrangement,35 access for use without paid license and access for 
consumption free-of-charge may still be considered as deploying 
the open business model.  
3.2.2 Freemium  
Apart from business model patterns described as “open”, the 
business model literature also describes some business models as 
based on the concept of “free”.36 Here, the relevant firm creates 
and captures value by offering a product free-of-charge and 
generating revenue through other means or products. In this 
regard, the concept of “free” may translate into an advertisement-
based free offer; a subscription-based free offer; and/or a free offer 
based on a “bait and hook” pattern where the free offer is used to 
attract customers to a paid offer.37 “Freemium” provides a veritable 
example of business models based on the notion of “free” or “zero 
price”.  
To be able to offer the music content free-of-charge to the 
consumers, a firm may provide “freemium” services to consumers - 
either offer subscription services to a category of consumers 
(“subscription-based freemium”) and/or offer advertising services to 
firms that may wish to advertise their products to the consumers on 
the platform (“ad-based freemium”). 38  Subscription-based 
freemium enables users of the platform to access certain music 
consumption features free-of-charge and requires users to pay a 
subscription fee or some similar fee (usually referred to as a 
                                                 
35  See Derclaye, E. and Favale, M. (2010). Copyright and contract Law: 
regulating User contracts: The state of the art and a research agenda. J. Intell. 
Prop. L., 18, pp.92-5 (hereafter, Derclaye and Favale 2010).  
36 Osterwalder and Pignuer 2010 supra at 67. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Mounier, P. (2011). Freemium as a sustainable economic model for open 
access electronic publishing in humanities and social sciences. Information 
Services & Use, 31(3-4), p.230; Halmenschlager, C. and Waelbroeck, P. (2014). 
Fighting Free with Free: Freemium vs. Piracy. SSRN Electronic Journal. [online] 





“premium”) to enjoy specialised functions and services such as an 
unlimited music catalogue, ad-free listening, off-line access and 
extended search features. 39  The process here involves the 
platform firms themselves uploading the music content onto their 
platforms. As a result, there is the requirement to obtain the license 
of the relevant copyright owner of the music content, which may be 
an individual, a record company, a Collective Management 
Organisation (CMO) and/or a music publisher.40 Such “licensing” 
terms are usually set by agreement between the platform firm and 
the copyright owner and would represent terms of access to the 
music content. 41  The agreement would also stipulate how the 
subscription fees received from subscribers may be shared and 
also, stipulate whether the music content is to be available to the 
free or non-subscribing customers.42 In many cases, most platform 
firms that deploy a subscription-based freemium business model 
combine such with ad-based freemium. In such instance, the 
agreement usually addresses the issue of whether and how to 
share the subscription fees and/or the advertisement fees received 
                                                 
39 Bekkelund, K.J. (2011). Succeeding with freemium: Exploring why companies 
have succeeded and failed with freemium. Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 
Specialization Project, 4350, pp. 6-7 (hereafter, Bekkelund 2011). Examples in 
the music industry include Spotify, Deezer as well as Spinlet. See generally, 
Spotify, (2015). Music for everyone. Available at: 
https://www.spotify.com/us/about-us/contact/ [Accessed 9 Jun. 2015]; 
Spinlet.com, (2015). Spinlet. [online] Available at: https://spinlet.com/faq/ 
[Accessed 10 Jul. 2015]; Pujol, N. (2010). Freemium: attributes of an emerging 
business model. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1718663 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1718663 (accessed 19 Jul. 2016) (hereafter, Pujol 
2010) 
40 Ritala 2013 supra at 42-3. 
41 Ibid. See also Solo 2014 supra at pp. 184–187; Teague 2012 supra at 27 - 28. 
42 For example, popular US artist, Taylor Swift had at some point withdrawn her 
music content from the Spotify platform because she did not want her music 
offered for free. See Dredge, S. (2015). Taylor Swift still has bad blood with 
Spotify over streaming music dispute. [online] the Guardian. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/04/taylor-swift-bad-blood-
spotify-streaming-music [Accessed 5 Aug. 2015]. See also Sawer, P. (2015). 
Spotify must change its free music service, says Universal records. [online] 
Telegraph.co.uk. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/music/music-
news/11487187/Spotify-must-change-its-free-music-service-says-Universal-




from subscribers and advertisers, respectively.43 In this regard, the 
terms of the agreement are expressly stated in line with the 
copyright law regulatory framework.44 
On the other side of the spectrum are platform firms, which 
deploy an ad-based freemium service where rather than the 
platform firm, it is the users of the platform that upload the music 
content onto the platform. Any member of the public may then 
access the music content free-of-charge. As a result of this, a lot of 
users are attracted to the platform both for the purpose of 
consuming the music content and for the purpose of uploading 
music content onto the platform. Advertisers, in turn, pay an 
advertising fee to the platform firms to use the platform to advertise 
their product and services to the teeming users of the platform.45 
The challenge in terms of the copyright law lies in ad-based 
freemium where there may be no explicit licensing agreement 
between the copyright owner and the platform firm or, where the 
platform firm is able to “force” the issuance of a gratis license.46  
More importantly, for the purposes of this study, it is worth 
noting that the various theories and interpretations developed are 
evidence of a lack of uniform terminology. Accordingly, the 
discussion in this section has been devoted to the analysis of the 
main classifications, in the attempt to shed some light on the issue 
and avoid possible misconstructions. 
3.2.3 Concluding remarks on open and freemium music 
business models classification  
From the foregoing, it is evident that there is no straightforward 
answer in defining an open music business model. On the one 
                                                 
43 See Ginsburg 2017 supra at p.74. 
44 See Derclaye and Favale 2010 supra at 110. 
45  See prezi.com. (2015). YouTube business model. [online] Available at: 
https://prezi.com/puvz26rl2cbg/youtube-business-model/ [Accessed 20 Nov. 
2017].  




hand, the notion of open access to the creative process does not 
seem to raise many questions in terms of acceptance as an “open” 
business model. On the other hand, the issue regarding open 
access to the use and consumption of the music content has been 
at the core of some serious debate. While some platform firms 
collaborate with copyright owners to provide open access to the 
consumption of music content without any discussion as to 
revenue or revenue share,47 other platform firms enter into terms 
with the copyright owner to receive and share the subscription fees 
and/or the advertisement fees received from subscribers and 
advertisers, respectively. 48  The major reservation, therefore, is 
whether music business models can be interpreted as open even 
when they are based on the use of copyright-protected works, 
which are not licensed for free, but under terms that only provide 
free access for music consumption. The answer may be relevant 
for copyright owners who have a policy interest in deploying 
proprietary music business models (hence, covered by exploitable 
copyright-protected works) while maintaining some form of 
openness. However, the significance of the debate is not only 
connected to the import of openness as such. Rather, the different 
arguments made by the literature focus on a much more relevant 
issue, which calls into question the relationship between the 
platform firm’s interests and the copyright terms applicable to the 
open and freemium music business model. The issue pertains to 
the need to, in the context of the open and freemium music 
business model, align the public interests in the use of the 
copyright products with the private interests of the copyright 
owners in being rewarded for their creative efforts.  
 In the circumstances, this study’s focus on the open and 
freemium music business model is based on a combination of 
                                                 
47 For instance, NotJustok.com. See section 3.4.4 below. 
48 See Ginsburg 2017 supra at 74. See Heald 2015 supra at 318. See also, 




selected features of the prototypes as described above. Here, the 
ability to upload and access the music content free-of-charge falls 
within the “open” description while ability to collect advertising 
payments from some other customer segment, falls within the 
“freemium” description. It is in this context, which accords with the 
business environment, that the term “open and freemium music 
business model” is used in this thesis. Here, the business model is 
“open” in the sense of being free-of-charge to the consumer and 
“freemium” in the sense of receiving a premium in terms of an 
advertising fee. Typical examples in Nigeria and South Africa 
include multinational internet companies such as YouTube, 
SoundCloud, and Facebook and local companies such as 
NotJustok.com.49 
3.3 The open and freemium music business model processes  
Before proceeding to examine the terms regarding the use of 
copyright-protected music content as they currently exist within the 
open and freemium music business model, it is important to first 
consider the processes that are put in place to deploy the business 
model. This is the case for two main reasons: for one thing, the 
processes provide the parameters within which the terms are set. 
There is therefore no meaningful application of the copyright terms 
without the processes surrounding their formulation and 
application. For another, before examining the contractual terms 
that apply within a given business model, it is important to 
understand the parameters of the business model itself. This will 
be so regardless of whether or not the business model is open 
and/or freemium: the crucial feature of all business models is their 
activity-based nature, which is revealed in the business processes. 
As noted in section 3.2, the open and freemium music business 
model does not exist in vacuum, but is explained within the context 
                                                 
49 These platforms are also referred to as “user-upload” platforms. See IFPI 




of the processes/activities of a specific firm and/or the sector within 
which such firm operates. 50  This dependence on processes is 
particularly relevant in the context of this thesis, as it also has 
implications for suggested solutions: without an understanding of 
the processes, any solution proposed to regulate the open and 
freemium music business model will inevitably prove ineffective.  
The deployment of the open and freemium music business 
model varies across firms. However, the following activities are 
characteristic of the open and freemium music business model:51  
(i) The design of a user-friendly digital platform that can 
store and/or host a large catalogue of music content as 
well as other copyrighted and non-copyrighted content; 
The digital platform is owned and operated by a firm to 
offer various products and services 52  pertaining to 
copyright for profit.53 
(ii) Creation and operation of registration or some entry 
requirement that keeps an index of users (“views” or 
“download” counts) which helps advertisers appreciate 
the number of consumers (“eyeballs”) that may 
potentially view their product advertisements; and also, 
(iii) The creation and operation of an interface that can serve 
                                                 
50 See section 1.4.1. See also Searle, N. (2011). Changing business models in 
the creative industries: The cases of television, computer games and music. 
Intellectual Property Office, pp.8-10. 
51 These activities are gleaned from a variety of studies regarding the open and 
freemium music business model. See Bekkelund 2011 supra at pp. 6-7. Pujol 
2010 supra at 1; Ritala 2013 supra at 42-3; Solo 2014 supra at pp. 184–187; 
Teague 2012 supra at 27 - 28. 
52 The products offered in this regard is a range of technical facilities including 
search facilities, listening service etc. For similar arguments in relation to 
algorithmic copyright enforcement, see Perel and Elkin-Koren 2016 supra at 
485. See also, paragraph 70 of the Statement of Defence filed in the suit 
between the Performing Rights Society v Soundcloud, Claim number 2015- 
903033, before the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Intellectual 
property (henceforth, PRS v Soundcloud). 
53  See for example, paragraph 90.2 of the Statement of Defence in PRS v 
SoundCloud. See also, Viacom International, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc. 676 F.3d 19, 





advertisements or commercials to users and other 
platform visitors in such manner as not to detract from 
the user-friendly experience. 
(iv) The availability of a “unilateral” contract in the form of 
“Terms of use and Privacy Policy” set by the relevant 
platform firm to address copyright use and privacy 
concerns.54 
The deployment of the open and freemium music business model 
usually begins with the platform firm providing a platform that is 
capable of hosting or storing music content, which users of the 
platform may upload thereon.55  Members of the public may access 
the uploaded music content free-of-charge and in such cases, may 
either download or stream music content, depending on the 
specific platform firm.56  The platform firm optimises the consumer-
experience through tags, search features, automatic playlists 
based on the direction of the consumer and the like.57 Given the 
gratis nature of the uploaded music content and the popularity of 
music content generally,58 the platform is able to aggregate a large 
mass of consumers. This in turn attracts other firms to advertise 
                                                 
54 Unilateral contracts lack mutuality given that the offeree or promisee is not 
bound to perform the requested act or forbearance. Examples include click-wrap 
contracts, browse-wrap contracts. See Clark, D. (2000). Revocation and the 
unilateral contract: A reappraisal. NZL Rev., p.17 at 35. By continuing to use the 
platform, the user is deemed to accept the terms stipulated by the platform firm. 
See Derclaye and Favale 2010 supra at 100. 
55 See paragraph 6.1 of the Particulars of Claim in PRS v Soundcloud which 
Soundcloud admitted in paragraphs 10, 17, 19, 20 of its Statement of Defence. 
56 See paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.4 of the Particulars of Claim in PRS v Soundcloud. 
See also, Schultz, A. (2016). IP and African Music Industries: An Interview with 
Phil Chard - part 4. [online] Afro-IP. Available at: http://afro-
ip.blogspot.com.ng/2016/09/ip-and-african-music-industries_2.html [Accessed 
20 Jan. 2017] (“Schultz 2016”);  Notjustok. (2017). About Us - Notjustok. [online] 
Available at: http://notjustok.com/about/ [Accessed 20 Nov. 2017].  
57 See Perel and Elkin-Koren 2016 supra at 485. Also, see paragraph 8 of the 
Particulars of Claim and paragraph 37 and 70 of the Statement of Defence in 
PRS v Soundcloud. 
58 See The Telegraph (2017). Top 10 most watched YouTube video of all time. 
[online] Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/0/most-watched-




their own products in the hope that the large mass of platform 
users will give attention to such advertisements. Of course, such 
firms can only serve their advertisements upon payment of agreed 
fees to the platform firms. Whether or not the platform firm will 
share the advertising fees with the relevant copyright owner, 
depends on the platform firm itself.59 Terms of use and Privacy 
Policy are documents to which registered users assent to or are 
presumed to have assented to upon using the platform or 
uploading content thereon. 60  These documents particularly 
stipulate the nature of the platform firm’s service and the 
representations and warranties obtained from the registered 
users.61 In most cases, the Terms of use requests for and relies on 
representations and warranties of the registered user regarding 
copyright ownership. 
The Terms of use are set unilaterally by the relevant 
platform firm and indicates a copyright policy, which governs the 
deployment of open and freemium music business model in terms 
of supply of the music content, revenue generation as well as 
access to the music content. Accordingly, the Terms of use 
function as a way to recognise the private interests of the copyright 
owner in revenue generation and the public interests of users and 
consumers in accessing the music content.  
 Corollary to the foregoing, it can be said that the process of 
deploying the open and freemium music business model is largely 
unilateral and mostly directed by the platform firms. For one, the 
uploading of the music content presumes that the uploader owns or 
has acquired copyright in the music content uploaded. 62   The 
                                                 
59 See section 3.4, below. See also IFPI 2017 supra at 24. 
60  See paragraphs 19, 20 and 73 of the Statement of Defence in PRS v 
Soundcloud.  
61  See Elkin-Koren 2011 supra at 329; paragraph 88.2 of the Statement of 
defence in PRS v Soundcloud. 
62 See paragraphs 3, 4, 26, 27, 52, 54 and 73.2 of the Statement of defence in 




consent or licence of the copyright owner is therefore implied in the 
case where it is not the uploader. Indeed, the copyright owner is 
directed to request a takedown of such music content where it is 
not the uploader and it objects to the provision of the music 
content.  
 Furthermore, many users (including copyright owners) are 
also attracted by the availability of the platform free-of-charge to 
store and help distribute their music content. From this perspective, 
some copyright owners elect to accept the Terms of use and 
consider the platforms to be a popular way of showcasing and 
promoting their music content. Whatever be the case, the Terms of 
use are set unilaterally by the platform firms in most cases.  
 The deployment of the open and freemium music model 
through unilateral processes has grown rapidly and consistently, as 
a mechanism for distributing music content in South Africa and 
Nigeria. This process represents the most common approach to 
deploying the open and freemium music business model globally 
on the Internet. In the context of copyright law, unilateral processes 
are faster and less formal than bilateral processes. This is because 
unilateral processes do not require prior agreement of the copyright 
owner, and therefore, there may be no lengthy negotiation 
process.63 
These characteristics of unilateral processes, at the same 
time, may be contrary to the policy approach of copyright law. 
There may be concerns for compliance with copyright law where 
platform firms, which obtain revenue based on the use of the music 
content, control and direct the deployment of the open and 
freemium music business model, without the prior involvement of 
                                                 





the copyright owner.64 The Content ID tool by YouTube discussed 
in section 3.4.4 below, provides a good example.  
3.4 Copyright terms 
Firms that deploy the open and freemium music business model 
have developed – sometimes in different ways – copyright terms 
indicating the various ways in which the copyright-protected music 
content may be used and accessed. These copyright terms also 
function as a framework to legitimise the platform firm’s use of the 
music content, as they need to be able to show compliance with 
extant copyright laws. Also, the copyright terms serve as a tool for 
the platform firms to enhance their competitiveness given that the 
terms explain the ways in which the music content is used. Further, 
users of the platform are guided by these copyright terms to also 
enable compliance with copyright laws. Without these terms as a 
guide, platform firms run the (greater) risk of copyright infringement 
liability and such outcome may be anticompetitive in the context of 
copyright law.65  
The above-mentioned copyright terms are of three main 
types: licensing terms and; access and usage terms.66 The specific 
content of these typical copyright terms may vary from one platform 
firm to the other, making it difficult to describe them with exactitude. 
Indeed, users of the platform may sometimes find it difficult to 
clearly identify which of the copyright terms apply to their actions.67 
For instance, the Creative Commons licences as a platform for the 
deployment of the open music business model have been criticised 
on the grounds that it misunderstands some key aspects of 
copyright law. 
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This notwithstanding, these copyright terms are particularly 
important as they aim at neutralising any potential risk of abusive 
or anticompetitive conduct, consisting for instance, in scraping or in 
a value gap. Such conduct may be anticompetitive in the copyright 
law sense. As will be better explained in Chapters four and five, 
scraping occurs when a platform firm “scraps” or applies copyright 
owner’s music content in the business model context without any 
payment to or licence from the copyright owner.68 Consequently, 
the platform firm may be competitive in its own sphere at the 
expense of the copyright owner.  
Furthermore, licensing, access and usage terms play a 
significant role as they function as constraints on the relevant 
stakeholders. From a policy perspective, they are important as the 
choice of relevant terms and their implementation by any 
stakeholder directly reflect the standards of competition within the 
copyright law framework.69  
3.4.1 Licensing terms 
As noted in the preceding chapter, a license is required where any 
person other than the relevant copyright owner, wishes to exercise 
or exploit any of the exclusive rights granted under copyright law. 
By extension, licensing arrangements determine the money flow to 
the copyright owner as well as the extent of use of the copyrighted 
material by the licensee. 
In the open and freemium music business model, licensing 
terms require registered users of the digital platform who upload 
music content thereon to grant a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-
free licence to the platform firm with respect to the uploaded music 
content. 70  Uploaders may be able to, in the case of certain 
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platforms specify whether the music content is to be private or 
publicly available and whether download should be enabled. 
Furthermore, to address cases where the royalty-free licence was 
invalidly given (that is, in cases where the “uploader-licensor” is not 
the actual copyright owner), the licensing terms further provide for 
the actual copyright owner to notify the platform firm to takedown 
infringing music content.71 Such notification may be made using 
designated forms provided by the platform firm for that purpose, by 
email or by post. This is the case, for instance with platforms such 
as YouTube.com, SoundCloud.com, NotJustOk.com and 
TooXclusive.com. The platform firm may then face copyright 
infringement liability where it does not takedown or disable access 
to the content upon receipt of the takedown notice or where its 
Terms of use and actual use are not such as may be undertaken 
without the prior, active approval of the copyright owner. 72  The 
applicable scenario may depend on the copyright or related law 
applicable to the music content especially where the copyright 
owner is not the uploader. For instance, even s75 of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act 2002 (South Africa) that 
offers protection to platform firms from copyright infringement 
liability when they act expeditiously to remove infringing content 
upon notification, differs slightly from other regimes. Here, platform 
firms may be protected only where they are members of an 
organisation approved by the Minister of Communication.73 Such 
copyright owner may rightfully decline to use the notification 
avenues provided by the platform firm and may instead, sue the 
                                                                                                                        
Youtube’s Terms of service. Youtube.com. (2016). Terms of Service - YouTube. 
[online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/t/terms [Accessed 14 Mar. 2016]. 
71 See Heald 2014 supra at 313. 
72 See Comninos, A., 2012. Intermediary Liability in South Africa. Association for 
Progressive Communications, Intermediary Liability in Africa Research Papers, 
3, pp.6-7, 12 (hereafter, Comninos 2012). 




platform firm for copyright infringement as occurred in the PRS v 
Soundcloud74 case. 
Notice and takedown procedures are usually prevalent in 
unilateral processes (in that the prior approval of the copyright 
owner is not obtained) and have been a popular feature of platform 
firms that deploy the open and freemium music business model.75 
Under such procedure, platform firms undertake to act 
expeditiously to remove or disable access to infringing music 
content to be exempted from copyright infringement liability. 76 
Notice and takedown procedures may be implemented in two 
different ways. First, the platform firm may make the music content 
available on its platform by itself. In this regard, the platform firm 
may procure the music content from different sources and then 
directly upload the music content to the platform. The platform firm 
further indicates its willingness to respond promptly to any request 
from the copyright owner to takedown such content. Such platform 
firms understand that copyright likely subsists in the products, 
which it makes available on its platform.77 However, they operate 
on the presumption that silence on the part of the relevant 
copyright owner is tantamount to consent.78 This presumption may 
be risky as the act of uploading music content without the consent 
of the relevant copyright owners may expose the platform firms to 
                                                 
74 See paragraph 111 of the Statement of defence in PRS v Soundcloud. 
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literature review. CREATe Working Paper 2015/04, pp.155-156. Available at: 
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liability for copyright infringement. 79  Such platform firms are 
prevalent in Nigeria. In this regard, Notjustok.com 80 ; 
tooXclusive.com81; 360nobs.com82 are typical examples. 
A second approach to implementing notice and takedown 
procedures involves the platform firm creating an enabling 
environment for copyright owners, users and consumers to make 
the music content available on that platform.83 Similar to the first 
approach, there is recognition that copyright may subsist in music 
content available on its platform. In this context however, the 
platform firm does not upload the music content on the platform 
and is not directly responsible in the event that the uploaded 
content is found to be infringing. Such licensing term falls under the 
statutory regime commonly referred to as the “safe harbour” regime 
– where platform firms are exempt from liability for copyright 
infringement resulting from the actions of their users in uploading 
and streaming the music content. 84  Such exemption applies in 
specified instances and in most cases the exemptions apply insofar 
as the platform firms act expeditiously to remove or disable access 
to infringing content upon notification. However, the issue of 
recourse for copyright owners whose content are found on 
platforms without their consent remains.85 Usually, because most 
platform firms are established in Europe or in the US, the platform 
firms adopt the safe harbour regime applicable in either regime, as 
                                                 
79 As the relevant copyright statutes provide, copyright is infringed when there is 
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80  See notjustOk. (2016). About Us –notjustOk. [online] Available at: 
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part of their licensing terms.86 Accordingly, the safe harbour regime 
statutorily provided for under s 512(c) of the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 1998 (DMCA) and Arts 12 to 14 of the EU E-
Commerce Directive provides one of the pillars of the copyright 
terms of the open and freemium music business model.87  
Under s512(c) of the DMCA, anyone who stored music 
content “at the direction of a user” on a “system or network 
controlled by or operated by the service provider” would ordinarily 
incur copyright infringement liability unless such person or entity 
falls within any of the criteria (safe harbour) provided under the 
statute. These criteria includes that such person or entity:   
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity 
using the material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or  
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material;  
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right 
and ability to control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph 
(3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material 
that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.  
While the EU E-Commerce Directive is different in that it provides 
for all forms of online content including copyright-protected content, 
it makes quite similar safe harbour provisions.88 For instance, art 
14 provides that:  
Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member 
States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the 
information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on 
condition that: 
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of 
facts or circumstances from which the activity or information is 
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(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.89 
Efficient takedown procedures enable the platform firms to meet 
the requirements for safe harbour protection and avoid liability for 
“authorising”, “enabling” or “directing” the infringement of their 
registered users. Indeed, the efficacy or validity of the takedown 
procedures to exempt the platform firms from liability for the 
infringement of their users has been challenged without much 
success in several suits in the US and within the EU.  
In Viacom v Youtube, 90  Viacom argued inter alia that 
YouTube was generally aware that the reproduction of music 
content on its platform was infringing and, for that reason, the safe 
harbour protection should not avail YouTube. Damages sought 
were to address the reproduction of copyright-protected content 
owned by Viacom. The Court rejected this argument holding that 
the fact that the language of the statute required expeditious 
removal of infringing material, it meant that the Internet Service 
Provider (in this case YouTube) would require prior knowledge of 
the specific infringing material.91 The applicable test was, therefore, 
one of distinction between subjective and objective standard. To 
have actual knowledge of infringement under the DMCA, an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) must subjectively know of specific 
instances of infringement.  To have the requisite offending 
knowledge of infringement, the ISP must be aware of facts that 
would have made the existence of specific acts of infringement 
objectively obvious to a reasonable person. 92  According to the 
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Judge Stanton of the US District Court for the Southern District of 
New York in his summary judgment: 
The tenor of the [DMCA] provisions is that the phrases "actual 
knowledge that the material or an activity" is infringing, and "facts or 
circumstances" indicating infringing activity, describe knowledge of 
specific and identifiable infringements of particular individual items. Mere 
knowledge of prevalence of such activity in general is not enough. That 
is consistent with an area of the law devoted to protection of distinctive 
individual works, not of libraries. To let knowledge of a generalized 
practice of infringement in the industry, or of a proclivity of users to post 
infringing materials, impose responsibility on service providers to 
discover which of their users' postings infringe a copyright would 
contravene the structure and operation of the DMCA. As stated in 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, (9th Cir. 2007): The 
DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright 
infringement-identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately 
documenting infringement-squarely on the owners of the copyright. We 
decline to shift a substantial burden from the copyright owner to the 
provider.93 
Notwithstanding this decision, the Court was persuaded by some of 
the arguments made by Viacom particularly the argument that 
specific knowledge of infringement was not required to show the 
existence of right and ability to control on the part of YouTube. For 
this reason, the Court remanded this issue to the district court for 
further proceedings.94 In April 2013, the district court again ruled in 
favour of YouTube, and Viacom once again appealed.  However, 
the parties concluded an out-of-court settlement in March 2014, 
shortly before the time scheduled for oral arguments on the second 
appeal.95 
In the case of PRS v SoundCloud instituted in the UK, 
whether or not the E-Commerce Directive’s safe harbour provisions 
would interpret SoundCloud’s business model as making it “aware 
of specific facts that would make specific acts of infringement 
obvious”, was not tested after all due to the settlement reached 
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between the PRS and SoundCloud.96 In the originating processes, 
PRS had claimed that SoundCloud required its license for 
streaming of music content owned by PRS members. PRS 
expressed the view that SoundCloud had a duty to procure PRS 
license and can only escape liability for its services’ copyright 
infringement if it procures the said license. 97 
However, while the notice and takedown procedures are 
addressed within the safe harbour regime, that regime does not 
address the platform firm’s use of the uploaded music content once 
it is placed on the platform. Such situation, which is the focus of 
this study, is a product of the copyright regime and the appropriate 
question would be whether such use falls or should fall within the 
scope of the exclusive rights available to the copyright owner under 
copyright law.98  This is especially so when the platform firms not 
only profit from the availability of music content on their platforms 
but also, provide other mechanisms for selected copyright owners 
to generate revenue from what may constitute users’ infringing acts 
and from the platform firm’s actions.99 Such conduct has become 
the subject of much scholarly attention and significant legislative 
activities particularly within the EU in the context of the interaction 
between the E-Commerce Directive and the proposed directive on 
copyright in the digital single market and the value gap proposal.100 
This is more fully discussed in Chapter four, below.101 
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Indeed, apart from the gratis license issued by uploaders to 
the platform firms in respect of the music content uploaded to the 
platform, the platform firms also set licensing terms that could 
result in payments to copyright owners.102 These payments may be 
received directly from the platform firms or from aggregators 
selected by copyright owners due to the aggregator’s relationship 
with the platform firm.103 Such payments are based on advertising 
revenue arising in connection with the use of the music content on 
the platform. This revenue-based approach is evident with 
YouTube, Soundcloud and Notjustok.com. 104  However, 
Notjustok.com does not share its advertising revenue with 
copyright owners.105  
3.4.2 Terms relating to access (“access terms”) 
Access terms in the open and freemium music business model 
impose obligations on the consumers, the users, the platform firms 
and the copyright owners. First, access terms impose on the 
consumers to use the music content in accordance with the 
dictates of the platform firms and in respect (for) of copyrights 
inherent in the music content. These terms are established by 
platform firms with the intention to limit copyright infringement and, 
generally to protect the respective economic interests of the 
copyright owners and enhance the competitiveness of the platform 
firms.  
Typically, the access terms concern the use of technological 
protection measures with respect to the music content. Music 
content can be accessed for free but beyond that, nothing much 
may be done with the music content. To access the music content, 
the terms and conditions for such access are stated on the 
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platform’s Terms of use and privacy policy.106 Again, the Content 
ID system in the case of YouTube (the CIS system for SoundCloud 
and Rights Manager for Facebook) is relevant here for the purpose 
of explaining the operation of the access and usage rules.107 Once 
a given music content is uploaded to the reference file by a 
copyright owner, others may be precluded from uploading or 
making available any music content found by the system to be a 
match with the uploaded music content. 108   In taking down or 
refusing access of music content to the platform, the platform firm 
is able to influence the decision of consumers regarding each 
specific music content as well as whether the relevant copyright 
owner may receive a share of the advertising revenue. As Perel 
and Elkin-Koren noted, “from an economic perspective, control 
over what information becomes available may shape the 
preferences of consumers, creating demand for particular content, 
while diminishing demand for other types of content.”109 
A further relevant issue, then, concerns access terms that 
are focused on attempts by platform firms to limit or increase its 
interaction with consumers of music content to avoid the risk of 
copyright infringement. Elkin-Koren, in particular, has noted that 
most platform’s Terms of use and related documents are crafted to 
please powerful corporate copyright owners and may ordinarily be 
unconscionable.110 Where the platform firm is actively involved with 
the consumer’s activities in respect of the platform, such may affect 
its ability to successfully rely on the safe harbour regime to escape 
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copyright infringement liability 111  (so-called safe harbour 
protection).  
According to the above, consumers and platform users 
accept that their use and access to the music content can be 
removed or restricted if the platform firm so decides or where the 
alleged copyright owner requests such restriction. 112  In these 
circumstances, as more fully discussed in Chapter four of this 
thesis, access terms that restrict such uses may conflict with 
statutory limitations and exceptions to copyright113 as well as the 
statutory scope of copyright protection114. At the same time, too 
“minor” restrictions may also be considered problematic for 
platform firms, as they risk copyright infringement liability.115 
Furthermore, access terms may impose on copyright 
owners that the music content and by extension, their access to 
revenue generation may be removed or suspended, where the 
relevant platform firm so decides.116 The timing of such removal or 
suspension may affect revenue generation. There are both 
practical and policy reasons why this may be so. For one, the 
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“number of views or streams” of the music content may serve as an 
index of the copyright owner’s reputation and popularity.117 Such 
popularity is the basis upon which advertisement fees are 
generated and shared. It may also provide or attract revenue from 
alternative sources such as invitations for concert performance,118 
brand endorsements and the like.119 Accordingly, removal of the 
music content after such index has been amassed, may affect the 
effectiveness of the alternative income streams. 120  Second, the 
effective enforcement of the copyright owners’ rights to revenue 
lies largely in the hands of the platform firms because the platform 
firm regulates access to the music content and access of the music 
content itself to the platform.121 
Corollary to the foregoing, it may be problematic where the 
platform firm acts arbitrarily in denying or refusing access to the 
platform in the context of open and freemium music business 
model. This observation leads to the conclusion that access terms 
should explain procedures for denial/refusal of access to platforms. 
Such explanation, as further explained in chapter six, will enable 
the copyright owners continue to “trade” on their publicity through 
view count and ensuing social media and brand ambassador 
relationship.122 
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Finally, access to the web platform and the available music 
content is free-of-charge. In the case of the former, this may be of 
immense benefit to copyright owners as the popularity of the 
platform provides authors (or artists) with considerable exposure 
that may be ordinarily out of its reach. In this regard, artists and 
copyright owners get to promote and create awareness to their 
music content. These have the potential to provide free promotion 
to uploaded content. Such benefit is crucial in the context of 
“plugging”.  
Within the music industry, “plugging” has been a significant 
part of the business model and a key mechanism for promoting 
new music content. According to Towse, plugging could be an 
“expensive affair” with copyright owners spending thousands of 
pounds to promote new music content in seaside resorts and on 
the radio.123  In the above context, the opportunities presented by 
the access rules are significant. At no cost to the copyright owner, 
its music content can be presented and promoted to the millions of 
platform users and advertisers. As a practical example, 
NotJustOk.com, available in South Africa and Nigeria has come to 
represent a powerful tool for plugging of new music content. In this 
regard, the platform provides the much-needed traction that 
copyright owners seek with open and freemium music business 
models and overcomes the constraints of geographical location 
(limited reach) and the inconvenience of online infringement.  
Access rules embody the openness that responds to the 
universal access objective of copyright law. They can offer 
copyright owners (performers and artists, particularly) the 
popularity and promotion that brings them more live performance 
opportunities, more brand sponsorships and more personality right 
licensing opportunities. Due to the fact that consumers are able to 
access the platform free-of-charge, the copyright owner enjoys 
                                                 




instant access to millions of consumers to whom it may 
communicate and advertise its music content.124  However, there is 
the question of whether such exposure constitutes adequate 
consideration for the music content provided through a gratis 
license.125  
3.4.3 Terms relating to usage of the music content (“usage 
terms”) 
Usage terms are closely connected to the terms regarding access. 
In this regard, usage terms determine what users of the platform 
and members of the public may do in relation to the music content. 
Members of the public may “like” and repost available music 
content. “Like”, “share”, “repost” are some of the buttons available 
on digital platforms. Users of these platforms may click any such 
button to express their feelings regarding the relevant content on 
the platform. As Robbins argues, clicking “like” or “share” may be 
construed as speech.126 They may also share the music content on 
other platforms using the facilities provided by the platform firms. 
The use of the music content by members of the public is mostly 
experiential and collaborative. 127  Such collaboration may be at 
several levels depending on the extent of the commitment required 
of participants. In this regard, the users of the platform may be 
restricted only to consumption or may be permitted to use the 
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music content in other creative endeavours.128 The design of the 
platform often determines the nature of the collaboration and the 
nature of the relationships among users.129  
Platform firms utilise the tags130 and title provided by the 
uploaders to offer search facilities and recommendations131 related 
to the music content to users. 132  User preferences in terms of 
music content are used to rank popular music content such that 
users can identify and view popular music content. 133  More 
generally, the music content is used to provide a webcast for users 
of the web platform. In this regard, the platform firm automatically 
selects continuous, successive music content for the user’s 
listening pleasure once the user has selected specific music 
content.134 The music content is also used to provide a popularity 
index that enables uploaders to gauge public engagement with its 
uploaded music content.135 Specific music content may be selected 
and promoted to registered users through various means such as 
on the platform, via email and also, on social media platforms.136 In 
some cases, platform firms also publicise and promote the 
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availability of and available music content on its platform thereby 
encouraging more user engagement with the platform and its 
services.137  
The pertinent question arising in this context relates to the 
interface between the nature of the usage rules and the scope of 
the rights, which is available to copyright owners in respect of the 
music content. This is a significant issue when it is considered that 
the boundaries of the exclusive rights determine the scope of the 
“rights” available to the copyright users.138  
3.4.4 Practical implementation of the copyright-based terms 
Having identified the copyright-based terms applicable to the open 
and freemium music business model, the next paragraphs provide 
a brief overview of the practical implementation of these rules. 
Examples include YouTube’s Content ID system, Facebook’s 
Rights Manager, Notjustok.com’s advertising and the like.  
The Content ID for the copyright community developed by 
YouTube operates very much like both a payment system and a 
decision-making system regarding the copyright-protected music 
content. As a payment system, it operates between the copyright 
owner and YouTube, to signal whether revenue is to be expected 
in relation to specific music content through YouTube’s Adsense 
program.139 In this context, the copyright owner from YouTube’s 
perspective may be the actual copyright owner or an aggregator 
having the authority of a multiplicity of actual copyright owners to 
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deal with YouTube on their behalf.140 As a decision-making system, 
Content ID offers a mechanism for automatic detection of uploaded 
music content that was put up without the consent and/or 
authorisation of the copyright owner.141 The system creates an ID 
File for music content, and stores it in a database. This reference 
content comes mostly from several pre-selected partners: an 
arrangement that naturally leaves some blind spots when it comes 
to independent musicians and other rights holders.142 The Content 
ID system is only available to copyright owners who meet specific 
criteria specified by Google. 143  One of such criteria is that a 
Content ID applicant must have exclusive rights to a fairly large 
music catalogue sought to be uploaded. 
When another platform user uploads music content (in the 
form of a video), it is checked against the database, and the 
Content ID system flags the video as a copyright violation if such 
content matches music content previously uploaded by a Content 
ID partner/copyright owner. 144  When this occurs, the copyright 
owner has the choice of muting the audio of a video file, blocking 
the video to make it unavailable, permitting continued reproduction 
while monitoring the viewing statistics of the video, or adding 
advertisements to the video.145 Unless the copyright owner accepts 
the displaying of advertisements alongside its music content, using 
the Content ID system, no revenue can accrue to such copyright 
owner. 
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To be able to receive the revenue accruing from his decision 
to include advertisements alongside his music content on 
YouTube, the copyright owner is required to operate a “Google 
Adsense” account.146 The Google Adsense account may only be 
established and operated based on an Adsense Agreement – a 
standard contract drafted by Google. 147  Under the Adsense 
arrangement, if Google were to serve advertisements alongside or 
simultaneously with the music content, the payment made to 
Google by the company whose advertisement is served would be 
split between the copyright owner and Google. Advertising fees 
becomes the revenue stream – it serves, implicitly as the new 
value metric available to the copyright owner in an environment 
where exploitation of reproduction rights previously held sway. In 
this context, the copyright work may be reproduced and distributed 
repeatedly without a single payment made to the copyright owner. 
Payment is only made to the copyright owner when the consumer 
takes interest in the advertisement running on the copyright work 
and if the copyright owner is part of the Adsense program. So, for 
example, music content uploaded by an Adsense partner may 
show advertisement of a new baby monitor before, during and/or at 
the end of communicating the music content to the consumer. But 
the revenue paid to the copyright owner would only accrue 
because the advertisement of the baby monitor was served to the 
consumer. This would be the case because the consumer 
indicated that his attention was first drawn to the music content – 
even if he ends up seeing the music content and the baby monitor 
advertisement. Access to the consumer is procured through his 
interest in the copyright-protected music content. Accordingly, the 
Adsense account and the Adsense relationship enable payment of 
revenue for the application of advertisement on the music content. 
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Without Content ID, a copyright owner would be ratcheting up 
streams with no revenue to show for it. Indeed, Content ID 
accounts for over a third of the monetized views on YouTube.148  
NotJustOk.com embodies this philosophy of generating 
revenue from advertising enabled by the availability of music 
content.149 Its approach provides a platform for copyright owners 
to, openly and freely share their music with fans and interested 
parties. The Terms of use direct artists to share their music with 
friends, fans and followers. Its stated philosophy is 
unpretentious:150 
NotJustOk.com offers a platform where Nigerian Music lovers around 
the world can access, listen, stream and give their opinions on Nigerian 
music content anywhere and anytime.  Our music content is accessible 
at any time to our audience in all time zones. Furthermore, artists find 
our platform a useful source of direct feedback from their fans and a way 
to gain insight into what their fans respond to.151 
As a firm, the operators of NotJustOk.com attracts a lot of 
advertising revenue due to its popularity as the go-to place for free 
music content in Nigeria. In fact, NotJustOk.com recognizes the 
shift to access to the customer and the customer’s data as the new 
value metric. It recognizes that by being the most-visited music 
platform, revenue does not come from reproduction but from its 
amassing of millions of “page views”. This acquisition of page 
views – the foundation of its existence – is neither focused on the 
copyright owner nor on the reproduction of its work. Rather, its 
objective is to attract the customer’s “eye” – the only thing that an 
advertising company will pay for.152 It is akin to the purpose of 
advertising in communicating a firm’s message to the public in a 
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medium/form where such message is most likely to be received.153 
However, there is no provision for NotJustOk.com to share such 
advertising revenue with the copyright owner. 
Beyond providing a system that has the potential to 
generate some advertising revenue for the copyright owner, the 
Content ID and AdSense systems and other similar systems such 
as Facebook’s “Rights Manager” also serve to provide a 
mechanism for platform firms to determine the level of access, 
which the platform users may enjoy with respect to the music 
content.154 In this regard, the platform firm may restrict or prevent 
the upload of music content based on prior arrangement with 
“participating right-holders”. Such music content may be blocked, 
removed or deleted. This is achieved through the operation of an 
automated surveillance system that permits some (but not each) 
copyright owner to upload their music content in a reference file 
and specify what action may be taken when a non-participating 
uploader attempts to upload music content matching the former 
music content.155  
3.5 The stakes at issue in the music copyright industry 
One of the key policy questions is whether compelling platform 
firms to obtain a paid licence for the music content in the open and 
freemium music business model may benefit the music copyright 
industry and the users and final consumers of music content. As 
some authors have rightly noted, a truly copyright-free music 
content may not always be as open to competition as music 
content with reasonable payment structures.156 According to Perel 
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and Elkin-Koren, algorithmic copyright enforcement may save 
licensing costs and grant a measure of access to copyright 
products, but they also regulate what users can do with the music 
content. In this regard, algorithms can lead to another user’s 
inability to upload a particular music content file. 157  Another 
question relates to the issue of whether the restrictions imposed on 
platform users and those obligatory for platform firms to put up are 
permissible within the scope of rights available to the copyright 
owner. In this regard, it is important to recognise the relationships 
and interests between the market players in the open and 
freemium music business context.158 
On the one side, there are the authors and owners of 
copyrights in the music content which are strategic for the 
implementation of the open and freemium music business model in 
terms of advertising and, which can include individual artists, 
composers and companies predominantly involved in music 
recording, production, publishing and distribution. Three major 
record companies dominate the global music industry. These are 
Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group and Warner 
Music Group. These record companies are large-sized 
conglomerates with branches in many countries. They also have a 
significant music distribution network with a large artist roster 
housing some of the world’s biggest music artists. These 
companies control many smaller record labels and may exercise 
oligopolistic powers, which may influence prices of music content 
and thus directly affect the position of competitors.159 Every other 
record company outside these three global majors are usually 
                                                 
157 See Perel and Elkin-Koren 2016 supra at 477-478. A slightly different position 
has been adopted by Zimmerman, who has argued that money or revenue does 
not provide incentives for further creativity. See Zimmerman 2011 supra at 38-
40. 
158 See Elkin-Koren 2011 supra at 311. 
159  See Garcia, K.A., 2014. Penalty default licenses: A case for uncertainty. 




referred to as “independent” record labels. In South Africa, 
Universal Music Group and Sony Music Entertainment also operate 
as the major record labels, while Warner Music Group is 
represented by Gallo Records. 160  In the case of Nigeria, these 
three major record labels are not active as the major record labels. 
While Sony Music Entertainment began operations in Nigeria in 
2016, 161  Universal Music Group only commenced operations in 
Nigeria in 2017. 162  Warner Music Group is yet to establish 
operations in Nigeria. The situation is the same on the publishing 
side. It is noted that there may be choice of law and jurisdictional 
questions given the transnational dimensions of these companies 
in South Africa and Nigeria.163 However, the focus of this thesis is 
on the regulation of the open and freemium music business model 
at the national (Nigerian and South African) level, given that 
Nigerian and South African copyright laws dictate copyright in the 
music content as discussed in this thesis. Therefore, questions of 
choice of law and jurisdiction are not explored in this thesis.  
In essence, independent record labels and music publishers 
populate the music industry in South Africa and Nigeria. As 
copyright owners, these independents qualify as SMEs due to their 
small size and small market share.164 As SMEs, these copyright 
owners do not have the resources and market power of the major 
record companies or any large-sized firm. Accordingly, they need 
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consistent growth in terms of revenue to lower the risk of financial 
failure and market exit.165  The aim pursued by this group is to 
maximize the revenue originating from licensing their music 
copyright out, with the purpose either to reinvest or simply to make 
profits out of their assets.166 Indeed as argued below,167 the greater 
the revenue, the better their chances of staying in the market. This 
correlates with their status as small business.168  
On the other hand, there are those players who (may) need 
a licence to use the music content protected by copyright, to legally 
implement their communication of the music content in the course 
of advertising. The aim pursued by this second group of firms is to 
either obtain a gratis licence or to pay the lowest possible amount 
as royalties and to obtain fair licensing terms. This is expected to 
enable them enhance their competitiveness and recoup their 
investments in designing the platform and its features. These 
market players do not wish to be compelled to undertake onerous 
filtering and monitoring measures to check copyright infringement. 
Finally, also a third category of market player operates within the 
open and freemium music business model context, namely the 
creative users who may apply the music content to producing new 
creative outputs.  
As shifts in business models occur in the wake of digitization 
and information technologies, the copyright owner, like every 
business entity, relies more and more on virtual or digital platforms 
to distribute the copyright products and generate revenue 
therefrom. Put differently, copyright owners usually rely on the 
assistance of digital platforms and firms who operate such 
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platforms to realise the economic interests from exploiting their 
exclusive rights through business models. If platform firms were to 
exclude paid licensing from the open and freemium music business 
model, there may be fewer firms investing in the creative outputs in 
copyright markets. It should be recalled that copyright owners are 
usually incentivised in investing resources in creativity if they get 
rewarded for their economic efforts. Rewards may consist either in 
the payment of royalties or in sharing of revenue realized from 
business activities ancillary to the dissemination of music 
content.169 Copyright owners thus have the need to be able to exert 
control over their creative outputs170 and to be able to reduce the 
cost of licensing and monitoring use of their creative outputs.171 
Exclusion of paid licensing from the open and freemium music 
business model may therefore result in less creativity and less 
competition within the music copyright industry.172 In other words, 
the immediate consequence could be a reduced number of 
professional creative outputs. 173  The ultimate effect could be 
detrimental to competition as well as the welfare of consumers, and 
may impact negatively on their consumption levels. A slightly 
different position has been adopted by Elkin-Koren, who has 
argued that the music content is experiential and demand is 
dependent on individual perception. 174  Nevertheless, there is 
significant consensus in the literature that copyright is considered a 
tool for revenue generation and whether it is directly (as in the case 
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of assignment or licensing) or indirectly applied (as in the case of 
brand sponsorships and licensing of personality rights), the 
expectation of revenue persists.175 Indeed, even in the case of the 
Creative Commons and other open business model, actions for 
copyright infringement results in damages once the work is used 
outside the dictates of the licence.176 Further, as Elkin-Koren points 
out, even though user-generated content is not produced for profit, 
it is increasingly shaped by market forces and can be distributed in 
a commercial setting and may, in fact, generate revenues.177 The 
platform firms offer several economic incentives – monetising 
activities through advertisements, charging subscription fees, using 
free distribution to market artists by cashing in on the online 
reputation. Platform firms generate revenue from social motivation 
and sometimes share advertising revenue with copyright owners 
who may also be platform users.178 
On the other side of the spectrum, it is to be noted that 
platform firms as a category of copyright users, invest considerably 
in creating and operating platforms. 179  These platforms play a 
central role in the deployment of open and freemium music 
business models. They facilitate trade and increase economic 
efficiency by making it easier for copyright owners to interact with 
their customers and people who value their music content and 
creative outputs.180  For example, a person who loves Flavour’s 
“Nwa Baby” can listen to the song on YouTube or on 
NotJustOk.com at no charge. In turn, Flavour or the copyright 
owner can see on YouTube the number of views to gauge 
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consumer reaction to the song. Especially in low-income 
economies like Nigeria and South Africa, platforms and platform 
firms can help achieve wider revenue-based distribution and allow 
copyright owners to concentrate on creating better music 
content.181.  
However, platform firms need a large music catalogue that 
will attract both platform users and advertisers to their platform. As 
stated in the Particulars of Claim filed in the suit between PRS and 
Soundcloud in the UK, such user-friendly service centred around 
availability of music content may include: provision of categorised 
and easily searchable music content182; making recommendations 
to users based on their indicated preferences, pushing and 
promoting particular music content to users, providing facilities for 
users to follow, like and share particular music content.183 Platform 
firms therefore incur costs of maintenance and updates, online 
marketing, managing the online community, protection against 
potential legal liability and they need ways to recoup these costs. 
They therefore adopt different business models (such as 
advertising) to recoup costs.184  Its services are provided with a 
view to generating revenue therefrom.185 Hence, by coordinating 
technology and by enabling the growth of music distribution, 
platform firms stand in a crucial position in relation to balancing the 
so-called private-public interest inherent in copyright law.186 
Given that the revenue flow is from advertising services, the 
availability of music (and other popular) content is crucial to the 
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platform firm’s success. In each case, the relevant platform firm 
aggregates a large music catalogue thereby increasing the 
likelihood that music consumers will be attracted to the site and 
companies seeking to advertise their products would pay a fee to 
access the advertising audience. In the circumstances, there is the 
question whether platform firms should be compelled to share 
advertisement revenue with copyright owners bearing in mind that 
the availability of the platform can create revenue streams from 
brand sponsorships and live performances for copyright owners.187 
Platform firms generally pursue the aim of working outside the 
exclusive rights framework to obviate any need for licensing 
obligations.  
For creative users, there is some room within copyright 
limitations and exceptions and subject matter restrictions that 
should enable them make certain creative uses of music 
content. 188  Users of music content in the digital environment 
generally are looking for: unrestricted access for transformative 
use; interaction; absence of contractual and technical restrictions 
as well as absence of constraints that may prevent them from 
engaging with the music content, transforming and remixing it.189 
Accordingly, certain restrictions in their access to the music content 
and the platform itself may frustrate the aim of this category of 
users in investing in further creative efforts. Such will be to the 
detriment of the copyright market.  
Beyond users who propose to apply the copyright-protected 
music content to further creative activities, there are consumers 
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who need to be able to access the music content for the purposes 
of consumption and consequent interaction with the copyright 
owner.190 For this category, it is important to them that their quest 
to enjoy the music content does not engender copyright 
infringement liability for them.191 
Therefore, while economic and social benefits stimulated by 
the open and freemium music business model are widely 
recognised by scholars and regulatory institutions, it is also true 
that the market players in that context present diverse interests, 
which are crucial to the promotion of competition in the music 
copyright industry. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Copyright protection and the open and freemium music business 
model play a significant role in today’s information-based economy. 
Copyright represents a relevant incentive for firms to create more 
and to enhance dynamic efficiency. The music content produced 
by copyright owners may then be subject to the open and freemium 
music business model processes; and the open and freemium 
music business model, it is well-known, may contribute significantly 
to economic growth. The copyright terms facilitate access to music 
content and have the potential to help in revenue generation for 
copyright owners. Both copyright and the open and freemium 
music business model, therefore, aim at enhancing societal 
welfare, which is crucial in competition policy’s goals. 
Besides the importance and meaning of the open and 
freemium business model, the chapter has shed light also on the 
different processes that may lead to its deployment. Further, 
relevant questions have been identified, particularly the question of 
rewarding copyright owners and addressing users’ needs in the 
                                                 






context of the open and freemium music business model. As 
argued above, rewarding copyright owners’ investments in 
creativity may consequentially provide benefits for both consumers 
and competition, to the benefit of the welfare of the society as a 
whole. Equally important was the analysis of the most common 
copyright terms. The nature of the copyright term implemented may 
discourage or incentivise the participation of copyright owners and 
users to the open and freemium music business model. For 
instance, terms relating to licensing pose many questions on the 
subject of revenue and the issue of platform firms’ obligations 
regarding paid licensing and potential liability for copyright 
infringement. Similarly, access and usage terms may determine the 
level of access to the music content, which platform users may 
enjoy. 
As some authors have noted, providing music content to 
consumers at zero price, whilst laudable, may still exceed the 
boundaries of the copyright law regulatory framework and its 
objectives. If the platform firms and the copyright owners agree to 
provide zero-price access to consumers, the terms of such 
agreement may restrict what consumers and users may do with the 
music content beyond consumption (i.e. listening) and may also 
adversely affect the economic interests of the copyright owners.  
Further, such terms may play a role in the determination of 
whether the platform firm may incur liability for copyright 
infringement. This may be the case where the copyright owner is 
presumed to have consented to the placing of the music content on 
the platform when no request is made to takedown the music 
content. The terms may also determine copyright infringement 
liability where the platform firm is presumed to have knowledge of 
the infringing nature of any use of the music content on such 
platform.  
The terms of inclusion or exclusion of the copyright owners 




distributors to the detriment of the economic interests of the 
copyright owners.  
The above analysis reveals that the deployment of the open 
and freemium music business model is a veritable example of 
innovation. As such, the business model may boost competition 
and add to a firm’s competitive advantage by ensuring that 
copyright-protected music content is used to set a firm ahead of its 
competitors in various markets. However, there is need to account 
for the copyright protection inherent in the music content utilised in 
the open and freemium music business model. Accordingly, the 
open and freemium music business model may also raise concerns 
under both South African and Nigerian copyright laws. This is 
because, as argued in this chapter, the open and freemium music 
business model represents a context where decisions are made 
and processes implemented and policies applied that affect both 
income generation for copyright owners and access for copyright 
users.  
All these conclusions will be thoroughly justified in the next 
chapters, which will shed further light on the need for the regulation 
of the open and freemium music business model and will better 





Chapter Four: Copyright consequences in the 
deployment of the open and freemium music business 
model  
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter examined the processes and copyright terms 
regarding the music content used in the context of the open and 
freemium music business model. That chapter showed how copyright 
law influenced the establishment and implementation of the terms that 
determine the conduct of platform firms, copyright owners and users 
of the platform in relation to the music content.  
Corollary to the foregoing, this chapter is aimed at highlighting 
the need for the regulation of the open and freemium music business 
model. To this end, the chapter seeks to identify and analyse whether 
the copyright terms identified in Chapter three are aligned with the 
objectives of the copyright law framework. Accordingly, after an in-
depth examination of the copyright terms from the perspective of the 
copyright regulatory framework, this chapter proceeds to examine the 
regulatory terrain for the business model in South Africa and Nigeria. 
From the perspective of copyright law, the open and freemium music 
business model may be aligned with the copyright system where 
copyright owners are incentivised and rewarded for their creative 
efforts and investments. This is also the case whenever copyright 
users are able to enjoy both creative and consumptive access to the 
music content. By providing for revenue for copyright owners and by 
ensuring access to users, the open and freemium music business 
model may serve the objectives of copyright law. However, the 
establishment and implementation of the copyright terms involved in 
the open and freemium music business model has created concerns 
for the incentives expected by the copyright owners both in terms of 




damages for infringement. Some of these concerns relate to the 
concepts of “value gap” and “scraping” said to be perpetuated by the 
copyright terms within this business model. There are also concerns 
regarding the ability of users of copyright works to lawfully access and 
use the music content in every manner outside the protected uses 
guaranteed by the copyright framework. While copyright users expect 
to use the music content for a wide variety of purposes given the 
limitations and exceptions to copyright, the copyright terms reveal 
some restrictions on those expectations. 
Section 4.2 analyses the relevant exclusive rights granted 
under copyright law vis-à-vis the copyright terms (licensing terms, 
access and usage terms) as well as the relevant limitations and 
exceptions to copyright protection in relation to the copyright terms.1 
The “template” provided by the international copyright treaties for 
these exclusive rights and the limitations and exceptions thereto is 
used as a benchmark to analyse the copyright terms. Before focusing 
exclusively on the regulatory experiences, as they currently exist in 
South Africa and/or Nigeria, it is important to first consider the various 
international copyright instruments that address the exercise of 
copyright. The reason for this is not far-fetched. National regulation of 
copyright has largely taken its cue from existing international 
instruments and in particular the Berne Convention, the TRIPs 
Agreement and the WCT. Despite the similarities that may arise from 
using the same legislative “template”, 2  the ratification approach 
specific to each jurisdiction as well as the promise of an eventual 
regulatory cumulative body of interpretative material as constructed by 
                                                 
1 As already stated, the establishment and implementation of the copyright terms 
stem from the platform firm’s interpretation of the copyright law system. See Section 
3.4, above. 
2 See Hugenholtz, P.B., van Eechoud, M., Gompel, S.V. and Helberger, N. (2012). 
The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy. 




the courts are factors that result in national differences. 3 
Consequently, the analysis here shall begin with a brief description of 
any guidance that can be gleaned from this international “template”, 
before moving on to the consideration of the South African and 
Nigerian respective regulatory experiences. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 
examine the copyright terms in the light of the regulatory framework 
provided by copyright law in South Africa and Nigeria, respectively. In 
doing so, the common position applicable to both South Africa and 
Nigeria will be pointed out while differences will be highlighted. In this 
regard, it is important to note that due to the influence of international 
treaties on domestic copyright laws, differences may not be so acute. 
Further, the two sections consider briefly, the recent proposed 
copyright reform currently going on in the two countries and how the 
Bills respond to the open and freemium music business context. 
Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 The copyright terms and the international copyright 
framework 
As stated in Chapter three, above, the copyright terms implemented in 
the open and freemium music business model relate to the issue of 
use and exploitation of copyright in the music content. In the case of 
the licensing terms, such relate particularly to the issue of revenue 
accruable to the copyright owner in respect of the music content.4 
Access terms relate inter alia to free access to the platform that 
copyright owners have as uploaders to upload their music content. In 
the case of usage terms, copyright owners as platform users would be 
unable to use the platform in the event of a match between their 
                                                 
3  Depreeuw, S. (2014). The variable scope of the exclusive economic rights in 
copyright, Wolters Kluwer, 487; Reid, L., 1972. The judge as law maker. J. Soc'y 
Pub. Tchrs. L. ns, 12, p.22. 




uploads and the music content contained in a previously-generated 
reference file. Further, the platform firm will deny the music content 
itself access to the platform again on the grounds that such content 
matches previously-uploaded content.5 Specifically, usage terms deal 
with the scope of permissible uses that the platform firm may make of 
the music content without the shadow of copyright infringement 
liability.6  
 Corollary to the foregoing, a crucial part of the analysis of the 
copyright terms implemented in the open and freemium music 
business model hinges on their relationship to the scope of the 
exclusive rights framework and the limitations and exceptions to those 
rights. As the licensing terms involve gratis licenses as well as 
revenue-based licenses, 7  the question of their alignment with the 
copyright law framework must be answered from the perspective of 
the relationship between the revenue streams and the exclusive rights 
available within the copyright framework. In particular, it may be 
argued that despite the use of their copyright-protected music content, 
the licensing terms are not aligned with the incentive basis for 
copyright protection. In the case of usage terms and access terms, 
these not only raise the question of the scope of the exclusive rights; 
they also raise questions regarding the scope of limitations and 
exception to copyright protection.  
In providing a platform for the hosting and storage of music 
content alongside a notice and takedown system, the platform firms 
are able to procure a gratis licence from the uploader. Bearing in mind 
that on one hand, a wide range of music content attracts consumers 
and on the other hand, the consumers are much sought-after by 
                                                 
5 Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.4, above. 
6 See Section 3.4.3, above. 




advertisers, the significance of the gratis licence is heightened. In 
these circumstances, the gratis licence provides the platform firms 
with the freedom to apply the available music content towards 
attracting and retaining the attention of members of the public and in 
rendering their advertising services. For example, in the case of 
Viacom v YouTube, it was alleged that at its inception, YouTube 
encouraged massive uploads to gain user traction. 8  Such user 
traction in turn attracts advertising revenue as third party firms pay the 
platform firms to have their products and services showcased to the 
members of the public who visit the platforms. With respect to the 
revenue-based licence, copyright owners operating within the 
licensing terms of the open and freemium music business model enjoy 
the opportunity to generate revenue by not requesting the platform 
firm to remove or disable access to its music content and instead, 
monetizing the access to such music content through advertisements.  
In these circumstances, advertising creates the nexus between 
the source of revenue and the music content. To obtain and retain the 
attention of the users of the platform, the platform firms would index, 
categorise and tag the music content, optimising access and 
interaction with it. 9  Accordingly, in considering the relationship 
between the copyright terms and the copyright framework, the 
pertinent question relates to whether these activities of the platform 
firm itself are within or outside the scope of the exclusive economic 
rights available to the copyright owners under the copyright 
framework. In this regard, the most relevant rights for copyright 
owners in the online context in which the open and freemium music 
business model operates, would be the right of reproduction and the 
                                                 
8 No. 07 Civ. 2103, 2010 WL 2532404. See paragraphs 3 to 6 and 31 particularly of 
the Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.  




right of communication to the public. 10  The other economic rights 
recognised by the Copyright Act in the case of Nigeria and South 
Africa, are either generally understood to be limited to tangible copies 
or more relevant in the physical space and are accordingly not 
relevant to the internet context of the open and freemium music 
business model.  
Further, it is to be noted that the boundaries of the exclusive 
rights determine the scope of the permissible uses that may be 
available to the copyright users. These permissible uses fall within the 
purview of limitations and exceptions to copyright protection. 
Accordingly, in considering the relationship between the copyright 
terms and the copyright framework, the other pertinent question 
relates to whether the implementation of the copyright terms are 
cognisant of the limitations and exceptions to copyright protection. The 
most relevant limitation and exception to copyright protection in the 
open and freemium music business model context, would be the fair 
dealing exception11 and the limitation to copyright protection imposed 
by statutory and/or compulsory licenses.12 The other limitations and 
exceptions such as limits on copyright subject matter, originality and 
fixation requirements, the exclusion of ideas, and the duration of 
rights, recognised by the copyright system, are of more general 
application and are accordingly not specifically relevant to the internet 
context of the open and freemium music business model.13 
                                                 
10 See Angelopoulos 2016 supra at p.13; Harms 2012 supra at 217.  
11 See Samuelson 2017 supra at 36-42.  
12 Ibid at p.13. 
13 See Challis, B. (2015). The 1709 Blog: What’s Wrong With the ‘Blurred Lines’ 
Copyright Ruling?. [online] The1709blog.blogspot.com. Available at: 
http://the1709blog.blogspot.com/2015/03/whats-wrong-with-blurred-lines.html 
[Accessed 7 Apr. 2015]; Corbett 2011 supra at 515; Heald 2014b supra; Elkin Koren 




The next paragraphs examine the copyright terms with 
reference to the right of reproduction and the right of communication 
to the public and identifies whether there is a fit between each right 
and the copyright terms. Subsection 4.2.2 undertakes a similar 
exercise with reference to the fair dealing exception and the statutory 
licence limitation in relation to the copyright terms implemented in the 
open and freemium music business model. As earlier stated, the 
international treaties – Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and 
the WCT- are applied as a benchmark for the analysis.  
4.2.1. Copyright terms and the scope of the exclusive rights 
framework 
(a) The right of reproduction 
As highlighted in Chapter two of this study, the reproduction right 
(along with the performing rights) has been the oldest and most 
prevalent value metric for the exploitation of music content. 14  For 
example, in South Africa, the reproduction right applies to all the 
categories of works and consists of the vesting of the exclusive right to 
reproduce or to authorize the reproduction of the applicable work “in 
any manner or form”. 15  Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention to which 
both South Africa and Nigeria are signatories secures the right of 
reproduction in relation to copyright works. According to that provision, 
“authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention 
shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these 
works, in any manner or form.” Further, art 9(3) clarifies that sound 
and video recordings are to be considered to be reproductions.  
                                                 
14 See Section 2.2.1, above.  
15  See the following provisions of the South African Copyright Act: Section 6(a) 
regarding literary or musical work, Section 7(a) regarding artistic works, Section 8(a) 
regarding cinematograph films, Section 9(a) regarding the “making directly or 
indirectly, a record embodying the sound recording”. See also Sections 10(a) and 




Neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the WCT replicate these 
provisions. However, both art 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement and art 
1(4) of the WCT require Contracting Parties to comply with them. As 
an “internet treaty”, which seeks to address the challenges posed by 
internet technology for the copyright ecosystem, 16  the Agreed 
Statement on art 1(4) of the WCT is apposite for the open and 
freemium music business model. In particular, the Agreed Statement 
provides that: 
The reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and 
the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in 
particular to the use of works in digital form. It is understood that the storage 
of a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a 
reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne Convention. 
Given that the storage of a protected work in digital form in an 
electronic medium such as a digital platform is recognised as a 
reproduction of that work, it will be immaterial that the form of the 
relevant copyright work was significantly modified during the process 
of copying. In this way, the digitisation of a given copyright work would 
still be considered as a reproduction of that work. This would mean 
that the reproduction right applies to every use of the work in the 
online context no matter how ephemeral or economically irrelevant 
they might be. This approach has led to the suggestion that the level 
of copyright protection in the online context may be unduly higher than 
the physical environment given that the nature of the internet generally 
necessitates reproducing the work even if temporarily.17 
To avoid such unwholesome interpretation, legislators in many 
jurisdictions sought to provide exemptions to individuals and firms who 
only engage in acts of reproduction of copyright works in situations 
necessitated by the very nature of internet use or at the behest of 
                                                 
16  Wipo.int. (2015). [online] Available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/activities/internet_treaties.html [Accessed 31 Jan. 
2017]. 




users of the services provided by such individuals or firms.18 These 
attempts led to the enactment of s512 of the US DMCA 1998 and the 
E-Commerce Directive in the EU, which are the two main global 
models for the safe harbour regime. As described earlier in Chapter 
three, above, the safe harbour regime provides a limitation of liability 
framework, which protects providers of hosting (and other internet-
related) services from liability for their users’ reproduction of copyright-
protected content unless they received actual notice or became aware 
of facts or circumstances indicating infringing content or activity.  
However, with the emergence of new business models and 
approaches to deploying digital platforms, there have been calls to 
abolish or considerably reform the safe harbour regime particularly as 
it applies to hosting services.19   Specifically, the regime has been 
identified as underpinning the copyright terms in the context of the 
open and freemium music business model.20 Also, the regime has 
been held responsible for the paltry payments or revenue from the 
platform firms and alleged to be unsupportive of copyright law's 
objective of incentivising creativity. The claim is that the regime 
enables massive reproduction of music content and thus, that the 
platform firms exploit the reproduction right to the detriment or to the 
exclusion of copyright owners. 21  Seen from this perspective, the 
                                                 
18 For historical context, see Pollack, W.M. (1999). Tuning in: The future of copyright 
protection for online music in the digital millennium. Fordham L. Rev., 68, p.2445. 
Traphagen, M. (2002). The unfinished business of copyright: A look forward from the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Int'l Intell. Prop. L. & Pol'y 63(7), p.1. Urban, J.M. 
and Quilter, L. (2005). Efficient process or chilling effects-Takedown notices under 
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Santa Clara Computer & High 
Tech. LJ, 22, p.621; Rosati 2016 supra. 
19 Edwards, L. (2011). Role and responsibility of the internet intermediaries in the 
field of copyright and related right. [online] WIPO, pp.29-30. Available at: 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_th
e_internet_intermediaries_final.pdf [Accessed 31 Jan. 2017].                                                





failure to ascribe liability to platform firms for the actions of users of 
the platform in streaming the music content on the grounds that such 
should be regarded as authorised or induced by the platform firms is 
held to be a fault arising from the safe harbour regime. This argument 
as conceptualised in the “value gap” statement, is that such platform 
firms should not be able to enjoy the safe harbour protection. Instead, 
the platform firms should enter into licensing agreements with 
copyright owners because they are involved in the exploitation of the 
reproduction right through their users.  
Value gap is the most cited example of the challenge for the 
copyright system arising from the open and freemium music business 
model, and has been described as a form of unfair competition.22 
According to the IFPI, the value gap makes licensed music platforms 
to compete unfavourably with unlicensed music platforms. In this 
regard, the extant copyright law is identified as clearly compelling 
subscription-based services such as Spotify to seek and obtain a 
licence from relevant copyright owners prior to operating its platform 
and deploying the use of music content available on their platform. 
Conversely, in the case of ad-based services which rely on music 
content uploaded by the users of the platform to operate their core 
services, the provisions of the extant copyright law which may require 
such firm to seek licences a priori23, is weakened. The requirement of 
licence in this case being to avoid being held liable for authorising the 
user uploads. This is because the safe harbour regime will not attach 
infringement liability on the platform firms for platform users’ 
reproduction of music content unless it is shown that the platform firm 
has the requisite knowledge of infringement. In other words, the 
enabling of user-upload of music content is interpreted as obliging the 
                                                 
22 ibid at p.25. 




platform firm to seek a license. Therefore, the safe harbour exemption 
which is made on the basis that platform firms are not to be held liable 
for enabling (or authorising) their users' actions in uploading or 
reproducing music content, is held to be problematic.24 According to 
the IFPI: 
The value gap describes the growing mismatch between the value that user 
upload services, such as YouTube, extract from music and the revenue 
returned to the music community – those who are creating and investing in 
music. The value gap is the biggest threat to the future sustainability of the 
music industry… Inconsistent applications of online liability laws have 
emboldened certain services to claim that they are not liable for the music 
they make available to the public. Today, services such as YouTube, which 
have developed sophisticated on-demand music platforms, use this as a 
shield to avoid licensing music on fair terms like other digital services, 
claiming they are not legally responsible for the music they distribute on 
their site. 
This statement, when applied to the open and freemium music 
business context, means that a value gap exists when platform firms 
are able to procure unfair licensing terms25 from copyright owners for 
the use of their music content within the platform. The licensing terms 
under which platform firms either procure a royalty-free, revenue-free 
licence or unilaterally impose revenue-sharing arrangements on terms 
favourable only to them are considered to be unfair.26 Such conduct 
results in the platform firm being able to enjoy the benefits of the 
music content with little or no corresponding revenue to the copyright 
owner.27 The objective of incentivising creativity is allegedly derailed in 
so far as copyright owners are unable to recoup their investments or 
exploit the right to reproduce their works as a consequence of the 
conduct.28 The principal concern is that the business model of the 
                                                 
24 IFPI 2017 supra at 24 – 28. 
25 See IFPI 2017 supra at 33. 
26 Ibid. 
27 ibid. 
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copyright industry has already been scrutinized in Chapter 2, on the relationship 




music copyright industry, which involves making considerable 
investments in music production and artist development, and 
expectation of revenue from reproduction becomes unsustainable.29 
Platform firms are then able to overrun the copyright owners, resulting 
in lesser revenue for new (but significant) uses of the copyright 
owners’ creative outputs.30  
To understand better why the copyright terms established in the 
open and freemium music business model is asserted as creating a 
value gap, some considerations deserve attention. A subscription-
based service, which involves a platform firm personally uploading 
music content on to its platform, is interpreted as directly engaging in 
the act of reproduction or making available of the music content to the 
public. As explained in Chapter three of this thesis, such platform firm 
will require the licence of the relevant copyright owners if it is to avoid 
liability for copyright infringement.31  Accordingly, such platform firm 
may literally be “at the mercy” of copyright owners whose music 
content is required to attract subscribers to its platform.32 Licensing 
arrangements in such cases are somewhat on a more equitable 
terrain or more accurately, the copyright owner is able to exercise the 
control that copyright law intends as it may refuse the licence. 33 
However, in the case of the open and freemium music business 
model, licensing arrangements between the platform firm and the 
copyright owner are not made before the commencement of the 
platform firm’s services. This is because the reproduction and making 
available of the music content is made primarily by users of the 
                                                 
29See IFPI 2017 supra at 33. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See section 3.4.1. 
32 Ritala 2013 supra at 42-3. 
33 Of course, they may overstep their bounds. See Ritala 2013 supra at 42-3; Also, 




platform and because upon meeting the specified conditions, the safe 
harbour regime exempts platform firms from liability for their users’ 
actions, liability for storing or hosting the copyright-protected content, 
including any rights of the copyright owner to compel a licence, arises 
after the fact. In explaining the existence of a value gap, a comparison 
between payments from “prior licensed” platform firms and payments 
from “post-licensed” platform firms shows the revenue from the latter 
coming up short.34 For this reason, the IFPI and several copyright 
owner groups have lauded proposed legislative reforms to copyright 
law that would require platform firms that rely on user-uploads to seek 
licensing arrangements a priori. 35  Such legislative changes are 
expected to close the value gap and address the competition 
concerns. Specifically, the IFPI supports the proposed reforms in the 
EU in terms of the so-called value gap proposal embodied in the 
proposed art 13 (1) of the Proposal for a directive on copyright in the 
Digital Single Market (DSM). 36  Article 13 of the proposed DSM 
Directive provides that: 
1.  Information society service providers that store and provide to the public 
access to large amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their 
users shall, in cooperation with rightholders, take measures to ensure the 
functioning of agreements concluded with rightholders for the use of their 
works or other subject-matter or to prevent the availability on their services 
of works or other subject-matter identified by rightholders through the 
cooperation with the service providers. Those measures, such as the use of 
effective content recognition technologies, shall be appropriate and 
proportionate. The service providers shall provide rightholders with 
adequate information on the functioning and the deployment of the 
measures, as well as, when relevant, adequate reporting on the recognition 
and use of the works and other subject-matter. 
2.  Member States shall ensure that the service providers referred to in 
paragraph 1 put in place complaints and redress mechanisms that are 
available to users in case of disputes over the application of the measures 
referred to in paragraph 1. 
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35 Ibid. 
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3.  Member States shall facilitate, where appropriate, the cooperation 
between the information society service providers and rightholders through 
stakeholder dialogues to define best practices, such as appropriate and 
proportionate content recognition technologies, taking into account, among 
others, the nature of the services, the availability of the technologies and 
their effectiveness in light of technological developments. 
Indeed, the cases instituted in the EU and in the US against platform 
firms as discussed in the previous chapter, have sought to address 
the reproduction of copyrighted content arising in the business model 
context, with specific focus on the perceived “mismatch” between the 
value from platform firm’s use of music content and the corresponding 
value received by the music industry.37 The objective in each of these 
cases was to prevent platform firms from creating a value gap in the 
music industry by failing to adequately reward copyright owners for the 
exploitation of the reproduction right which is exclusive to the 
copyright owner.38 In this regard, the U.S. and EU courts have often 
elaborated similar perspectives, refusing to accept that the respective 
copyright owners had a valid claim to licensing from platform firms 
because of their (platform firm) users’ activities.39  While it is to be 
noted that the value gap proposal has experienced criticisms peculiar 
to its conflict with other EU Directives such as the prohibition against 
the imposition of a general monitoring duty,40 the similarities in the 
outcomes of these cases help to explain the misconstruction inherent 
in the conceptualisation of the value gap as a challenge to the 
copyright system.  
                                                 
37  See Viacom v Youtube supra; GEMA v YouTube, District Court of Munich 
(Landgericht (District Court) Munich I, 30 June 2015, 33 O 9639/14); Court of Appeal 
of Hamburg (Oberlandesgericht (Court of Appeal) Hamburg, 1 July 2015, 5 U 
87/12)  Higher Regional Court of Munich Judgment of 28 January 2016 – Case 
Ref.: 29 U 2798/15. 
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firms liable for their users’ activities. 
40  See Rosati, E. (2016). Neighbouring rights for publishers: are national and 
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As identified in Chapter three, apart from providing a platform 
for user uploads of music content and storing music content at the 
direction of users, the platform firm’s activities in relation to the music 
content and in the implementation of the licensing terms involve 
indexing, categorization, deletion and filtering of music content as a 
way of attracting and retaining customers to the platform. 41 
Accordingly, it is argued that the perception that the implementation 
and application of the copyright terms sits in opposition to the 
exploitation of the reproduction right is misguided. By extension, the 
perception that the safe harbour regime requires massive reform, 
which may exclude platform firms from the safe harbour protection, or 
require licensing for user-uploads is largely unwarranted. In reality, the 
crux of the copyright terms in the open and freemium music business 
model as evident from Chapter three, is hinged on access to the 
consumer, consumer’s data and consumer’s attention.42 Remarkably, 
the payments and accounting for open and freemium music business 
models are not connected to the traditional exploitation of the 
reproduction rights but have been developed by advertising 
calculations, which are hinged on consumer reach or access. 
The copyright terms in particular, serve the purpose of gaining 
access to the copyright owners' consumers, consumers' data in terms 
of their likes and dislikes/tastes, and promotion for the artist (copyright 
owner). While proponents of the value gap proposal see reproduction 
rights as the main value metric in the copyright terms, the evidence 
points to access to the consumer and consumer's data as the main 
value metric. In the circumstances, it is argued that one of the key 
copyright law implications of the open and freemium music business 
model is the erosion of the significance of the reproduction right. 
                                                 
41 See sections 3.3 and 3.4, above. 




The argument that the value and utility of the reproduction right 
diminishes in the context of the copyright terms of the open and 
freemium music contributes to the plethora of calls in the literature for 
a shift in focus for copyright regulation. Concerning the view that the 
reproduction right as presently constituted should no longer be the 
exclusive preserve of the copyright owner, it is evident that the 
reproduction right involving user uploads particularly in the open and 
freemium music business model context does not result in (much) 
economic value.43 Rather, it is the indexing, storage and optimisation 
of user uploads and the provision of access to customer for the 
purposes of advertising, that generates economic value in the open 
and freemium music business model context.  
A case in point concerns the introduction of an ancillary 
copyright protection for press publishers in Italy, Spain and 
Germany.44  By virtue of this protection, press publishers have the 
exclusive right of press products' communication to the public for 
commercial purposes within one year after being published. 45  In 
Germany, this right required Google to pay press publishers for its 
(Google’s) use of links to news items from press publishers in its 
Google News service.46 In effect, the legislature and the participants 
considered reproduction rights to be the revenue generator – in other 
                                                 
43 See Angelopoulos, C. (2016). EU copyright reform: Outside the safe harbours, 
intermediary liability capsizes into incoherence - Kluwer Copyright Blog. [online] 
Kluwer Copyright Blog. Available at: 
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Property Review, (5), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: 
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45 See Jing-jing, Y.A.N. (2015). Review of the 8~(th) Amendment of the German 
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words, the platform firm, Google, was exploiting the reproduction right 
held by the press publishers. The expectation was that the provision 
for the ancillary copyright would enable press publishers to earn 
revenue whenever their press content is reproduced and made 
available through freemium-based services on search engines.47  
Despite this provision, the press publishers in those countries 
failed to receive any revenue and even lost "traffic" (access to 
readers/consumers) when they sought to exploit/enforce the 
reproduction rights.48 In the case of Germany, the press publishers 
were “forced” to provide Google with a gratis licence regarding the 
ancillary copyright. In VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der 
Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte von Medienunternehmen mbH 
v Google Inc. (“German Press Publishers”), the Press Publishers 
represented by its collecting society, VG Media instituted an antitrust 
complaint before the German competition regulator, Bundeskartellamt 
against Google arguing that Google’s market power enabled it to 
successfully procure a gratis licence despite the objective of the 
ancillary copyright which was to provide revenue for press 
publishers. 49  The Bundeskartellamt declined to initiate formal 
proceedings against Google on grounds, inter alia, that it accepted 
that there was objective justification (i.e. avoidance of damages for 
copyright infringement) for Google’s actions and as such it cannot be 
compelled to exploit the ancillary copyright. 50  Accordingly, the 
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monetisation of the news content was not crucial to Google’s services 
as Google could profitably run its services without the exploitation of 
the ancillary copyright in the news content. The press publishers’ suit 
before the German Regional Court failed on the same grounds and 
they subsequently appealed. However, the appeal has stalled 
because the appeal court had questioned the competence of the 
ancillary copyright in the light of EU law. In this regard, the court 
referred the matter to the CJEU and the reference in this case 
concerned whether the law conferring the ancillary copyright on Press 
Publishers should have been notified to the EU in terms of Directive 
98/34/EC (as amended by Directive 98/48/EC).51 This requirement, if 
applicable, may mean that the ancillary copyright is unenforceable in 
the first place. From the perspective of economic theory of copyright, 
the Court’s explanation for the revenue generator in open and 
freemium business models involving news content shows the utility in 
focusing on the platform firms’ designation of earnings and source of 
revenue, as a determinant of what rights, if any, are being exploited. In 
this case, the ancillary right or reproduction right proved to be no 
revenue earner. 52  One cannot escape though the self-evident 
viewpoint arising from an analysis of Google’s sources of revenue, 
none of which arise from the reproduction right and the majority of 
which arise from advertising and data in terms of “traffic”. 
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2015). 
51 VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte 
von Medienunternehmen mbH v Google Inc, C-299/17. 
52  See Ramalho, A. (2016). EU competence to create a neighbouring right for 
publishers? The small pieces make up the big picture - Kluwer Copyright Blog. 
[online] Kluwer Copyright Blog. Available at: 
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 A paradigm shift from reproduction rights exploitation towards 
access to consumers can be noticed, particularly in the approach of 
the platform firms in the open and freemium music business model 
context. Today, more and more platform firms stress the importance of 
the access to the consumer by creating ticketing and concert 
opportunities based on music content that platform users and 
consumers love.53 Therefore, it is argued that it behoves copyright 
owners to monetise access to the consumers of their music content. 
Further, the copyright terms should not be viewed as an exploitation or 
exercise of reproduction rights or based on the safe harbour regime, 
but rather as a method deployed by the platform firms to gain access 
to the consumers and consumers’ data. 
In this context, the deployment of the open and freemium music 
business model necessarily entailed a new approach to the analysis of 
the scope of copyright protection, particularly the parameters of the 
reproduction right as value metric. The fact that the source of revenue 
within the business model flows from advertising may be interpreted to 
mean that the copyright system based on and the economic right of 
reproduction of music content (or any copyrighted content) have been 
jettisoned as the value metric in the copyright ecosystem. The new 
value metrics operate outside the reproduction of content to generate 
revenue from the interaction with the content. In these cases, the 
exploitation of the reproduction rights is discarded, and its 
“monetisation” superseded by other income streams. The open and 
freemium music business model introduces revenue streams that are 
more external to the remuneration system based on the reproduction 
of music content. As such, a copyright law system focused on the 
expectation of revenue from every reproduction of copyright-protected 
content blurs the consideration of other viable revenue opportunities 
                                                 




that free and/or uninhibited reproduction may have offered. It is 
argued that such restriction is disadvantageous because digitization 
involves such rampant reproduction to the extent that making 
reproduction exclusive to the copyright owner is near futile. The focus 
is no longer on leveraging on the reproduction rights per se; the focus 
is on the consumer. The very implication of the copyright terms within 
the open and freemium music business model is to remove the focus 
on copyright protection system based on reproduction and place it 
squarely on the consumers of the “business” created by the music 
content. It follows that the platform firm’s activity cannot be properly 
assessed through the lens of reproduction. The focus here is on the 
activities of the platform firm itself, which clearly does not amount to 
reproduction of the music content.  
(b) The right of communication to the public 
According to the Berne Convention, the authors of literary and artistic 
works shall have the exclusive right to authorise the communication of 
their works to the public.54 The Convention does not explicitly define 
the right of communication to the public. However, that provision 
appears to restrict the application of the right to places where without 
being in the same place and at the same time where the transmission 
or communication is taking place, the recipients of the communication 
would not be able to perceive the work. 55  According to Ficsor, 
communication to the public within the meaning of the Berne 
Convention, is restricted to:  
A transmission by wire or wireless means, of images or sounds, or both, 
making it possible for the images and/or sounds to be perceived by persons 
                                                 
54 See Berne Convention, Articles 11, 11bis, 11ter, 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1). Dreier, T. 
(2006). Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works. In Dreier, 
T. and Hugenholtz, P.B. eds., Concise European copyright law (Vol. 2). Kluwer Law 
International, 49. 




outside the normal circle of a family and the closest social acquaintances or 
the family, at a place or places the distance of which from the place where 
the transmission is started is such that, without the transmission, the images 
or sounds, or both, would not be perceivable at the said place or places, 
irrespective of whether the said persons can perceive the images and/or 
sounds at the same place and at the same time, or at different places and at 
different times.56  
Given that the Berne Convention predates the emergence of the 
internet and new media, it is unsurprising that the scope of the right 
under the Convention appears to be narrowly defined as to exclude 
those means of communication.  
Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement require Contracting States 
to recognise the right of communication to the public as provided in 
the Berne Convention. Nevertheless, art 8 of the WCT expands the 
scope of the right of communication to the public to include the 
“making available to the public of works in such a way that members 
of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them”.57 While no explicit definition is provided for the right 
of communication to the public under the Treaty, the inclusion of the 
“making available” ambit clearly accommodates communication on the 
Internet and new media in which each person determines when and 
where to access a given copyright-protected content. However, 
notwithstanding this broad inclusion, the “Agreed Statement 
concerning art 8” in indicating that “the mere provision of physical 
facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself 
amount to communication within the meaning of [the WCT] or the 
                                                 
56  See Ficsor, M. (2003). Guide to the copyright and related rights treaties 
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WIPO, 275. 
57  Angelopoulos, C. (2011). Creative Commons and related rights in sound 
recordings: Are the two systems compatible? In L Guibault & C Angelopoulos (eds.), 





Berne Convention,” appears to have reduced the scope of art 8 in 
relation to the Internet. In this regard, it may be argued that as far as 
the right of communication to the public is concerned, the person or 
firm who did not create, but merely facilitated the dissemination of 
infringing content, will not be construed as communicating the work to 
the public.58 
In these circumstances, mere facilitation of the distribution of 
music content may be outside the scope of the protected use involved 
in the right of communication to the public.59 However, there is no 
definition of what kind of activity would qualify as a “mere provision of 
physical facilities” under the Treaty. Applying the literal rule of 
interpretation,60 would suggest that only the provision of hardware is 
excluded and that acts of installation of the physical facilities or of the 
provision of services that use them may fall within protected use. 
However, it is possible to argue that the services in the nature of 
digital facilities that enable distribution of protected content are 
excluded from the scope of protected use.61 This may be particularly 
so when the activities in question are restricted to enabling distribution 
only. Significantly, it is to be noted that the Agreed Statement is limited 
to the act of communication to the public and there is no mention of 
the reproduction of copyright protected works. Accordingly, where the 
same act constitutes both reproduction and communication to the 
public, it appears that the Agreed Statement may not exempt the 
                                                 
58  International Bureau of WIPO (1997). WIPO National Seminar on Digital 
Technology and the New WIPO Treaties (WIPO/CNR/SEL/97/1). 
59 Ibid.  
60 The Literal Rule requires that where the statutory provisions appear to be clear 
and unambiguous, they should be interpreted according to their literal meaning or in 
their usual grammatical sense. See Nabhan v Nabhan [1967] 1All NLR47 at 54; 
Faturoti 2017 supra at 7. 
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platform firm from liability for the act of reproduction.62  
As evidenced from the foregoing analysis, the international 
copyright instruments (Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and 
the WCT) when analysed individually offers both guidance and certain 
leeway to Member States in the construction and scope of the right of 
communication to the public, particularly in the digital era. The EU, for 
instance takes advantage of this. In the case of the EU, the Copyright 
Directive63 adopts the WCT approach providing a broad discretion to 
EU Member States in making their domestic laws. Like the WCT, art 
3(1) of the Copyright Directive does not define the concept of 
“communication to the public”. In the absence of an explicit definition, 
the CJEU has relied on the stated objectives of the Copyright 
Directive, which includes ensuring a high level of protection of 
intellectual property and for authors, to define the scope of the right of 
communication.64 Further, in a long line of cases on the construction 
of the right of communication to the public, 65  the CJEU has 
                                                 
62 See Angelopoulos 2016 supra at 139.  
63 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
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64 See Recital 24 of the Copyright Directive. 
65 See the following cases, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España 
(SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA, C-306/05, EU:C:2006:479 (“SGAE”);  Organismos 
Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon v Divani 
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Globus Bucures ti” );  Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC 
Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and  Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd 
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Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA (C-432/09), EU:C:2011:648 (“Airfield”);  Società 
Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso, C-135/10, EU:C:2012:140 (“SCF”); 
Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland and Attorney General, C-
162/10, EU:C:2012:141 (“PPI”); ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TV Catch Up 
Ltd, C-607/11, EU:C:2013:147 (“TV Catch Up”); Nils Svensson and Others v 
Retriever Sverige AB, C-466/12 (‘ Svensson’), EU:C:2014:76;  OSA - Ochranný  





consistently identified that the essential components of the right of 
communication to the public are “an act of communication”, which is 
directed to a “public”.66 Where the act of communication consists in 
making the work available to the public, the CJEU has also identified 
other relevant prerequisites.67 These include considerations such as 
the indispensible intervention of the person or firm making the 
communication and the knowledge and awareness68 of the maker of 
the communication regarding the consequences of his/its 
communication or intervention.69  
In Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems, 70 the CJEU held 
that the notion of “communication to the public” would include the sale 
of a multimedia player on which there are pre-installed add-ons, 
available on the internet, containing hyperlinks to freely accessible 
websites on which copyright works have been made available to the 
public without the authorisation of the copyright owners. The Court 
took the view that an intervention like the one of the provider of a 
multimedia player is to be regarded as enabling access to unlicensed 
                                                                                                                              
as, C-351/12, EU:C:2014:110 (“OSA”);  BestWater International v Mebes and 
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66 Rosati 2017 supra at 3. 
67 Ibid at 5. 
68 Rosati 2017 supra at 11-2. 
69 Ibid at 3. 




content that would be otherwise more challenging to find. As such, an 
intervention of this kind falls within the scope of art 3(1) of the 
Copyright Directive on the making of communication to the public.71 
Regarding the “public” to which the work is being 
communicated or made available in the online context, such would 
include any unspecified number of people such as the users of the 
platform (including advertisers)72 as held Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV 
and XS4All Internet BV (“The Pirate Bay” or “Pirate Bay”), either 
where the copyright owner was not the one who uploaded or 
authorized the uploading of his work.73 The Pirate Bay is particularly 
notable in that it dealt with a situation where the communication to the 
public is construed as being made by a platform firm. Accordingly, it is 
particularly apposite to this study, which focuses on the activities of 
the platform firm and whether such may be construed as 
communicating the music content to the public. This differs from the 
safe harbour regime and the consequent value gap proposal where 
the platform firm may be considered liable for copyright infringement 
because of the actions of the platform users themselves. In other 
words, the protection is particularly applicable in secondary liability 
cases where the platform users have to be primary or direct 
infringers.74 
In The Pirate Bay, the Dutch Supreme Court sought guidance 
from the CJEU on the question of whether the operators of a website 
like the Pirate Bay, which operated a system that indexed and 
categorized protected works for users, are to be regarded as making 
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72 The Pirate Bay para. 37.  
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acts of communication to the public within the meaning of art 3(1) of 
the Copyright Directive. While the CJEU decision has several 
implications particularly for the notions of primary and secondary 
liability, 75  the focus here lies on the CJEU’s interpretation of the 
activities of the Pirate Bay (as a platform firm) vis-à-vis the act of 
communication to the public. The CJEU held inter alia that: the right 
has two key components – (1) an “act of communication” (2) directed 
to a ‘public’. 76  The act of communication need not involve actual 
transmission of the protected work. Mere making available of the work 
suffices. According to the CJEU, the right also involves other inter-
related, 77  complementary criteria, which include: the indispensable 
role played by the platform firm78 (“indispensability”) and the profit-
making nature of the communication at hand (“profit-making”). 79 
Specifically, while the interpretation of the act of communication to the 
public will depend on the facts of each case, “as a rule, any act by 
which a user, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, provides its 
clients with access to protected works is liable to constitute an “act of 
communication” for the purposes of art 3(1) of Directive 2001/29”.80 
This follows the CJEU decision in cases such as Svensson, 
BestWater, GS Media81 and Filmspeler.82 
More importantly (for the purposes of this study), the CJEU 
                                                 
75 For instance, by requiring knowledge (actual or constructive) on the part of the 
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77 The Pirate Bay supra at para 25. 
78 The Pirate Bay, para 26. 
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held that a platform firm would be making an act of communication 
where it provides and manages a platform that provides users with 
access to the works concerned. In such circumstances, the platform 
firm satisfies the indispensability requirement and may be regarded as 
playing a crucial role in making the works available.83 In the case of 
the Pirate Bay, this was satisfied by its indexing of torrent files to allow 
users of its platform to locate and share the protected works. 84 
Further, the actions of a platform firm in indexing, categorizing, 
deleting or filtering user-uploaded protected work constituted more 
than “mere provision of physical facilities.85 Such actions were held to 
constitute an “intervention” by the operators of the Pirate Bay. It is 
immaterial that these activities were undertaken automatically or using 
algorithms.86 
Given that the protected works were uploaded by platform 
users (and in some cases, copyright owners themselves), it was 
required that the primary liability of the platform firm depended on its 
communication being directed to a “new public”, that is, a public not in 
the contemplation of the copyright owners when they authorized the 
initial communication. The CJEU held that a platform firm would 
satisfy this requirement where it is informed that its platform provides 
access to works published without the relevant copyright owner’s 
consent.87 This “new public” requirement is also met where given the 
sheer number of protected works shared on the platform and the fact 
that the platform was operated for the purpose of making profit, the 
platform firm is presumed to be not unaware of the absence of the 
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copyright owners’ consent in some of the works published.88 In this 
case, advertising revenue was held to satisfy the “profit-making” 
intention.89 Again, this follows the CJEU’s reasoning in the cases of 
GS Media and Filmspeler. 
The analysis of the CJEU jurisprudence on the right of 
communication to the public particularly in the Pirate Bay, highlighted 
some important elements, concerning: a) the function of the right of 
communication to the public in relation to the open and freemium 
music business model; b) the role of copyright terms; and c) the legal 
approach developed to tackle the use of music content in the business 
model context.  
Regarding the first point, activities consisting of indexing, 
categorizing, filtering and deleting relevant music files containing 
copyright content could be regarded as engaging in an act of 
communication to the public.90 Further, and, secondly, the indexing of 
the music files, compilation of view count, generating playlists, to 
enable users of the platform to locate the music content supports both 
the gratis licensing system and the revenue-based licensing system. 
According to the CJEU in the Pirate Bay: 
… it is clear from the observations submitted to the Court that, in addition to 
a search engine, the online sharing platform TPB offers an index classifying 
the works under different categories, based on the type of the works, their 
genre or their popularity, within which the works made available are divided, 
with the platform’s operators checking to ensure that a work has been 
placed in the appropriate category. In addition, those operators delete 
obsolete or faulty torrent files and actively filter some content. In the light of 
the foregoing, the making available and management of an online sharing 
platform, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must be considered 
to be an act of communication for the purposes of Article 3(1) of Directive 
2001/29. 91  
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In either case, the licensing terms are formulated to address the fact 
that the platform firm is taking further independent steps to 
communicate the music content to the public and in making the work 
available to the public.92  Indeed, it appears that this interpretation of 
the copyright terms is similar to the legal approach adopted by the 
PRS in its analysis of Soundcloud’s behaviour in PRS V 
Soundcloud.93  In this context, the PRS seems to have considered 
Soundcloud’s conduct as infringing in the absence of a PRS licence 
for the relevant music content. 
In the course of 2015, the PRS sent a letter to Soundcloud 
stating that given the nature of its activities on the soundcloud.com 
website, the latter required a license from the PRS to continue to 
undertake the specified activities. 94  Through this formal step, the 
copyright owner (that is, the PRS) indicates the copyright content 
made available without its licence. The requirements for this sort of 
letter under the notice and takedown procedure and/or the safe 
harbour regime are strict and specific. However, copyright owners 
whose copyright has been infringed directly and primarily by platform 
firms may proceed to sue for copyright infringement against the 
platform firm and may not be obliged to request a takedown per se. In 
this regard, the PRS provided a list of works to which it owned 
copyright and which were made available on the Soundcloud platform. 
Negotiations, which were commenced between the two organisations 
eventually, broke down leading to the commencement of the suit. 
However, the parties still picked up negotiations in the course of the 
suit leading to an out-of-court settlement in 2016. A complete history 
of the case is well beyond the scope of this section, as the purpose is 
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to address the facts relevant to the present study.95 Here, the focus is 
on the main legal features emerging from the case, so as to show its 
link with the Pirate Bay case and how both may apply to the South 
African and/or Nigerian regulatory framework.96 The institution of the 
suit was justified as “the works are made available from the UK and/or 
are targeted at members of the public in the UK”. 97  As the PRS 
argued, the copyright owners allegedly damaged by SoundCloud’s 
conduct obtained copyright protection on the basis of UK copyright 
law.98 Hence, action by the PRS was considered appropriate. This is 
the correct approach because, even in the face of choice of law 
provisions, music content on digital platforms would still be subject to 
the copyright laws of the conferring country. 99  In South Africa, 
copyright holders seeking enforcement of their rights rely mainly on 
the Copyright Act. According to s 44(1) of the Copyright Act, “no 
copyright or right in the nature of copyright shall subsist otherwise 
than by virtue of this Act or some other enactment in that behalf”.   
The legal features emanating from the PRS v SoundCloud case 
concerned the conduct of Soundcloud in relation to the exclusive 
rights of the PRS including whether such conduct infringed on the 
PRS’ copyright, the alleged existence of a duty to seek/obtain licence, 
                                                 
95 Also, relevant activities of Soundcloud have already been presented in Chapter 3, 
above. 
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and the reliefs sought. The next paragraphs will focus on the analysis 
of the PRS’s line of reasoning. Due to the settlement reached by the 
PRS and Soundcloud in 2016 and given that the terms of settlement 
was not disclosed, the analysis of the parties’ reasoning will be based 
mainly on the arguments emerging from the originating processes and 
the outcome of the announced settlement. Also, the appropriateness 
or otherwise of the court settlement reached in this case will not be 
addressed as the analysis is only relevant for the purpose of 
highlighting the potential of the copyright law regulatory framework for 
the open and freemium music business model in relation to South 
Africa and Nigeria.  
One of the pertinent issues deserving due attention concerned 
the PRS’ rights protected by copyright law and implicated in the 
context of the open and freemium music business model. The PRS, it 
was contended, is an exclusive assignee of copyright in over 6 million 
songs (music content) and had the right inter alia to communicate the 
said music content to the public within the meaning of the UK 
Copyright Act.  
The claimant/the PRS had alleged that Soundcloud had 
implemented an infringing behaviour aimed at denying the PRS the 
proceeds of exploitation of PRS’ exclusive rights.100 Such a conduct 
consisted in the inducement/authorisation of infringing reproduction of 
PRS’ music content and engaging in unauthorised acts of 
communication to the public. It was alleged that Soundcloud had 
implemented this infringing behaviour after getting users of its platform 
to upload copyright-protected music content on its soundcloud.com 
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platform.101 To avail itself of the protection of the safe harbour regime, 
Soundcloud policy outlined a free, non-exclusive licensing scheme 
which it required all users to adhere to in uploading their copyright-
protected content. After the upload of the music content and its 
acceptance by the over 160 million Soundcloud user community, 
Soundcloud interacted and dealt with the content in such manner as to 
highlight its “compatibility” with other content and to highlight 
“compatible” artists as per its “explore” section.102 Soundcloud was 
alleged to have infringed on the PRS’ exclusive right of 
communicating the relevant music content to the public.103  
In support of its allegation that Soundcloud was engaged in 
acts of communication to the public, the PRS highlighted the primary 
goal pursued by Soundcloud. Soundcloud had a policy of open music, 
promoting those freely available to the public and uploaded by its 
users who are expected to be copyright owners or who have the 
requisite authority to upload such music. By its own admission, 
SoundCloud transcoded the music files, 104  operated automated 
indexing and search facilities105 and also, provided automated content 
recommendations.106 However, it argued that these activities do not 
amount to using the music content in any manner pertaining to the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner and as such, it had no 
obligation to seek a license. 
In addition, Soundcloud also sought to rely on the existence of 
the safe harbour regime, which it felt shielded it from any potential 
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obligation to seek a license or face liability for infringement. Such a 
regime would impose an obligation of notification on the part of the 
PRS to enable Soundcloud takedown the content uploaded by users 
on its platform. This is similar to YouTube’s stance that its Content ID 
licensing scheme was not obligatory. 
While there is no judicial precedent emanating from this case 
given the out-of-court settlement, the fact of the settlement and the 
fact the parties have entered into and maintained formal licensing 
arrangement post-settlement supports the conclusion that the platform 
firms have a hand in the exploitation of the exclusive right. By 
extension, the licence of the copyright owner is required and a share 
of realised revenue, expected. However, the acceptance of the 
interpretation of the activities as one requiring a license and affecting 
the copyright owners’ exclusive rights depends on the specific legal 
framework. In the PRS v Soundcloud case, the right of communication 
to the public under UK’s Copyright Act was allegedly infringed by the 
activities of Soundcloud itself. This raises the question of the 
availability and potential of the right of communication to the public 
under South African and Nigerian copyright law. 
The conduct was interpreted as resulting in a claim for 
damages and account of profit for primary copyright infringement 
perpetuated by Soundcloud, due to its alleged interaction with the 
music content. The PRS’ position recalls the principle that “where the 
court orders an account of profits, by that order it takes from the wrong 
doer all the profits he has made from his piracy and gives them to the 
party who has been wronged as the nearest approximation which it 
can make to justice”. 107  Again, the availability of such remedies 
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depends on the availability of the right, which must have been 
infringed. By extension, the availability and application of the right in 
the case of South Africa and Nigeria depends on their respective 
copyright laws, which are examined in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, below. 
4.2.2. Copyright terms and the scope of the limitations and 
exceptions framework 
As earlier stated, the parameters of what users of protected work can 
do in relation to any protected work depends, not only on the scope of 
copyright protection, but also on the limitations and exceptions to 
copyright protection.108  Put differently, the scope of limitations and 
exceptions to copyright protection may determine whether or not a 
copyright user’s activities require a licence.  
 Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention to which both South Africa 
and Nigeria are signatories provides the parameters for Member 
States to formulate limitations and exceptions to copyright protection. 
These parameters provide a test widely referred to as the “three-step 
test”. The first step of this test requires the identification of the 
particular purpose the limitations and exceptions would serve (that is, 
the limitations and exceptions should be dedicated to “certain special 
cases”). The second step requires the limitations and exceptions not 
to conflict with a normal exploitation of the work. The third step 
considers whether the limitations and exceptions would otherwise 
unreasonably prejudice legitimate interests of the author or copyright 
owner.109 In the case of the Berne Convention, this test is limited to 
the reproduction right. Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention provides 
that: “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to 
permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, 
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provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author”.  
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement expands the scope of the 
three-step test to apply to all the exclusive rights granted to authors 
and copyright owners. It provides that: “Members shall confine 
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases 
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder”. 
Further, by requiring Member States to “confine limitations or 
exceptions to exclusive rights” in terms of the three-step test, the 
TRIPS Agreement somewhat reconfigured the test into a check for the 
appropriateness of the limitations and exceptions adopted by Member 
States. It also provided a process by which Member States can 
challenge another Member State’s adoption of limitations and 
exceptions that fail the three-step test. 110  The WCT specifically 
permits Contracting Parties to “devise new exceptions and limitations 
that are appropriate in the digital network environment”.111 
Member States of these treaties have in their copyright laws 
adopted many limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights, which 
they consider to be compliant with the three-step test.112 For instance, 
specific exceptions such as the fair dealing exceptions available in 
many jurisdictions including South Africa and Nigeria as indicated in 
Chapter two, above are considered compliant with the three-step 
test.113  Few cases have analysed the meaning of each of the steps of 
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the three-step test. 
In resolving the dispute between the EU and the US over an 
exception to the rights holders’ copyright in US copyright law,114 the 
WTO panel’s decision extensively analysed each of the steps. On the 
first step, the WTO panel held that the scope of any limitation to 
copyright protection must be known and particularised. 115  On the 
second step, the WTO panel took the view that the term “normal” 
consists of a dynamic element capable of taking into account 
technological and market developments. 116  Essentially the panel 
established that not only actual but also potential effects are to be 
considered when assessing the permissibility of copyright exceptions 
and limitations.117 
With respect to the third step test, the WTO panel stated that 
the analysis would require the following stages: a definition of the 
“interests” of right holders at stake and which attributes make them 
“legitimate”, then, an understanding of the term “prejudice” and the 
level of prejudice that may be considered “unreasonable”.118 
Regarding the meaning of “interests”, the WTO panel observed 
that “interests” are not necessarily confined to actual or potential 
economic issues.119 It further noted that the term “legitimate” refers to 
both lawfulness and legitimacy “in the context of calling for the 
protection of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives 
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that underlie the protection of exclusive rights”.120 On the question of 
what degree of “prejudice” would be necessary to qualify as 
“unreasonable”, the panel concluded that the “prejudice to the 
legitimate interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if 
an exception or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an 
unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner”.121 However, the 
WTO panel adopted the view expressed in the Guide to the Berne 
Convention122  that the prejudice contained in the third step of the 
three-step test may not be unreasonable if the rights holder is 
equitably compensated, for example through a system of non-
voluntary licensing with equitable remuneration.123  
While the WTO decision has been criticised for focusing 
exclusively on economic interests, there is no doubt that it has shed 
some light on how the test is to be understood. In general terms, most 
courts have, in line with the WTO Panel decision adopted a rather 
restrictive and rights holders-focused.124 
In the Mulholland Drive case, 125  for instance, the claimant 
argued that some technological protection measures (TPMs) 
unlawfully prevented him from exercising his rights under the private 
copy exceptions. The French Supreme Court held inter alia that the 
private copying exception was, at least in relation to movies and 
audiovisual works, usually in conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
work and therefore in breach of the second step of the three-step test. 
In this context, the French Supreme Court expressly stressed the 
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importance of the DVD market for the movie industry for recovering 
the costs of producing a movie. 
It appears from the foregoing cases that the test favours a 
specific provisions approach as a general clause exception or 
limitation may be more likely to violate the requirements contained in 
the first step of the three-step test. 126  It also appears that the 
“prejudice” contained in the third step of the three-step test may not be 
unreasonable if the rights holder is, for instance, equitably 
remunerated through a system of non-voluntary licensing.127 
These considerations may have informed the approach of 
many jurisdictions, which have made provisions for compulsory or 
statutory licences as a limitation to exclusive rights in that they permit 
certain uses of protected works subject to an obligation to pay for such 
use under a compulsory or statutory licence.128 
In the case of usage and access terms implemented in the 
open and freemium music business model, these indicate inter alia, 
the uses to which platform firms may put the music content. Such 
uses have been described in Chapter three and include storing and 
indexing of the music content in a manner that will optimise search 
engine uses of the music content. 129  Further, such uses enable 
platform users to engage with and interact with the work in the course 
of social consumption and production.130  The pertinent question is 
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whether such use may be regulated by the scope of limitations and 
exceptions to copyright protection. As Samuelson rightly points out, 
“users’ interests are often examined through the prism of Limitations 
and Exceptions (L&E) to copyright”.131 Accordingly, the potential for 
applying copyright law to regulate the open and freemium music 
business model is evident where the consideration is whether the 
restrictions imposed by the copyright terms are over and above those 
covered by the scope of copyright protection and/or limitations thereto.   
 In the case of Society of Composers, Authors and Music 
Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada (“Bell”),132 the plaintiff challenged 
as infringing, the activities of the defendant in permitting its customers 
to listen to 30-second preview of songs to enable them make a 
decision regarding downloading the full song for a fee. The defendant 
denied that such conduct amounted to infringement and instead 
argued that its permission of 30-second song preview was in fact, 
within the research category of the fair dealing exception. The 
Canadian Supreme Court agreed with the defendant’s argument that 
30-second song previews could be treated as consumer research and 
would therefore qualify as fair dealing. The Court concluded that 
“limiting research to creative purposes would also run counter to the 
ordinary meaning of ‘research’, which can include many activities that 
do not demand the establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can 
be piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or confirmatory. It can in fact be 
undertaken for no purpose except personal interest”.133 
Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court in Alberta (Education) v 
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Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (“Alberta Education”) 134 
interpreted “private study” (a fair dealing category) widely in holding 
that it may include teacher instruction. The Court therefore held that 
private study “should not be understood as requiring users to view 
copyrighted works in splendid isolation”.135 
These decisions indicate the possibility that the fair dealing 
exception and indeed, other limitations and exceptions to copyright 
may be interpreted broadly and applied to a wide range of innovative 
uses that do not require the consent of copyright owners.136 However, 
whether the fair dealing exception may be interpreted as extending to 
the copyright terms in the open and freemium music business model 
context depends on two factors. These involve the consideration of 
whether the activities may be construed as research, private study or 
other specific activities listed under the fair dealing category and 
whether such use is fair.137  
Furthermore, there is also the possibility, as discussed in 
Chapter six, of treating the platform firm’s activities as regulated use 
and apply a compulsory and statutory licence as a limitation to the 
copyright protection covering the music content.138 The interpretation 
of digitisation and indexing of protected works for library collections as 
fair use is instructive. In the US, the courts have accepted as fair use, 
the making of copies of texts and images for the purpose of indexing 
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their contents and showing parts of same in search results.139 Similar 
consideration has been extended to non-profit organisations indexing 
books to develop a searchable database that will assist researchers in 
the case of Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust.140 
In these circumstances, it appears that the activities of platform 
firms as embodied in the copyright terms may be interpreted as fair 
use or fair dealing using an expansive interpretation of the latter. 
However, the fact that the indexing and optimisation in the case of the 
platform firms is undertaken for profit may change the tenor of such 
interpretation. Indeed, such indexing differs from that undertaken in 
the context of (non-profit) libraries, which is usually for the purpose of 
lending the books to the public. Accordingly, while the said activities 
may be permissible, the platform firm may be obligated to pay a fee 
under a compulsory licence. The commercial context of such activities 
may provide the rationale for the creation of a compulsory license for 
the implementation of the copyright terms in the context of the open 
and freemium music business model.141 
4.2.3 Conclusive remarks on the international copyright treaty 
and the copyright terms 
Evidently, the Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement and the WCT 
offer significant leeway or flexibilities for Member States in designing 
the scope of the exclusive rights and the parameters of the limitations 
and exceptions to such rights. In this case, such flexibilities relate to 
the freedom to define and determine the scope of the right of 
communication to the public in terms of business models as well as 
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freedom (subject to compliance with the three-step test) to delineate 
limitations and exceptions to the right. The CJEU jurisprudence on the 
construction of the right of communication to the public and the 
Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence on the construction of the fair 
dealing exceptions offer a veritable example of how these flexibilities 
may be deployed. 
Regarding the right of communication to the public, the result of 
the foregoing analysis would be that the indexing, tagging and 
optimizing of music content based on users’ preferences in the context 
of the open and freemium music business model may constitute acts 
of communication to the public which may require the relevant 
copyright owner’s consent. While libraries are increasingly involved in 
similar conduct of indexing and tagging of protected works to aid their 
digital public lending services, they procure and reproduce the works 
themselves as against the case of the platform firms that rely on user 
uploads to index and tag protected content. Particularly, the ability to 
participate and actual participation of libraries in digital public lending 
has been subject of debate in many jurisdictions particularly in the EU 
and within the EU Member States. 142  Indeed, there have been 
concerns regarding the role of libraries as custodians and distributors 
of creative products, the economic interests of authors as distinct from 
those of publishers, the legal categorization of public lending practices 
and the appropriate regulatory approach to the issue of e-lending or 
public lending of digital books. 143  There is however significant 
consensus on the need for regulation of public lending practices and 
the undesirability of continued self-regulation in that field. 144  This 
                                                 
142  Sganga, C. (2016). Public e-lending and the CJEU: Chronicle of a missed 
revolution foretold. Journal title Opinio Juris in Comparatione, p.7. 
143 Ibid at pp. 6-7 10-11. 




debate and the increasing demand for access to e-books appear to 
have brought the indexing and search optimisation by libraries closer 
to the issues expressed for the open and freemium music business 
model. This is especially so when the import of the platform firms’ 
activities is considered. However, the import of such indexing and 
related activities differ from that undertaken by libraries because of the 
background of the platform firm as advertising firms rather than 
authors and due to the profit-making nature to the communication in 
question as evidenced by the receipt of advertising revenue.145 This 
means that providing a gratis licence in the context of the licensing 
rule is likely to result in loss of revenue that would have accrued to the 
copyright owner.146 Without adequately remunerating these copyright 
owners (especially when they are SMEs), the implementation of the 
open and freemium music business model copyright terms may lead 
to revenue losses and anticompetitive effects on the copyright 
marketplace.147  
 Conversely, the activities of the platform firms may in certain 
circumstances be treated as captured within the scope of permissible 
uses. The application of the cited decisions of the Canadian Supreme 
Court in that regard may result in such interpretation. However, such 
use may require the payment of a fee under a compulsory statutory 
licence due to profit-making nature of the use. 
The next two sections explore the current state of the South 
African and Nigerian copyright regulatory framework in relation to the 
copyright terms. Specifically, the rights of reproduction and 
communication to the public and the limitations and exceptions 
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pertaining to these rights in relation to the open and freemium music 
business model, are considered.  
4.3 Copyright terms and the South African copyright system 
 Under the South African Copyright Act, the reproduction right applies 
to all the categories of works and consists of the vesting of the 
exclusive right to reproduce or to authorize the reproduction of the 
applicable work “in any manner or form”.148 Section 1(1) of the Act 
provides some clarification regarding the scope of the reproduction 
right. “Reproduction” in the Act is defined thus:  
“Reproduction” in relation to- (a) a literary or musical work or a broadcast, 
includes a reproduction in the form of a record or a cinematograph film; (b) 
An artistic work, includes a version produced by converting the work into a 
three-dimensional form or, if it is in three dimensions, by converting it into a 
two-dimensional form; (c) any work, includes a reproduction made from a 
reproduction of that work; and references to “reproduce” and “reproducing” 
shall be construed accordingly. 
In this regard, reproduction essentially means copying of a work either 
in the same medium or in some other form such as record, 
cinematograph film or three-dimensional form. Another indication of 
the scope of the reproduction may be found in the definition, which the 
Act ascribes to “infringing copy” as a copy of the work infringed.149 
The granting of the exclusive right of reproduction “in any 
manner or form”, has been suggested to mean that the right covers 
both digital and analogue reproductions. 150  Indeed, in the case of 
Pastel Software (Pty) Ltd v Pink Software (Pty) Ltd, 151  the court 
recognised that reproduction may take place electronically even if 
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such reproduction was short-lived. The broad reach of the right is in 
line with the regulatory approach to copyright protection in South 
Africa, as stated in the Preamble to the Copyright Act. Also in keeping 
with the broad range of the reproduction right, the concept of “material 
form” has a wide meaning by virtue of s 2(2) of the Act where 
reference is made to a work being written down, recorded, 
represented, in digital data or signals or otherwise reduced to material 
form. In this way, the Act is aligned with the WCT in recognising that 
the digitisation of a work constitutes a reproduction of said work. 
According to Dean,  
The wide meaning given to “reproduction” is of considerable significance in 
the electronic age and in e-commerce. Examples of what would constitute 
reproduction, whether in a material form or otherwise, for purposes of the 
Act include loading software and data into a computer; operating a computer 
program, (this entails a reproduction of the program being made internally in 
the computer); downloading material from the Internet; displaying material 
on a computer screen, including material sourced from the Internet; and 
incorporating material in a website. Electronic communications and the 
Internet bring about new situations with which copyright law must deal. It is 
necessary to adapt or extend classical copyright concepts so as to cater for 
these new situations, which have arisen in the electronic age.152  
Furthermore, the use of the expression “includes” in delineating the 
scope of the reproduction right highlights s 1(1)’s intention of defining 
the right of reproduction expansively to include different uses of the 
copyright-protected subject-matter. This non-exhaustive approach 
suggests that the storage of music content by platform firms in the 
context of the open and freemium music business model would fall 
within the scope of the exercise of the right of reproduction, which is 
exclusive to the copyright owner. Similarly, given that partial copies of 
a work are also covered by the reproduction right irrespective of the 
                                                 




weight or size of the copied portion, the indexing and tagging of music 
content whether by an automated process is likely to qualify as a 
protected use under this interpretation. However, there is presently no 
court decision regarding the import of indexing or storage in the digital 
context. 
 South Africa is yet to ratify the WCT. However, the Copyright 
Amendment Bill 2017, in proposing the introduction of a mandatory 
exception to the reproduction right in the case of temporary copies, 
may apply to ameliorate the strictness of such interpretation. Section 
12 of the Amendment Bill includes a new s 13A which provides that:  
13A. (1) Any person may make transient or incidental copies of a work, 
including reformatting an integral and essential part of a technical process, if 
the purpose of those copies or adaptations is— (a) to enable the 
transmission of the work in a network between third parties by an 
intermediary or any other lawful use of the work; or (b) to adapt the work to 
allow use on different technological devices, such as mobile devices, as 
long as there is no independent economic significance to these acts.153 
This provision of the Bill, if passed into law, may likely absolve access 
providers from direct liability for e.g. proxy caching for the sake of 
network efficiency or the transient copying necessary for the operation 
of search engines. The services of host providers, on the other hand, 
may not be covered by the exception, because the indexing and 
storage involved in hosting services may not be temporary or 
transient. As a result, hosting providers may still be liable for direct 
copyright infringements of the works they store.154 
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However, s 75 of the ECTA adopts the global model provided 
by the US DMCA and the EU E-commerce Directive, in exempting 
hosting providers from liability for storage of protected content once 
the said storage is at the behest of the user of the storage or related 
services and subject to certain conditions stated in that section. While 
there is presently no decision of the South African courts on the scope 
and/or application of s 75 of the ECTA, a close reading of that 
provision (and the proposed s 51 of Nigeria’s Copyright Bill 2015) 
shows that it is similar to art 14 of the EU E-Commerce Directive and s 
512(c) of the US DMCA.155  That said, the safe harbour protection 
envisaged in the preceding statutes, to the extent that they impose 
liability on platform firms on the basis of the primary liability of 
users/uploaders, is not considered apposite for the purposes of this 
thesis.156 
With respect to the right of communication to the public, such is 
currently provided only for sound recordings. Section 9(e) of the Act 
provides that “copyright in a sound recording vests the exclusive right 
to do or to authorise the doing of any of the following acts in the 
Republic: communicating the sound recording to the public”. Apart 
from sound recordings, communicating literary works, musical works 
and other categories of protected work to the public is not included 
within the scope of the exclusive rights under the Act. Further, the 
concepts of “communication” and “public” are not defined in the Act. 
This is unlike the EU where the WCT approach is adopted in art 3(1) 
of the Copyright Directive. Accordingly, in the absence of explicit 
statutory provision, clear statutory definition and/or judicial 
interpretation, it is uncertain whether the following constitutes the 
exercise of the right of communication to the public:  
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(a) Communication to a public not present at the place where the 
communication originates; or whether local communications, 
such as public performance, recitation and display, are 
excluded; 157 . This is different from Recital 23 of the EU 
Copyright Directive, which involves a broad interpretation of 
the right of communication to the public as to cover all 
communication to a public not present at the place where the 
communication originates. Indeed, what is pertinent is whether 
the public to which the communication is transmitted in a 
different place from where the communication originates.158 
(b) Mere provision of physical facilities for the distribution of the 
sound recording. This differs from Recital 27 of the EU 
Copyright Directive, which repeats the Agreed Statement on 
art 8 almost verbatim, thus introducing the WCT’s deference 
for the mere provision of physical facilities to the EU legal 
landscape. 
(c) Making available to the public the sound recording in such 
manner that once completed, members of the public are able 
to access the sound recording from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them, i.e. on demand. This is unlike the 
approach of the WCT. 
(d) Services that involve the provision of the sound recording to a 
user in circumstances that the user has no control over when 
and where to access the sound recording (so-called “non-
interactive services”). Examples of such non-interactive 
services include regular television and radio transmissions, 
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webcasting and internet radio services. 
(e) Services that involve the provision of sound recording to a 
user in circumstances that the user may control when and 
where she accesses the sound recording (so-called 
“interactive services).  For instance offers to download a work 
from a public website or online streaming services, which 
allow the consumer to access the work at her convenience. 
Again, similar to the case of the right of reproduction, the Copyright 
Amendment Bill 2017 seeks inter alia to provide for a right of 
communication to the public in terms of the WCT. In this regard, 
Clause 4 of the Amendment Bill amends s 6 of the principal Act which 
concerns copyright in a literary or musical work to include in sub-
section (eA), the right to communicate “the work to the public, by wire 
or wireless means, including by means of internet access and the 
making of the work available to the public in such a way that any 
member of the public may access the work from a place and at a time 
chosen by that person, whether interactively or non interactively’’. The 
same right is provided for in the case of artistic works by amending s 7 
of the principal Act,159 cinematograph film by amending s 8 of the 
Principal Act,160 sound recording by amending s 9(e) of the Principal 
Act.161 
 However, until these provisions are enacted into law through 
the amendment of the Copyright Act, the right of communication to the 
public as stipulated in the Berne Convention and also the WCT 
remains external to the South African copyright system. 
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The fair dealing exceptions contemplated by s 12(1) of the 
Copyright Act have not been subject of judicial interpretation until the 
case of Moneyweb (Pty) Limited v Media 24 Limited and Another. 
However, the fair dealing exception examined in that case pertained to 
“reporting current event in a newspaper, magazine or some other 
periodical” as contained in s 12(1)(c)(ii) of the Act.162 Currently, it is 
uncertain whether the activities of the platform firm in the context of 
open and freemium music business model would fall within any of the 
fair dealing categories. At this point, however, it becomes important to 
acknowledge two things: First, it is possible to stretch the meaning of 
the specific fair dealing exceptions to accommodate the activities 
undertaken by the platform firm in the context of the open and 
freemium music business model. In the Bell case discussed above, 
the court interpreted the “research” fair dealing exception to include 
consumer research. Second, the copyright law reform process 
currently on-going in South Africa and Nigeria present an opportunity 
for the fair dealing exception to be specifically accommodating of the 
activities of the platform firms. However, this approach has the 
potential to engender conflicting interpretations. In the circumstances, 
it appears the best viable solution is to ensure that fair dealing 
exceptions need to offer a measure of legal certainty. In the absence 
of such certainty, users of copyright-protected content may err on the 
side of caution by avoiding uses of such content in any manner that is 
not explicitly permissible. As a result, creativity may be stifled. 
It has been suggested that the bouquet of exceptions in the 
Copyright Amendment Bill be expanded to include such copying for 
indexing and storage purposes on the grounds that while such use 
involves copying, the copying does not affect the copyright owners’ 
                                                 




market. 163  Conversely, expanding the scope of exclusive rights to 
cover such uses may engender similar results as occurred in the 
German Press Publishers’ case discussed above. Again, the inclusion 
of a gratis licence scheme within the copyright terms discussed in 
Chapter three, above lends credence to this argument. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is argued that the copyright terms 
and the copyright system in South Africa are not aligned. However, 
the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 in adopting the WCT approach to 
the right of communication to the public shows some promise. Indeed, 
the Government Communication regarding the Amendment Bill made 
explicit reference to the possible introduction of appropriate steps to 
address various instances of “value gap” in the copyright industry.164 
The consideration of this possibility by the South African Government 
therefore strongly suggests recognition of the pertinent issues and a 
resolve to consider and possibly adopt appropriate steps to address 
them within the copyright law framework. However, there is still need 
for considerable efforts to realise the potential of the communication to 
the public. Indeed, in failing to define the scope of the right of 
communication to the public to include communication made for profit, 
the Copyright Act gives platform firms the power to define the scope of 
the property rights by enabling them to use copyright works without 
corresponding revenue. 
A properly clarified right of communication to the public could 
redefine the process, reduce unnecessary restrictions on copyright 
user access to the music content and generate revenue for copyright 
owners. But in its current form, the South African Copyright 
                                                 
163 See Sag 2009 supra at pp.1607-1682; Sag, M. (2012). Orphan works as grist for 
the data mill. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, pp.1503-1550. Jockers, M.L., Sag, 
M. and Schultz, J. (2012). Digital archives: Don't let copyright block data mining. 





Amendment Bill merely provides for the right without any clarification 
regarding key concepts such as what constitutes communication, 
definition of “public” and the import of profit-making intention. In effect, 
such approach encourages innovators with new technologies to enter 
the copyright sector but results in the adoption of copyright terms that 
delivers value to platform firms at the expense of copyright owners 
and even other copyright users.165 
4.4 Copyright terms and the Nigerian copyright system 
With respect to the creation of a reproduction right that applies to all 
the categories of works and consists of the vesting of the exclusive 
right to reproduce or to authorize the reproduction of the applicable 
work “in any manner or form”, the Nigerian Copyright Act is quite 
similar to its South African counterpart. 166  Further similarities exist 
with respect to the definition of “reproduction” and the wide scope of 
the reproduction right itself. Section 52(1) of the Nigerian Copyright 
Act defines “reproduction” to mean “the making of one or more copies 
of a literary, musical or artistic work, cinematograph film or sound 
recording”. 167  This definition has been confirmed in several cases 
such as Oladipo Yemitan v. The Daily Times (Nigeria) Ltd and 
Another168 and the case of Peter Obe v. Grapevine Communication 
Limited 169 , where the Nigerian courts accepted that verbatim 
reproduction or copying of a protected work was the exclusive 
preserve of the copyright owner and as such, amounted to 
                                                 
165 Rens, A. (2017). Department repeats mistakes of others in bid to alter copyright 
law. [online] Available at: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2017-10-13-
department-repeats-mistakes-of-others-in-bid-to-alter-copyright-law/ [Accessed 16 
Oct. 2017]. 
166 See Ss 6, 7 and 8 of the Copyright Act. 
167 See s 51(1) of the Copyright Act. 
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infringement when undertaken without the consent of the copyright 
owner. 
Regarding the scope of the right of reproduction, the Nigerian 
Copyright Act also uses the expression “in any manner or form”, which 
suggests that the right extends to both digital and non-digital 
reproductions of a protected work.170 Furthermore, the fact that s 51(1) 
defines the reproduction right to mean the making of one or more 
copies of the work indicates that that the storage of music content by 
platform firms in the context of the open and freemium music business 
model would fall within the scope of the exercise of the right of 
reproduction. Similarly, the indexing of music content is likely to qualify 
as a protected use given that use of the expression “in any manner or 
form” indicates that partial copies of a work irrespective of the weight 
or size of the copied portion, is covered by the reproduction right. 
 To further constrain the expansive boundaries of the 
reproduction right, the Copyright Bill 2015 like its South African 
counterpart seeks inter alia to introduce an exception to the 
reproduction right in the case of temporary copies. Section 20(1) of 
the Copyright Bill provides thus:  
The rights conferred in respect of a work by sections 8 to 12 of this Act do 
not include the right to control - 
(p) temporary acts of reproduction which are transient or incidental and an 
integral and essential part of a technological process and whose sole 
purpose is to enable a transmission in a network between third parties by an 
intermediary; or for other lawful use, where such use has no independent 
economic significance.  
Again, like its South African counterpart, this provision bears strong 
resemblance to art 5(1) of the EU’s Copyright Directive. Further, while 
this provision may protect access providers from direct liability, it may 
not avail service providers engaged in the act of permanent copying 
for the purpose of indexing and storage of protected content. Instead, 
                                                 




such activities may be safe from the boundaries of protected use by 
virtue of s 51 of the Copyright Amendment Bill, which offers safe 
harbour to hosting providers similar its South African counterpart. A 
close reading of this provision shows that like the case of South Africa, 
it is similar to art 14 of the EU E-Commerce Directive and s 512(c) of 
the US DMCA. 171  However, until the Copyright Amendment Bill is 
enacted into law, the position remains that temporary and permanent 
copies and indeed reproduction in any manner or form would fall 
within the boundaries of the reproduction right. Similarly, no safe 
harbour regime is available to hosting service providers unless s 51 of 
the Copyright Amendment Bill is enacted into law. 
Regarding the right of communicating the work to the public, 
such is presently is restricted to communication “by a loud speaker or 
any other similar device” in the case of a literary or musical work172 
and is associated with the reproduction of the work in the case of a 
sound recording. Section 6(1) of the Act provides that, “copyright in a 
sound recording shall be exclusive right to control in Nigeria- (a) the 
direct or indirect reproduction, broadcasting or communication to the 
public of the whole or a substantial part of the recording either in its 
original form or in any form recognisably derived from the original”. 
Further, the notion of “communication to the “public” is given a 
non-exhaustive meaning in that the Act defines it to “include, in 
addition to any live performance or delivery, any mode of visual or 
acoustic presentation, but does not include a broadcast or re-
broadcast”. 173  However, similar to the case of South Africa, it is 
uncertain whether in the absence of clear statutory definition and/or 
judicial interpretation, linear and non-linear services, interactive and/or 
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non-interactive services are within or outside the scope of the right. 
The Copyright Bill does not provide authors with the exclusive 
right of communication to the public in the manner provided by the 
WCT. Instead, Art 15 of the WIPO Performances Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT) is adopted to provide for remuneration for exercising the 
“making available” right. In this regard, s 14(7) of the Bill provides that: 
“sound recordings made available to the public by wire or wireless 
means in such a way that members of the public may access them 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by them shall be 
considered as if they had been published for commercial purposes”. 
Publishing for commercial purposes entail the payment of “a single 
equitable remuneration for the direct or indirect use of sound 
recordings”. 174  Performers and producers of sound recordings are 
entitled to such payment through their collecting societies.  
 In providing for the making available right in terms of 
commercial purposes, the Copyright Bill 2015 offers potential for the 
adoption of a compulsory licensing scheme that would apply to 
activities related to the copyright terms. Such approach aligns 
favourably with a revenue-based licensing terms within the open and 
freemium music business model.175  However, by placing collecting 
societies at the centre of revenue collection176 and performers and 
producers at the centre of revenue negotiation, 177  it appears the 
implementation of s 14(7) may be quite problematic given the potential 
for monopolistic abuses on the part of collecting societies.178 In this 
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regard, it calls to mind the scenario in the German Press Publishers’ 
case cited above. The platform firms may still be able to procure a 
gratis licence leaving the collecting societies with no payment to 
enforce. Consequently, even if the Bill is adopted in its current form, 
the lacuna created by the dichotomy between the personnel for 
revenue negotiation and that for revenue collection, persists.  
 In any event, it remains to be seen what provisions of the Bill 
would make it into the substantive Copyright Act. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has endeavoured to provide a comprehensive overview 
of the copyright terms implemented in the open and freemium music 
business model within the current copyright system in South Africa 
and Nigeria and identify points of friction, opportunities and 
challenges. Using specific provisions of international copyright treaties 
such as the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT 
as benchmarks, the chapter considered the copyright terms to check 
their compatibility with the copyright framework. It was shown that 
instead of the right of reproduction, the copyright terms appear more 
closely related to the right of communication to the public. This is 
evidenced by the CJEU jurisprudence on the construction of the right 
of communication as more particularly highlighted by the Pirate Bay.  
Apart from the current copyright system in South Africa and 
Nigeria , the chapter also considered the proposed amendment to the 
copyright statute presently going on in both South Africa and Nigeria. 
The proposed amendments were briefly analysed in relation to the 
WCT to determine whether they take advantage of the leeway in 
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international treaties to provide the necessary regulatory framework 
for the business model to be deployed. In this regard, neither South 
Africa nor Nigeria has appeared to take full advantage of the guidance 
and leeway to provide a better-aligned regulatory framework for the 
open and freemium music business model. This is problematic as it 
leaves the business model largely unregulated despite the issues 
arising from its deployment. 
The identification of these issues as concerns is based on the 
interpretation of the purport of the exclusive rights and its boundaries 
in terms of users’ rights and exceptions to copyright protection. 
Therefore, it is imperative to have a priori, legal framework that will 
address these concerns and ensure that the open and freemium 
music business model meets the objectives of copyright law in 
promoting competition. While the legislative changes proposed in the 
literature may not be applicable to address the identified copyright 
implications of the open and freemium music business model, the 
proposed amendments to the copyright statutes in South Africa and 
Nigeria may be amenable to being applied to regulate the business 
model. Accordingly, after exploring the competition law angle relating 
to the copyright terms in the next chapter, this study will aim at 
proposing ways in which the copyright law framework may be applied 




Chapter Five: Competition Consequences 
5.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter two, above, competition law complements 
copyright law in the achievement of its objectives. In this regard, 
competition law may apply to restrict the exercise of copyright to 
protect the public interests as copyright and other IPRs do not stand in 
the way of competition law application. Competition law may also 
apply to ensure that dominant and economically powerful firms, be 
they distributors or even copyright owners themselves, do not derail 
the legitimate distribution of copyright products. Accordingly, copyright 
owners, users of copyright-protected content including platform firms 
are in the focus of competition law so long as they are involved in 
economic activities.1  
Platform firms, as described in Chapter three, are owners and 
operators of multisided platforms dealing with copyright owners on 
one hand and with consumers and advertisers on the other hand. The 
application of competition law to platform firms generally, and to the 
relationship between platform firms and other firms using their 
services or rendering similar services, in particular, is quite 
controversial.2 The platform firms as identified in the context of this 
thesis are in practical terms, multisided platforms. The activities of 
multisided platforms have been the subject of much debate in the EU 
and in the US, particularly with respect to the appropriateness or 
otherwise of applying competition law rules to regulate them. Of 
particular concern to this thesis is how competition law in South Africa 
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and Nigeria may be applied to regulate the concerns arising from the 
copyright terms of the open and freemium music business model, 
particularly, the position of copyright owners as both suppliers to and 
users of the services of the relevant platform firms. Competition law 
enforcement can be much more challenging and technical than 
copyright law in this instance because it requires the platform firm to 
be dominant in a clearly defined relevant market and/or for the 
conduct of the platform firm to adversely affect competition in such 
relevant market. 3  In this context, the definition of “market” usually 
relies on monetary exchanges so that in the case of the open and 
freemium music business model where music content is distributed 
free-of-charge; it may be difficult to define the relevant market.4 
 This notwithstanding, the copyright terms of the open and 
freemium music business model may raise competition concerns for 
both the copyright owners and the users of music content on the 
platforms. This is because the open and freemium music business 
model represents a context where the need to address the interests of 
all relevant stakeholders – copyright owners, platform firms, creative 
users and consumers – is heightened and where competition in one 
sector/industry may potentially affect competition in another sector. A 
typical example is the case of competition in the advertising and online 
search market affecting competition in the music copyright industry. 
On the one hand, it seems important to encourage the platform firms’ 
investments in deploying the business model to provide consumers 
with free access to music content, and to refrain from intervening in 
                                                 
3 See section 5.3 below. 
4 See Gal and Rubinfeld 2015 supra at 3-5; See also, Bakhoum, M. (2017). Abuse 
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Interface with Abuse of Dominance. In: P. Paul Nihoul, ed., Abuse Regulation in 
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their pursuit of profit from their business activities. On the other hand, 
the recognition and protection of the economic interests of platform 
firms should be addressed alongside the need to incentivise and 
reward copyright firms for their investments in creating music content, 
and the need to enhance access to music content in the interest of 
competition. Failure to address any of these goals may preclude 
competition in the market for the creation and distribution of music 
content and may lead to considerable losses for society as a whole.5 
The impact on societal welfare has been identified through the prism 
of ensuring that artists and record labels have enough incentive for 
continued creativity while promoting technological advancements by 
platform firms. Indeed, in letter to the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), the Copyright Alliance pointed out the likely impact on 
societal welfare, of rules that do not permit the copyright owners to 
earn revenue from the use of their works.6 
As noted earlier, the existence of copyright and other IPRs do 
not restrict the application of competition law.7 Particularly in the case 
of the open and freemium music business model, which involve 
platform firms that utilise the availability of copyright-protected music 
content to procure advertising revenue, the potential of competition 
law application has been explored.8 Within the EU, the EU competition 
authority (the European Commission) has beamed the competition law 
                                                 
5  See Libguides.wits.ac.za. (2017). LibGuides: Copyright and Related Issues: 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2017. [online] Available at: 
http://libguides.wits.ac.za/Copyright_and_Related_Issues/SA_Copyright_Amendme
nt_Bill_2017 [Accessed 24 Nov. 2017]. 
6  The Copyright Alliance is comprised of the Southern African Music Rights 
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Recording Industry of South Africa (RiSA), the South African Music Performance 
Rights Association (SAMPRA), the Musicians Association of South Africa (MASA) 
and the Music Publishers Association of South Africa (MPA SA). 
7 See Chapter 2, above. 




searchlight on the potential anticompetitive conduct implemented by 
undertakings that facilitate access to copyright products in the open 
business model context. 9  In particular, the European Commission, 
although recognising that the open business model in itself “does not 
raise competition concerns”10 also noted that it could raise competition 
concerns in relation to business practices, policies or contractual rules 
surrounding its implementation.11 In South Africa, while platform firms 
within the context of this thesis, have not been the subject of 
competition law scrutiny, the activities of firms which like platform 
firms, own and operate distribution systems for copyrighted content 
have been scrutinised as discussed in Chapter two, above.12 Such 
activities and conduct have been reviewed under s8 of the South 
African Competition Act, which prohibits abusive conduct by dominant 
firms. Similar prohibition of abusive conduct by dominant firms is 
made in s73 of the Nigerian Competition and Consumer Protection Bill 
2016 currently undergoing legislative processes.13   
This chapter considers the legal framework of abuse of 
dominance in place under competition law for the protection of 
competition in South Africa and Nigeria. The copyright terms of the 
open and freemium music business model identified in Chapter three, 
above are analysed to see whether they are aligned with the 
                                                 
9  See for example, European Commission, (2016). Antitrust: Commission sends 
Statement of Objections to Google on Android operating system and applications. 
[online] Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm 
[Accessed 6 Jan. 2017] (Hereafter, Google Android Statement).  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. In particular, the Commission stated that its concerns “relate to the conditions 
for use of Google's proprietary apps and services on Android devices, which are not 
open source”. 
12 See DW Integrators supra; Mandla Matla Publishing supra. In these cases, the 
competition enforcer did not find any offensive conduct under the Competition Act. 
13 Article 102 TFEU and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Also, see Bakhoum 2017 




competition law framework. To conduct the analysis, section 5.2 
discusses the interface between the platform firms’ copyright terms 
and competition law. It highlights how the copyright terms constitute 
economic activities, which may affect the structure of the market and 
thereby have competition law implications. The section focuses 
particularly on the competition issues arising from the implementation 
of the copyright terms within the open and freemium music business 
model. Because the application of competition law is restricted to 
economic activities between firms 14 , section 5.2 examines the 
copyright terms from that perspective. This provides a benchmark for 
the analysis conducted in section 5.3 regarding the South Africa and 
Nigerian competition law perspectives. Section 5.3 deals with the legal 
approach to the application of the concept of unilateral abusive 
conduct in South Africa and Nigeria. This analysis is relevant because 
unilateral conduct concerns the behaviour of platform firms in 
deploying the open and freemium music business model. In dealing 
with the legal approach, the section reviews the main criteria put 
forward under competition law and by the competition authorities in 
applying the concept of abuse of dominant position. It further 
highlights how the enforcement approach to unilateral conduct in 
South Africa and Nigeria may regulate the competition issues 
identified from the copyright terms. The section also considers the 
issue especially from the perspective of South Africa and Nigeria, 
which as stated earlier, are developing jurisdictions with copyright 
owner firms who are small businesses/SMEs and platform firms facing 
competition from international platform firms.15 Section 5.4 concludes 
                                                 
14  The Competition Act (in the case of South Africa) and the Competition and 
Consumer Protection Bill (in the case of Nigeria) do not explicitly define “economic 
activity”. However, Section 3(1)(e) of the South African Competition Act clearly 
excludes “concerted conduct designed to achieve a non-commercial socio-economic 
objective or similar purpose” from activities regulated by the Act. 




the chapter.  
5.2 Copyright terms from a competition law perspective 
In each market, there are several market participants, which include 
firms engaged in different economic activities, their suppliers, 
customers and/or consumers. A key feature of markets is the 
existence of firms, which are not equal in size, market reach and/or 
consumer size. In practical terms, firms in both vertical relationships16 
and horizontal relationships17 differ in size and economic strength. It is 
possible for inequality of economic power in vertical relationships to 
affect the ability of horizontally related firms to compete. 18  Put 
differently, economic inequality between vertically integrated firms 
may affect competition in markets in which firms are horizontally 
integrated. From the perspective of the dominant or economically 
stronger firm, such economic imbalance may reinforce its market 
power in the relevant market apropos its competitors. From the 
perspective of the weaker firm, it may affect its ability to effectively 
compete on the downstream market for the production of goods.19 As 
a market regulatory legal tool which is concerned only with the effects 
which the conduct of market participants have on a given market,20 
competition law will interfere with the freedom of market participants 
to enter into business dealings as long as the business transactions 
affects the relevant market. 
                                                 
16 “Vertical relationship” means the relationship between a firm and its suppliers, its 
customers, or both. See Section 1(xxxiii)(ii) of the South African Competition Act. 
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1(xiii) of the South African Competition Act. 
18 See Boy, L. (2006). Abuse of market power: controlling dominance or protecting 
competition?. In: H. Ullrich, ed., The Evolution of European Competition Law: whose 
Regulation, which Competition?, 1st ed. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA,: 
Edward Elgar, p.216 (hereafter, Boy 2006). 
19 In terms of copyright, the downstream would be the market for the creation and 
production of music content 




By itself, the mere fact of the relationship and economic 
strength of the copyright owner firm and that of the platform firm may 
not constitute sufficient grounds for competition law intervention. Nor 
would such provide the appropriate impetus to assess the effect of the 
open and freemium music business model on competition. The 
decision to give away its work for free in the case of the gratis 
licensing scheme is entirely the decision of the copyright owner based 
on its assessment of its economic interests.21 As held by the US Court 
in Jacobsen v Katzer22:  
The lack of money changing hands in open source licensing should not be 
presumed to mean that there is no economic consideration, however. There 
are substantial benefits, including economic benefits, to the creation and 
distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses that range far beyond 
traditional license royalties. For example, program creators may generate 
market share for their programs by providing certain components free of 
charge. Similarly, a programmer or company may increase its national or 
international reputation by incubating open source projects…The Eleventh 
Circuit has recognized the economic motives inherent in public licenses, 
even where profit is not immediate.  
Nonetheless, the open and freemium music business model, the 
participating entities and the copyright terms implemented in deploying 
the business model do not stand alone, independently, from the 
copyright market. The copyright terms, being contractual provisions 
are legal instruments used to formalize business dealings and are 
therefore, capable of changing the structure of the copyright market. 
As contracts, the copyright terms formalize economic dealings 
between the various market participants, viz: the copyright owner, the 
platform firm, the consumers and the advertising companies.23 
There is a close connection between competition and market 
participation, which, from a legal perspective, occurs through 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
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23 See First, H. and Waller, S. (2013). Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit. Fordham Law 




economic relationships and contractual terms, set by (or between) 
market participants.24 From a competition law perspective, specifically, 
economic relationships and contractual terms are regulated for the 
purpose of eliminating and penalising anticompetitive conduct and/or 
conduct that restrict competition. Such conduct may be cartels, abuse 
of dominance or specified restrictive agreements. In the case of 
mergers, competition law regulates contractual provisions and 
relationships by monitoring (and approving or refusing to approve) 
prospective contractual relationships that have the likelihood of 
affecting the openness and competitiveness of a market. The purpose 
of these regulatory activities is to protect and/or promote competition. 
It is this interface between the copyright terms of the open and 
freemium music business model (as embodying contractual provisions 
and economic relationships) and competition law in South Africa and 
Nigeria that this chapter seeks to explore. These copyright terms 
constitute the basis for evaluating whether open and freemium music 
business models processes preclude or promote competition.25  
The copyright terms represent the terms of the relationship 
between the platform firms, the copyright owners, copyright users and 
consumers and in some ways, advertisers. These rules are therefore 
contracts which are legal instruments used to formalize business 
dealings.  As contracts, the copyright terms are intertwined with the 
market and as such, they may affect the structure of the market. As 
competition law regulates the general legal environment where 
transactions take place, it may apply to ensure that the copyright 
terms are implemented in respect of competition law rules. 
                                                 
24 Market participants include firms and their suppliers or firms and their customers 
and/or consumers. 
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Competition law applies to ensure that the implementation of the 
copyright terms does not affect competition adversely. Several 
aspects of the copyright terms raise specific competition law 
questions. These include the import of the platform firm’s ability to 
obtain a gratis licence in respect of the music content, the exclusion of 
copyright owners based on firm size and repertoire size as evident 
from the revenue-based licensing terms, amongst others.26 
As noted in Chapter three, the gratis licensing term within the 
open and freemium music business model relates to the grant of a 
royalty-free or gratis licence by each person uploading music content 
to the relevant platform. 27  This particular provision is aimed at 
ensuring that the platform firm may deploy the music content in 
providing its advertising services, without incurring liability for 
copyright infringement. The import of such gratis licence in relation to 
the platform firm’s use of the music content particularly in cases where 
the uploader is not the copyright owner has been discussed in 
Chapter four, above from the perspective of copyright law.28  
As a business entity investing creative efforts and funds 
towards the production of music content, the grant of a gratis licence 
to platform firms particularly for the use of the music content in a 
commercial context may create concerns for copyright owners. 
Indeed, as Chapter four of this thesis has shown, copyright owners 
are increasingly concerned about the viability of the music copyright 
sector in the face of the open and freemium music business model. 
The consideration of the effect of the open and freemium music 
                                                 
26 See Alexiadis, P. (2017). Forging a European Competition Policy Response to 
Online Platforms. Business Law International, 18(2), pp.93-7 (hereafter, Alexiadis 
2017); Verhaert, J. (2014). The challenges involved with the application of article 
102 TFEU to the new economy: a case study of Google. ECLR, 35(6), pp.265-7.  
27 See Section 3.4.1, above. 




business model in Nigeria and South Africa on competition may be 
undertaken from various respects. It may relate to a distribution 
system or a platform, a long-standing business relationship between 
two firms or the services that are required for the copyright market29 to 
function properly. Competition may be affected where a firm (such as 
a platform firm) depends on another firm (a supplier30) to distribute 
copyright products or where a firm (such as the copyright owner) 
depends on another firm (a distributor31) to distribute its copyright 
products. From the perspective of competition law, there is the 
question of the effect, which the gratis licence may have on the 
copyright market.  
Apart from the gratis licence, the licensing terms also provide 
for a revenue-based licensing regime. In this regard, selected 
copyright owners can share advertising revenue received by the 
platform firms for the use of the music content to render advertising 
services. Music content identified by participating partners is excluded 
from the platform and those uploaded by the said participating 
partners are monetized through advertising. The conditions for 
acceptance into the revenue-based licensing scheme vary across 
platforms. In most cases, selected copyright owners are obliged to 
own exclusive rights to a substantial body of original material that is 
frequently uploaded by the platform users. By implication, smaller 
copyright owners are excluded from the revenue-based licensing 
scheme. 32  Furthermore, by implementing contractual provisions 
                                                 
29 See Ritala 2013 supra at 25; Drexl 2013 supra at 42. 
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licensing apply for all firms operating as a digital music service. See Ritala 2013 
supra at 25. 
31 See the subject of the dispute in the case of Attrakt v Google supra discussed 
below. 




regarding the payment and termination of payment, the revenue-
based licensing terms may have a significant effect on competition in 
the copyright market. Similar to the case of the gratis licensing rule, 
the question is whether there is compatibility between competition law 
and the parameters for exclusion or inclusion of copyright owners from 
the revenue-based licensing scheme. Additionally, there is also the 
question of how the conduct of platform firm in relation to the copyright 
terms affects competition in terms of market participation by copyright 
owners and/or other platform firms. Possible issues relate to the 
feasibility for smaller platform firms to put such a system in place and 
whether the licensing terms in particular, impedes market entry for 
other platform firms by unduly raising their costs. 
As stated in previous chapters, the open and freemium music 
business model plays a crucial role in today’s information-based 
economy. In deploying the business model, the platform firms make it 
possible for consumers to enjoy music content free-of-charge, 
resulting in greater access to copyright products.33 The platform firms 
also utilise the “supply” of copyright-protected music content that 
enable them to enjoy competitive advantage in their own sphere of 
operation. For instance, the provision of advertising services requires 
copyright owners to provide “content” that platform firms may use to 
attract consumers, which in turn attracts payment from advertising 
companies. 34  This scenario, it is argued, correlates to a vertical 
                                                 
33 Rizk 2010 supra at 490; Elkin-Koren 2011 supra at 341; Santos 2013 supra at 
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34 See Li, Z. (2016). Legal Boundaries of Competition in the Era of the Internet: 
Challenges and Judicial Responses. Internet Competition & Regulation Of Online 
Platforms, [online] p.143. Available at: 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-
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2017]; Hughes, P., 2009. Business strategy and EC competition law: two systems 
separated by a common language. International Company and Commercial Law 




relationship between the copyright owner and the platform firm. 35 
Where the economic power in such vertical relationship is 
disproportionate, it may affect competition in the horizontal 
relationship,36 between competitors such as other platform firms. From 
the perspective of the platform firm, the (limitless) “supply” from the 
copyright owner as a “trading partner” may strengthen its market 
power in the relevant market apropos its competitors in the platform 
provision business. From the perspective of the copyright owner, it 
may affect its ability to effectively compete in the creation and 
distribution of the music content (the “copyright market”). The 
distribution of copyright work is an ancillary market for the platform 
firms in this context. For example, Google, which owns YouTube, is 
primarily in the advertising business rather than music distribution. 
There are two dimensions to the promotion and/or protection of 
competition, which is explained hereunder. First, it is to be understood 
that the broad principle behind the protection of competition through 
competition law is the definition and calibration of a “relevant market”. 
Whether any unilateral or concerted conduct (whether by or between 
horizontally or vertically related firms) restricts competition is assessed 
from the standpoint of a relevant market. Similarly, assessing whether 
the conduct of any firm is anticompetitive (abuse of dominance) 
requires that such firm enjoys a dominant position in a relevant market 
and abuses such dominant position. 37  To define and assess 
dominance, competition law examines the economic status or 
                                                 
35 See Gal and Rubenfield 2015 supra at 9-11. 
36 See Boy 2006 supra at 216. See also, Bakhoum 2017 supra at 22. 
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Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd v Nationwide Poles CC (49/CAC/Apr05). This approach is largely 





influence38 of market participants – the “market” having been defined 
prior. As such, the conceptual approach to assessing economic 
influence, under competition law, relies on market power 39  and/or 
market share40 of the participants in a relevant market. Accordingly, 
whether the copyright terms and resultant economic relationships are 
directed to exclude competitors or to exploit suppliers and/or 
consumers, the primary requirement is that such rules or relationships 
must affect competition in the relevant market. Otherwise, such rules 
or relationships may not be painted with the anticompetitive brush.  
Second, competition law may protect and promote competition 
by scrutinising the conduct of one party in a contractual or business 
relationship, even where such party does not hold a dominant position 
in relation to any relevant market. 41 In such instance, it may hold that 
competition may also be restricted or adversely affected when a 
market participant enjoys a stronger economic position vis-à-vis its 
supplier or trading partner and relies on its position of economic 
strength to decimate the weaker trading partner’s ability to compete or 
remain in its business.42 Competition is affected in such instance even 
in the absence of a dominant position in the regular competition law 
sense 43  because the choices available to a market participant to 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39  See Drexl, J. (2008). The Relationship Between the Legal Exclusivity and 
Economic Market Power. Links and Limits. In: I. Govaere and H. Ullrich, eds., 
Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest, 1st ed. Lang, pp. 16-18 
(hereafter, Drexl 2008). 
40  South African Competition Act 1998 assesses dominance from a combined 
market share and market power approach. See Section 7 of the Act. 
41 See Drexl 2013 supra at 42. See also, Bakhoum 2017 supra at 26... 
42 See Hughes 2009 supra at 389-392.  





conduct its business are undermined.44 Indeed, competition law has 
been applied to cases where an undertaking, which is a distributor of 
copyright products, exercises its proprietary rights in the distribution 
system to the detriment of the copyright market.45 In this regard, as 
explained in Chapter two, competition authorities may apply a test, 
which aims at achieving the identified applicable goals of competition 
law. 
From a competition law perspective, the open and freemium 
music business model may be nonthreatening where the economic 
freedom of each market participant is not undermined. The 
consumer’s access to the music content is guaranteed; the platform 
firms continue to innovate in providing products and services that suit 
their customers (including the advertising firms) and the copyright 
owner’s choices in terms of participating in the copyright market are 
not unjustifiably limited.46 Such state of affairs constitutes the process 
in which competition law complements copyright law in achieving its 
objectives.47  
 Corollary to the foregoing, there is need to consider how 
competition law rules may be applied to regulate the copyright terms 
as implemented in the open and freemium music business model. 
This thesis argues that even in cases such as the gratis licensing 
scheme where the relevant market participants accept the policies 
within the open and freemium music business model and consumers 
enjoy access to the music content free-of-charge, the policies 
                                                 
44 Bakhoum 2017 supra 5 at 2 and 21; Këllezi, P. (2008). Abuse below the threshold 
of dominance? Market power, market dominance, and abuse of economic 
dependence. In Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement 
Mechanisms?. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, p. 62 (hereafter, Këllezi 2008). 
45 See Drexl 2013 supra at 167.  
46 See Attrakt v Google supra. Here, Google was required to justify its withdrawal ad 
nutum. 




determine the economic influence of the copyright owners and 
platform firms. There is need for the application of competition law to 
regulate the open and freemium music business model to ensure that 
the business model may promote competition in copyright markets.48 
This is mainly from the perspective that competition law intervenes to 
promote access of music content to the market. The need for 
regulation is made more pressing by the nature and impact of the 
policies in the open and freemium music business model and the 
economic weight of the copyright owners as small businesses in 
Nigeria and South Africa’s music industries. For instance, the revenue-
based licensing scheme may provide for contractual terms that require 
that copyright owners agree on the denial of access to the platform or 
revenue share on any stated or unstated grounds. Another applicable 
instance may be the exclusion of copyright owners from participating 
in the revenue-based licensing scheme because of firm size and/or 
repertoire/catalogue size; the unilateral imposition of a gratis licence 
as a condition for copyright owners to upload their music content on 
the platform and the challenges in terms of resources required by 
copyright owners to monitor and challenge the removal of their music 
content from platforms that have them without the copyright owners’ 
consent. Although the competition challenges of these instances is yet 
to be considered in court, it is submitted that these instances have the 
potential to engender anti-competitive effects. Such contractual terms 
may raise potential competition concerns because they challenge the 
boundaries between the freedom of the platform firms to deploy their 
business models and competition in copyright markets. The 
boundaries between these two are set by the specific goals of 
competition law in each jurisdiction. These goals provide the pro‐
                                                 




competitive justification for antitrust intervention. 49  As argued more 
fully in Section 5.3.1, below, this is even more pertinent where the 
competition statute, like South Africa’s, has the goal of protecting the 
interests of small businesses. 
In Italy, the Court of Milan, dealt with a case that illustrates, in 
the advertisement sector, how contractual provisions may affect the 
economic freedom of a market participant and thus, competition in a 
given market. The contractual terms may strengthen the economic 
power and position of a market participant vis-à-vis its competitors. 
The rules may also limit the freedom and ability of other market 
participants to participate in other markets. In the case of Attrakt 
S.R.L. v Google Ireland Limited, (“Attrakt v Google”)50 Google, which 
is active in the search engine and advertising business, created two 
separate contractual relationships with its search engine and 
advertising partner, Attrakt S.L.R., an Italy-based search engine 
company. These two contracts were linked to each other and used by 
Google to control the contractual relationship and create a situation 
where its conduct undermined the continued participation of Attrakt in 
the market. 
With Attrakt as a trading partner, Google agreed on a 
publishing and revenue share service that enabled Google to display 
advertisements on Attrakt’s website and share accruing revenue from 
the advertisements with Attrakt.51 Parallel to that, there was another 
contract for Google to provide advertising services to Attrakt which 
enabled Attrakt to display its website links on Google’s site and 
advertising network (referred to as “Adword”) upon payment to 
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50 See Attrakt v Google supra.   




Google. 52  These contracts are interrelated such that Attrakt paid 
Google to attract users to its (Attrakt’s) site based on the AdWords 
agreement and relied on Google to make returns form these 
payments, based on the Adsense agreement. The Adsense 
agreement obliged Google to pay Attrakt when users clicked on the 
ads appearing on Attrakt’s website. With Attrakt and indeed each 
Adsense partner,53 Google was exclusively in charge of selecting ads 
to be included as part of the search results depending on the 
particular website user. Google’s selection could not be modified and 
only Google knew and could account for remuneration earned from 
clicks.54 Provisions were inserted in the AdSense contract directing 
Attrakt to follow Google’s directives and to permit Google to control 
announcements and position of announcements on Attrakt’s site, links 
and search results. 55  In addition to these provisions that obliged 
Attrakt to largely conduct its business based on Google’s directives, 
additional provisions related to Google’s exclusive control of revenue 
accounting and payments were included. 56  A limitation of liability 
clause states that Google’s liability in the event of any breach is 
limited to a stated sum. This provision prevents the Adsense partner 
from collecting actual monies owed by Google in the event of a suit or 
from collecting potential damages as may be assessed by a court. 
This may result in huge losses especially for a small firm. In the light 
of all these provisions, the Court accepted the existence of a 
dependency between Google and its trading partner, Attrakt. The 
Court concluded that a situation of economic dependence existed 
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between the parties.57 Further, the court took the view that Google’s 
conduct amounted to an abuse of dominance as well.58 
Analyzed individually, Google’s position and actions under the 
Adsense contract was a legitimate exercise of its right to run its 
business as it sees fit and to accept or refuse to deal with any 
business entity or individual.59 Indeed, the Court acknowledged that: 
“it is certainly true that in fixed term contracts, withdrawal is permitted, 
in order to reflect the need to avoid an obligatory binding agreement 
from persisting perpetually...”.60  
However, analysed together, with regard to their actual effects 
on the market, the two contracts allow Google to “create” a firm 
(Attrakt) that is economically dependent on it. The Court found that: 
An examination of the contracts and correspondence exchanged by the 
parties to the action reveals a decidedly unbalanced picture in favour of the 
defendant Google, which, from the setting-up of the contractual relationship 
until its conclusion, dictated the conditions, time schedule and modifications to 
be implemented on the site owned by Attrakt. It continually made demands of 
Attrakt of all kinds, aimed basically at monitoring developments in the 
contractual relations and the possibility of growth on the part of Attrakt. The 
continual requests for information, the directives and controls constitute clear 
evidence of the fact that, apart from a business form, unbalanced in favour of 
the defendant, who decided the fees to be paid and the shares, on the other 
hand, to which it was entitled for intermediation activities, the Google company 
was aware of the operations carried out by Attrakt, and hence no increase or 
anomalous development in the advertising displayed could escape it, unless it 
was permitted by the company or, even encouraged. The increase in turnover 
stemming from the contracts was always observed with interest by Google, 
which, on its part, encouraged the AdWords campaign and received punctual, 
immediate replies from Attrakt – as it acknowledged itself in the 
correspondence – on the operating methods used to earn profits, with regard 
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to the interdependent relationship between the two AdWords and AdSense 
contracts, as well as the technical aspects with which users were redirected to 
the Attrakt landing-page.61 
The two contracts enabled Google to plan and coordinate its 
advertising distribution services. The costs to leave the Google 
platform or to shift to another platform were high enough to deter 
Attrakt from leaving the platform. In this regard, Attrakt’s profits were 
exclusively reliant on the difference between the income received 
through the AdSense contract, and the spending it made on the 
Adwords contract.62   
It is evident from the foregoing that the economic powers of the 
parties were clearly unequal, with Google being the economically 
dominant party. Further, in both contracts executed by the parties, 
Google clearly had the upper hand and significantly, could terminate 
the contract at any time.63 The foundation of Attrakt’s business was 
based on Google’s direction and will.64 It was therefore important that 
termination of the contract by Google must be made for good reason 
and preferably, followed with payments of any monies due Attrakt.65 In 
the absence of these steps necessitate by the very nature of the 
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contractual relationship and economic position of the parties, Google 
exercise of its termination powers and failure to pay outstanding 
monies to Attrakt resulted in the pronouncement of a “death sentence” 
on Attrakt’s business. 
This contractual relationship with the creation and use of a 
platform highlights how the copyright terms of the open and freemium 
music business model in particular, can be used to restructure the 
market by stabilizing or enhancing the market share of an 
economically stronger party and by limiting the freedom to compete of 
the weaker party. 66 The implementation of the contractual rules may 
also result in the abuse of a dominant position, which is an 
anticompetitive conduct. 67  On an extensive analysis, it becomes 
apparent how contractual terms regarding a gratis exchange can work 
to re-order the structure of the market and thereby affect 
competition.68 The example of the Attrakt v Google case is not an 
isolated case. While this case is not from the copyright sector, it is 
instructive because the contractual terms pertinent to the case are on 
all fours with Adsense, which is one of the copyright terms of YouTube 
in Nigeria and South Africa.69  
Certain approaches to business practices in open and 
freemium music business models may in fact extend the reach of 
competition law to vertical contractual relationships between firms, 
which are not competing in the same market or in any defined market 
and which do not hold a dominant position as per a specific market. In 
protecting the ability of market participants to compete, competition 
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law goes beyond encouraging formal economic equality between 
market participants70 and keeping the market open and competitive.71 
Competition law aims to rectify the adverse effects of inequalities in 
contractual relationships, which erodes competition. 72  This is 
particularly the case in jurisdictions, which have concentrated markets 
and where copyright markets are not functioning due, inter alia, to 
concentration of economic power.73 In the case of open and freemium 
music business model in Nigeria and South Africa, where majority of 
copyright owner firms are small businesses/SMEs, it is argued that the 
copyright owners may be the weaker trading partners requiring 
competition law intervention in certain instances.74  
The imbalances in the relationship of the market participants 
within the open and freemium music business model, generally and 
between copyright owners and platform firms specifically coupled with 
the copyright terms of the business models, have the potential to 
erode competition. Indeed, the copyright terms and their 
implementation – in particular, rules regarding access to the revenue-
based licensing scheme and justification for acceptance –may require 
competition law regulation. Such regulation would ensure that the 
open and freemium music business model may be better aligned with 
the goals of competition law which include enhancement of consumer 
welfare and ensuring that market participants (especially copyright 
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73 See Bakhoum, M. (2011). A dual language in modern competition law? Efficiency 
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owners as small businesses/SMEs) have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the copyright market.75 
The strategy of locking in owners of copyright in music content 
is a common feature in the open and freemium music business model. 
Weighing the criteria adopted by the Italian court in evaluating whether 
Google’s conduct was abusive and as such, anticompetitive, it 
appears that the open and freemium music business model may 
exhibit the potential to restrict competition or derail the realization of 
the goals of competition. This is because the business model is 
subject of contracts that create economic dependences and their 
abuse, curtailing the freedom of copyright owners to compete.76 In 
addition, the economic inequalities necessitate an enquiry as to the 
protection and promotion of competition in copyright market.77   
Contracts remain a crucial factor in the sustenance of the 
business model and the copyright owner is compelled to relinquish its 
control of these contracts to the platform firm. The popularity of the 
music content is the catalyst for the realization of the economic 
interests of the copyright owner. As such, the copyright owner is 
reliant on the platform firm to indicate the popularity levels through 
number of views, number of clicks on ads displayed during music 
consumption; number of subscriptions and/or the number of 
“downloads”. The popularity levels trigger market forces as they 
determine the revenue, if any that accrues from interaction with the 
music content embodying the copyright work. The operation of market 
forces in the open and freemium music business model in Nigeria and 
South Africa result in heightened reliance on platform firms, which 
                                                 
75 Section 2(e) South African Competition Act; Section 1(a) Nigerian Competition 
and Consumer Protection Bill 2016. 





dictate contractual rules that could undermine the economic freedom 
of the copyright owner.78  
The concentration of economic powers in the hand of the 
platform firm affects not only the structure of the market, but also the 
individual freedoms of copyright owners as market participants. As 
suggested by Bakhoum, the difference between economic freedom 
represented in voluntary contractual agreements and that represented 
in market participants’ respective opportunity to compete is the 
determinant of competitiveness. 79  In the case of the open and 
freemium music business model, parties have clearly exercised 
“formal” economic freedom as copyright owners place their music 
content on platform that enable consumers to access the content at 
zero prices. However, there is the likelihood that the economic 
freedom of the copyright owners to compete in the market created by 
the platform firm’s copyright terms may be limited.80 In a revenue-
based licensing arrangement, which has the effect of locking in 
copyright owners, the freedom of competition of the weaker party to 
shift to another distributor may be considerably restricted. Switching to 
another platform firm or taking the existence of other platforms into 
consideration without considering the mileage that has accrued on any 
specific platform is unlikely to expose the competition risks of the 
copyright terms of a specific platform. This is because, as explained, 
the popularity levels established on one platform may determine 
revenue levels on the platform and from other avenues such as live 
performance events, social media and brand relationships.81 Indeed, 
number of social media followers, number of concerts in a given 
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period, social media post views are all metrics that corporate brands 
look at to select brand ambassadors.82 Due to the fact that popularity 
levels generated on a specific platform is crucial for revenue 
generation, there is the fear that a decision by the platform firm to shut 
out the copyright owner from the platform may result in economic 
losses for the copyright owner. Protecting economic freedom and 
freedom to compete may justify antitrust intervention to protect the 
copyright market against “structural restrictions” and the “individuals 
against coercion”,83 two elements of economic freedom. As pointed 
out, with the examples of the Adword and Adsense contracts in advert 
distribution agreements,84 openness and free access may affect the 
structure of the market because of the way they are implemented.85 
As already discussed, the relative dominance of platform firms 
may affect the individual freedom of copyright owners, in the case of 
open and freemium music business models where, the copyright 
owner as a supplier or a distributor depends “exclusively” on the 
facilitating platform as a distributor or a supplier and does not have 
equivalent alternatives. Exclusivity in this case may arise as a result of 
the unique offerings of each platform firm. This enables platform firms 
to take over audience previously “acquired” by another platform firm. 86  
In such cases, the individual freedoms of the copyright owner may be 
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restricted. Indeed, access to the services of the platform firm may be a 
prerequisite for effective competition in the market for the provision of 
music content in Nigeria and South Africa.87 In such situation, antitrust 
intervention or scrutiny may be necessary to promote competition in 
such copyright markets.88  
The copyright terms are used to create an avenue for the 
distribution of music content. However, for copyright owners of those 
music content, the copyright terms may limit their freedom to compete 
in that market. Given the potential conflicts amongst the different 
individual economic freedoms, safeguards are necessary to protect 
and coordinate individual freedoms as such freedoms are not absolute 
rights.89 Hence, there is need to regulate the exercise of the economic 
freedom of the platform firms.90 This is especially so in the case of the 
open and freemium music business model where openness (including 
the consequent freedom to use the copyright work) may be threatened 
by the implementation of contractual or copyright terms made by 
platform firms. The concentration of economic powers in the hand of 
platform firm affects not only the structure of the market, but also the 
individual freedoms of copyright owners as market participants.  
5.3 Copyright terms and the respective competition law regimes 
in South Africa and Nigeria 
This section considers the copyright terms of the open and freemium 
music business model in the light of the regulatory framework 
provided by competition law in South Africa and Nigeria, respectively. 
The conduct of economically strong or dominant firms and the effect of 
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such conduct on competition are addressed by the competition law 
concept of abuse of dominance. It is be noted that the consideration of 
the competition law framework in Nigeria is hypothetical given that 
there is no competition statute and it is a parliamentary bill (i.e. the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Bill 2016) that is being 
considered.  
5.3.1 South Africa 
After the abolition of apartheid and the subsequent removal of trade 
sanctions, the government commenced a process to comprehensively 
reform competition law through the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) in 1997. The aim was to devise a framework that ensures that 
the days of monopolies and highly concentrated markets were over 
and that real opportunities existed for all South Africans to participate 
in world markets. 91  Consequently, South Africa enacted the 
Competition Act 1998, which became fully operative in September 
1999. The Competition Act 1998 repealed the Maintenance and 
Promotion of Competition Amendment Act, 1990 and previous related 
laws thereto.  
The South African competition enforcers (Competition 
Commission, Competition Tribunal and Competition Appeal Court) are 
yet to deliberate on the import of the use of copyright-protected music 
content in the context of the open and freemium music business 
model. Yet, the debate about the application of competition law to the 
activities of platform firms as distributors of copyright products 
continues unabated. As multisided platforms, the activities of platform 
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firms have been the subject of much debate in the EU and in the US, 
particularly with respect to the appropriateness or otherwise of 
applying competition law rules to regulate them. 92 The prohibition 
against unilateral conduct amounting to abuse of dominance is dealt 
with under s8 of the Competition Act. This provision may be applied to 
assess the implementation of the copyright terms implemented in the 
context of the open and freemium music business model. Such 
conduct, termed “abuse of dominance” include charging of excessive 
prices, refusal of access to an essential facility, requiring or inducing a 
supplier or customer to not deal with a competitor; refusing to supply 
scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those goods is 
economically feasible; selling goods or services on condition that the 
buyer purchases separate goods or services unrelated to the object of 
a contract, or forcing a buyer to accept a condition unrelated to the 
object of a contract; selling goods or services below their marginal or 
average variable cost; or buying-up a scarce supply of intermediate 
goods or resources required by a competitor.93 Each of these conduct, 
apart from excessive pricing and refusal of access, is presumed anti-
competitive unless the firm concerned can show technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gains that outweigh the anti-
competitive effect of the Act. 
There are significant similarities between South Africa’s 
approach to applying abuse of dominance provisions and that of the 
EU. For instance, the abuse of dominance provisions in s8 of the 
Competition Act is similar to that found in s102 of the EU’s TFEU. It is 
therefore reasonable to anticipate that in cases of alleged abuse of 
dominance, South Africa’s competition enforcers will apply competition 
law in a similar manner as its EU counterpart. Similar to the position 
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within the EU competition law framework, South African competition 
law is applied to economic activities on the basis of whether such 
activity affects the competitive process or efficiency in the 
marketplace. In relation to conduct which amounts to abuse of 
dominant market position, antitrust intervention requires that the 
alleged offending firm be in a dominant position;94 and the conduct 
complained of must affect competition in a relevant market.95 Each 
criterion, in turn, requires a specific approach.  
Dominance is assessed based on the existence of market 
power which is analysed vis-à-vis other competitors’ market shares in 
the relevant market. 96  According to s7 of the Competition Act, a 
dominant firm is one that holds at least 45% of a given market; or at 
least 35% of the market in the absence of proof that it has market 
power or less than 35% of the market and market power. “Market 
power” under the Competition Act, means the “power of a firm to 
control prices, or to exclude competition or to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers or 
suppliers”.97 In defining market power, the South African Competition 
Act adopts the EU approach in the decision of the court in the case of 
United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v 
Commission of the European Communities98 where market power was 
                                                 
94  International Competition Network (ICN) (2008). Report on Abuse of Superior 
Bargaining Position. [online] Japan, p.10. Available at: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc386.pdf. 
[Accessed 9 Mar. 2017] (hereafter, ICN Report 2008); Bakhoum 2017 supra 5 at 16. 
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95 ICN Report 2008 supra at 10. Also, see Bakhoum 2017 supra at 16. 
96 See ICN Report 2008 supra at 19; Bakhoum 2017 supra at 17; Section 7 of the 
South African Competition Act. 
97 See Section 1(xiv) of the Competition Act. 
98 [1978] ECR I- 00207, para. 65 (United Brands); C-85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche/ 




defined as the power of a firm to behave independently towards its 
competitors, customers and consumers. 99  In that case, the court 
accepted the behaviour of United Brands as evident of its dominant 
position because it found that United Brands was able to enjoy a 
position of “economic strength” which enabled it to “prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”.100 The court 
held that such behaviour by an undertaking in a dominant position 
where it succeeds in eliminating a competitor established in the 
market, would have repercussions on the “patterns of competition”.101  
In the context of the open and freemium music business model 
as described in this study, the question, as earlier stated is whether 
the copyright market is a “valid” market in which the gratis licencing 
terms and the other copyright terms enabling its establishment and 
implementation may attract competition law scrutiny under s8 of the 
Competition Act. The dominance in question largely relates to the 
relationship between the platform firms and the copyright owner so 
that the considerations highlighted in Chapter two,102 regarding the 
issuance of a compulsory licence under competition law, may be more 
apposite for a copyright law-based statutory licence. 103  The 
relationship between the platform firms and the copyright owner 
amounts to a vertical relationship as copyright owners may be 
                                                 
99 See United Brands supra at para 38. See also ICN Report 2008 supra at 22. 
100  FitzPatrick, M.H. (1979). United Brands Company v. Commission of the 
European Communities: Window to price discrimination law in the European 
Economic Community. Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus., 1, p.338; Maliszewska-Nienartowicz, J. 
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suppliers to or, customers of the platform firm. 104  Furthermore, by 
providing a free platform that enables massive reproduction of music 
content, platform firms occupy a unique and powerful position in 
relation to the distribution of music content. Accordingly, while the 
platform firm may not have the requisite 35% and/or above 35% of the 
market for the production and distribution of music content, it does 
have the power to behave independent of the copyright owners and 
other users of its platform (market power).105  
However, the behaviour of a dominant firm would only be 
abusive if such behaviour falls under the conduct prohibited as such 
under the Act.106 In the case of South Africa, s8 of the Competition Act 
contains a closed list of conduct prohibited for dominant firms. 
Therefore, unlike art 102 TFEU which prohibits “any abuse” by a 
dominant firm and contains a non-exhaustive list of conduct 
considered abusive, South African Competition Act appears to 
consider only the listed conduct in s8 as abusive.107 Accordingly, while 
art 102(2) TFEU does not exclude the possibility of recognising 
abuses not mentioned in art 102(2) TFEU,108 s8 of the Competition 
Act may not recognise conduct outside the list provided in the Act. 
                                                 
104 See Section 1(xxxiii)(ii) of the South African Competition Act. 
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Some specific aspects of the copyright terms that raise competition 
law questions include: the potential of the gratis licensing scheme to 
exclude copyright owners from the copyright market based on loss of 
revenue; the aspect of the revenue-based licensing rule that excludes 
copyright owners with smaller number of music content. These issues 
may be considered in relation to s8(c) of the Competition Act given 
that other paragraphs of s 8, as indicated in Chapter two of this 
thesis, 109  deal with specific matters such as excessive pricing 110 , 
refusal of essential facilities to a competitor,111 tying112 and the like.113 
While excessive pricing covered by s 8(a) relates to instances where a 
dominant undertaking, which holds dominant market power, charges 
prices that are above the competitive pricing level; refusal of essential 
facilities prohibited under s 8(b) relates to cases where the dominant 
firm has a product or facility which is considered crucial for 
competitors to compete.114 
Section 8(c) of the South African Competition Act contains a 
catch-all provision on exclusionary acts. It prohibits dominant firms 
from engaging in any action that prevents or impedes another firm 
entering into, or expanding within a market (exclusionary act).115 Such 
                                                 
109 See section 2.3, above. 
110 See s8(a) of the Act. 
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conduct is only prohibited if it is shown that the anti-competitive effect 
of the exclusion outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain. Accordingly, in the case of the gratis licensing term 
where the copyright owner may be inhibited from investing in creative 
and distributive efforts due to the absence of revenue, the question is 
whether the anti-competitive effect of such exclusion outweighs any 
pro-competitive gains. In the case of the revenue-based licensing term 
smaller copyright owners are excluded based on the size of their 
copyright portfolio. Similarly, the question from a competition law 
perspective is whether the anti-competitive effect arising from treating 
copyright owners differently based on the quantity of content in which 
rights are held outweighs the pro-competitive or other gains from such 
exclusion.  
It seems from the wording of s8(c) that the onus lies on the 
copyright owner to show that the anti-competitive effect of such 
exclusion outweighs its technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain. By extension, there appears to be a presumption 
that “exclusionary acts” by dominant firms are pro-competitive ab initio 
or at least are not sufficiently anti-competitive. 116  The exercise of 
dominance resulting in excluding a market participant is, in most 
cases, perceived as evidence of competition and controlling such 
dominance and concentration of economic power is likely to restrict 
competition. In the case of South Africa, it has been posited that 
because a small business will typically hold a market share of 10% or 
less in any defined market, it would be unlikely that the exit of the 
small business will provide proof of sufficient anti-competitive effect as 
                                                 
116 See Gal and Fox 2015 supra at p. 332.  See also, Fox, E. (2006). Comment: 
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to trump other pro-competitive gains in the market.117 Viewed from this 
perspective, it may be an uphill task to challenge the business 
practices that led to the exclusion or exit of the copyright owner (as a 
small business) as sufficiently anticompetitive. The following 
statement made by the South African Competition Commission 
confirms this reasoning:  
The hurdle for proving abuse-of-dominance cases are significant, they 
require extensive legal and economic analysis. This is evident in the small 
number of cases where abuse of dominance has been found and the 
extensive evidence that has been required for these findings…118  
[…it] should be noted that cases that deal with abuse of market power are 
often difficult to prove in practice. Specifically, complaints relying on those 
sections of the Competition Act wherein a small business must prove a 
substantial prevention or lessening of competition in a particular relevant 
market are often unsuccessful.119 
Prohibited practices are prosecuted under the Competition Act either 
as restrictive agreements, which have the effect of substantially 
preventing or lessening competition in a market (Ss 4 and 5), or as an 
abuse of a dominant position (Ss 8 and 9). The abuse of dominance 
provisions of the Competition Act in particular, outlaw a range of 
exclusionary acts that are most likely to affect small businesses as 
existing firms or new entrants seeking access to markets. While the 
prohibited practices in Chapter two of the Competition Act may 
                                                 
117  See Kampel, K. (2004). Competition law and SMEs: Exploring the 
competitor/competition debate in a developing democracy (No. 30655). University of 
Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM). See also Du 
Plessis, L. (2015). How does competition law enforcement benefit small business. 
[online] Competition News, Edition 53. Available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Competition-Commision-September-Newsletter.pdf, p.8 
[Accessed 5 Mar. 2017] (hereafter, Du Plessis 2015). 
118  See Compcom.co.za. (2017). Abuse of dominance | The Competition 
Commission of South Africa. [online] Available at: http://www.compcom.co.za/abuse-
of-dominance/ [Accessed 6 Feb. 2017].  




engender a consideration of the interests of small businesses or 
firms, 120  the likelihood of finding antitrust liability in most of these 
cases when the offending effect is the exit of a small firm, is low. 
It is possible to argue that where the copyright owner as a 
market participant loses the opportunity and freedom to compete 
within the economy and to access alternatives both as supplier and 
“buyer”, the gratis licensing term has the effect of substantially 
reducing competition.121 Here, it is to be noted that as indicated in 
previous chapters, the protection of the economic freedom of the 
copyright owner contributes to keeping the copyright market open and 
competitive. The existing link between competition and SMEs 
participation in the market has already been drawn in Chapters two 
and three, above. Sometimes the exclusion of protected works from 
the market does not have significant effect. The crucial competition 
issue here is the exclusion of the copyright owner, a small 
business/SME from the economy and economic participation. It is 
argued that in the open and freemium music business model, the 
gratis licensing terms as embodied in the Terms of use or service, 
create a situation where the economic freedom of the copyright owner 
depends largely on the platform firm. Indeed, in some instances, 
leveraging on such economic dependence presents dire 
consequences for competition in the copyright market. The fact that 
the platform firms deliberately refrain from taking proportionate 
measures to prevent the availability of infringing content, taking 
advantage of the delays and inefficiencies that come with notice and 
takedown procedures (i.e. the copyright owner first has to identify the 
content, notify the platform and await takedown), may lend credence 
to the anticompetitive assessment. Also, the question of whether it is 
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feasible for copyright owners and/or smaller platforms to put such a 
system in place and whether such will raise their costs (thereby 
impeding their market entry) may be proof of anti-competitive effect. 
The European Commission in its investigations and complaints 
against Alphabet Inc. took a similar approach where the Commission 
indicted Google (which has Alphabet as its parent company) for the 
contractual terms which Google stipulated for the use of its Android122 
software in mobile phone operating systems. 123   The result of the 
Commission’s investigation considered Google as dominant in the 
markets for “general internet search services, licensable smart mobile 
operating systems and app stores for the Android mobile operating 
system”. Google was found to hold market shares of more than 90% 
in each of the identified markets in the European Economic Area 
(EEA).124 Having established Google’s market dominant position, the 
Commission went on to identify the potentially infringing conduct 
inherent in the business practices and contractual stipulations for 
using the Android open business model.  
While the Commission expressed the view that by itself, 
Android was pro-competitive, Google, in offering a platform that 
facilitated the deployment of an open business model (Android), 
stipulated contractual terms that raised antitrust concerns. According 
to the Commission, the following business practices were 
anticompetitive: 
                                                 
122 Android, owned by Google Inc. is an open-source operating system, meaning 
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(a) Requiring manufacturers to pre-install Google Search and 
Google's Chrome browser and requiring them to set Google Search 
as default search service on their devices, as a condition to license 
certain Google proprietary apps; 
 (b) Preventing manufacturers from selling smart mobile devices 
running on competing operating systems based on the Android 
open source code; 
(c) Giving financial incentives to manufacturers and mobile network 
operators on condition that they exclusively pre-install Google 
Search on their devices. 
In considering the effects of the identified business practices and 
contractual rules, on the relevant markets, the Commission found that 
the conduct would have the following effects: (1) strengthen Google’s 
dominant position in general internet search services; (2) impede the 
ability of Google’s competitors in the mobile browsers market to 
compete with Google; (3) obstruct the development of operating 
systems based on the Android open source code; and (4) hinder the 
opportunities that the Android open source code would offer for the 
development of new apps and services.125 
Some scholars have condemned this approach as an inappropriate 
challenge to Google’s very business model.126 In particular, Colomo 
compared the facts of the investigation with the facts in Pronuptia de 
Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schiligallis (Pronuptia),127, 
arguing that the Commission needs to show that it assessed the 
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126 See van Loon 2012 supra at 34. See also, Colomo, P. (2016). Android meets 
Pronuptia, or why software licensing is like a franchising agreement. [online] 
Chillin'Competition. Available at: https://chillingcompetition.com/2016/04/25/android-
meets-pronuptia-or-why-software-licensing-is-like-a-franchising-agreement/ 
[Accessed 9 Mar. 2017]. 




conditions of competition with and without Google’s business practices 
before expressing competition concerns.128 However, it is argued that 
analysis such as Colomo’s sets a single agenda for competition law 
enforcement.129 Such agenda relates to the application of competition 
law only when the competition process manifested in the absence of 
efficiency is affected. But, as Evenett rightly noted: 
…competition law is a multifaceted tool and can be adapted to 
different circumstances. For example, the presence in many 
developing countries of a large informal sector in certain 
markets may alter assessments of the number of substitutes 
available to buyers and therefore the assessment of the market 
power of incumbent firms. This consideration may not be that 
important in implementing competition law in the highest 
income countries….130 
Conversely, despite the possibility that the incentive for 
continued investment in creative efforts may be reduced by the gratis 
licencing and circumstances regarding its grant and use, there is no 
compulsion under competition law for platform firms to procure a paid 
licence in every case. This is especially so in view of the requirement 
to show that the anticompetitive effect of such contractual term 
outweighs the “technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive, gain” 
resulting from such rule.131 Such proof may be hard to find when the 
efficiency in the distribution of music content arising from the 
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implementation of the copyright terms is considered.132 The likelihood 
of wider distribution of copyright products and the existence of 
incentive for continued creativity are key parameters for assessing 
competition consequences. This criterion was applied by the 
Japanese competition authority to promote competition in the 
distribution of sound recordings through ring tones. In the relevant 
cases, the complaint was that the actions of the distributor firm that 
owns the distribution system amounts to abuse of dominance.133 For 
one, both parties benefit from the gratis licence: the platform firm is 
able to use the music content for advertising, the copyright owners 
benefit from the visibility and free distribution provided by the 
existence of the platform. 134  As evident from Chapter three, the 
savings from the cost of plugging may be quite significant for a small 
business.135 Secondly, showing the absence of the usual hitches in 
the music content distribution process can offer proof of efficiency (or 
other pro-competitive gain) and by extension, provide a competition 
law defence for the platform firms. For example, collecting societies 
have relied on their administrative systems and databases to show 
their efficiency and necessity for the music copyright industry. 136 
Indeed, YouTube and its Content ID tool may be prime example of 
technological and/or efficiency gain. From the database that offers a 
centralised location for a large volume of copyrighted content to the 
ability to monetise what may be infringing use, the Content ID tool 
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may be evidence of technological and efficiency gains. Furthermore, 
there is nothing stopping the copyright owners from designing their 
own distribution system. However, network effect is to be considered 
and also the fact that the systems are designed in such manner that 
illegal uploads will continue regardless of whether the copyright owner 
participates or not. So, then, it comes down to weighing the degree of 
pro- and anti-competitive effects. 
Furthermore, given the fact that the copyright terms result in 
consumers enjoying (legal) access to the music content at no cost, it 
may be problematic to show that the anti-competitive effect of 
excluding some copyright owners based on a gratis licence granted to 
platform firms on their own volition outweigh such pro-competitive 
gain.137 As the US explained in response to the question posed by the 
International Competition Network (ICN):138  
…in the absence of harm to competition, governments generally should 
make every effort not to interfere in privately-negotiated contracts. The 
package of terms that make up a contract between parties in a vertical 
relationship reflects the parties’ agreement as to how to allocate rights and 
risks between them in an efficient manner. 
Such position may exist in the context of the open and freemium 
music business model context.139 Without substantial anti-competitive 
effect shown, it appears that the Competition Act may not be 
applicable to scrutinising the specific issues of exclusion arising from 
the copyright terms of the open and freemium music business model. 
However, it is argued that the showing of significant anticompetitive 
                                                 
137 See van Loon 2012 supra at 35. 
138 The International Competition Network (ICN) had enquired as to why the United 
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effect requires a balancing between safeguarding competition in the 
market, respecting freedom of contract and protecting the freedom of 
competition of weaker parties against powerful business partners”.140 
In this regard, the presence or existence of countervailing power on 
the part of the copyright owner is a factor in assessing the effect of the 
copyright terms on competition.141 The protection and promotion of 
competition in open and freemium music business models is not 
limited solely to the achievement of efficiency 142  and/or consumer 
welfare goals.143 The protection and promotion of competition is also 
curtailed when the economic freedom of copyright owners as market 
participants is denied.144 At the foundation of competition law in South 
Africa, is the intent to control concentration of economic power in the 
public interests.145  The open and freemium music business model 
creates new forms of concentration of economic power due to its very 
approach of openness and free (universal) access to music content. 
Such approach, as reflected in the copyright terms, gives platform 
firms (non-copyright firms), the latitude to concentrate economic 
power that dictates the pace of the music copyright industry. This 
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concentration of economic power through openness and resulting 
contractual terms gives platform firms as stronger economic entities, 
leveraging powers vis-a-vis the copyright owners as small businesses 
and therefore, weaker trading partners. Where it reaches a critical 
level, such concentration of economic power is likely to affect the 
structure of the market and the freedom of competition of markets 
participants in economically weaker positions.146  
This situation can be illustrated in situations where the platform 
firm can terminate the contract for any and no reason. The timing and 
circumstances of such termination may be such that the copyright 
owner not only loses significant revenue but may also be limited in its 
ability to shift to another facilitating platform as a trading partner. 
These kinds of policies and their implementation may limit not only the 
economic freedom of the copyright owner as the weaker party (vertical 
approach), but may also strengthen the market power of the relatively 
dominant firm (horizontal approach). Consequently, the market may 
be affected. 
To understand better how the open and freemium music 
business model create a situation of economic dependence between 
owners of platform firms or distributing systems and owners of 
copyright in music content, some considerations deserve attention. A 
technological or distribution platform which is essential to implement 
open and freemium music business models has a much higher value 
ex post than ex ante,147 because at the start of the open and freemium 
music business model process, several alternative platforms may 
potentially be available. Once one platform has been involved and 
network effects set in, competition ends between platforms that may 
be foregone without significant financial consequences. As a concept, 
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network effects occur where a product or service gains additional 
value as more people use it.148 For instance, in the case of the open 
and freemium music business model, a platform may become more 
valuable to a copyright owner because of the number of views the 
copyright owner’s music content may have generated on the platform. 
It is clear, then, how the contractual rules of open and freemium music 
business models may well create a situation of economic 
dependence. To exercise and maintain its dominance in the 
distribution system, the platform owner may threaten to block the 
distribution of the music content by removing access to the 
platform.149 That is why Ginsburg suggested that the recognition and 
enforcement of the entirety of the author and copyright holder’s 
monetary and moral interests is the most viable way of securing the 
position of the author within copyright law.150  
However, the competitive effects of the open and freemium 
music business model have yet to attract the scrutiny of the South 
African competition regime. Such inattentiveness, it is argued, 
appears to be out of touch with the development needs of emerging 
economies such as South Africa where contractual processes and 
provisions between two economically unequal firms (one being 
dominant in relation to the other) are rife and may adversely affect 
competition in downstream markets.151  
However, in addition to promoting efficiency, the Competition 
Act also includes provisions that hint at the possibility of considering 
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the economic and contractual position of firms in promoting 
competition in the South African economy.152 In this regard, s2(e) of 
the Act provides that one of the objectives of the Act is to: “to ensure 
that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the economy”. As Fox points out, South 
Africa’s Competition Act explicitly enables the promotion of 
competition in order to advance market access of SMEs, highlighting 
the important link between competition and inclusiveness and equity 
of market participants and market participation.153 However, while the 
provisions of s2(e) of the Act seems to validate the call for the 
recognition of the effect of business conduct on small businesses and 
on loosely defined markets, the Competition Appeal Court in Sasol Oil 
(Pty) Ltd v Nationwide Poles CC 154  largely rejected such 
interpretation. The reason is probably because besides validating the 
role and position of small businesses, the requirement necessitated by 
s2(e) adds nothing further to the debate on what constitutes sufficient 
anticompetitive effect in the absence of an interpretation contrary to 
that, which is commonly accepted.  
Because of the expressly stated requirement to consider the 
weight of the effect of the business conduct of dominant firms in 
relation to a clearly defined market, it clearly appears that any 
recognition of the role and position of copyright owners as small 
businesses as object of competition scrutiny is secondary to the 
recognition of the effect on competition relevant market as the object 
of competition enquiry. The result is that the available competition law 
remedies to enforce the recognition are limited to usage solely by the 
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proof of significant anticompetitive effect as the metric for 
competitiveness. Indeed, this eventuality is confirmed by several 
commentators, who have lamented the limited impact of the Act’s 
recognition of small businesses in moving the competition law 
trajectory in South African competition law beyond the traditional 
difficulties related to market definition and anticompetitive effect.155 
For similar reasons, there have been suggestions that new 
competition law jurisdictions should forgo the economic model of 
market definition in assessing dominance and its abuse.156 
The combination of the approach embodied in s8(c) of the Act 
and the clear objective in s2(e) of the Act appears to suggest that the 
South African approach is more enlightened than its Nigerian 
counterpart (discussed below), particularly as there is room to apply 
the provisions of the Act in such a manner as to enhance the 
opportunities for small businesses to compete. It is, however, 
questionable whether the application of the Act can ever transcend the 
market identification and anticompetitive effect approach, as the 
competition enforcers continue to interpret effects in relation to a 
clearly defined market, and there are no interpretative mechanisms, 
which can be resorted to for the benefit of the specific transactions in 
the event of an abusive conduct.157 The inability of this enforcement 
approach in South Africa to break away completely from that 
                                                 
155 See Du Plessis 2015 supra at 8.  
156 See for example, Al-Ameen, A. (2015). Application of abuse of dominance in new 
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requirement to evaluate competitiveness from a defined market 
structural perspective remains a concern.158  
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the fact that there is room to 
even consider the interests of SMEs (of which a significant number of 
copyright owners in South Africa are) may yield results that enhance 
the position of copyright owners. As noted by one practitioner: 
…Some of the Commission’s interventions in this regard have had a 
positive impact on smaller businesses. For example, following complaints 
received related to exclusionary conduct by Sasol Nitro, a division of Sasol 
Chemical Industries (Pty) Ltd (Sasol Nitro) as well as collusive conduct with 
other participants in the fertiliser industry, the Commission uncovered various 
anticompetitive practices that were impeding the competitiveness and growth 
of South Africa’s fertiliser industry. Following the Commission’s investigation, 
Sasol Nitro reached a settlement with the Commission, and as part of the 
conditions to the settlement the firm was requested to divest its fertiliser 
blending facilities located in Durban, Bellville, Potchefstroom, Endicott and 
Kimberley. Subsequent research has shown that this is likely to have led to 
significant entry by several smaller players at the blending level of the 
fertiliser industry post the Commission’s intervention”.159  
The practitioner observes that: 
Though the Tribunal did not succeed in its particular use of the public interest 
arguments in favour of small business in Nationwide Poles (where it was 
arguing for a different standard of showing substantiality where a small 
business is harmed), its remarks about the potential of competition law to 
                                                 
158 See Roberts, S., Tapia, J. and Ybar, M. (2013). The Same and the other: A 
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Working Paper 2; Roberts, S. and Tapia, J. (2015). Abuses of dominance in 
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contribute to an enabling environment for small business development have 
merit.160  
Notwithstanding the import of the acceptance that the Act provides 
mechanisms for small business to challenge business conduct that 
affect them and their enterprises, the question of whether such 
mechanism is efficacious or efficient in addressing the ability of those 
small business to stay competitive, remains. It appears that so long as 
any possible remedy is still linked to the conventional competition law 
proposition, which associates the harm to competition exclusively with 
harm to a clearly defined market and harm to efficient market 
processes, the application of the Act may not even take-off in the first 
place. This leads to the unavoidable conclusion that regardless of the 
recognition of the contractual position of small businesses, s8 is still 
inextricably intertwined with the traditional competition law proposition 
which reserves competition law remedies to cases where competition 
(in the form of efficient market processes) in a clearly defined market 
has been harmed. The inapplicability of the Act may foreclose the 
benefits of competition law enforcement which include the threat of 
exorbitant files as a compelling force that may shape the conduct of 
platform firms. 161  As exemplified in the European Commission’s 
complaint against Google with respect to the Android operating 
system, Google made voluntary commitments to rectify the 
anticompetitive conduct rather than go through the hog of trial. 162 
Through the formal step of sending a Statement of Objection, the 
European Commission informs the firms subject to an investigation of 
                                                 
160 Ibid. According to Makhaya, “the Competition Appeal Court was careful to make it 
clear that its decision did not seek to diminish the ability of small and medium 
businesses to “use the Act to protect their ability to compete freely and fairly” (case 
number 49CACAPRIL05). 
161 For instance, see s 59 of the Act. Penalties for contravention of the Act may be 
up to 10% of the offending firm’s annual turnover. See also, s 74(3) of the Draft 
Competition and Consumer Protection Bill 2016. 




the objections raised against them. Sending a Statement of Objections 
does not prejudge the final outcome, as the Commission may still 
decide to close proceedings without a formal decision. In some cases, 
sending a Statement of Objections may result in the offending firm 
making voluntary commitments to rectify the alleged anticompetitive 
conduct. 
Business practices that affect competition in a relevant market 
are subject of clear rules, which the courts and competition enforcers 
apply to resolve such matters.163  These matters are decided by a 
definition of a market in terms of geographical location and in terms of 
products and services that are substitutable by consumers in such 
geographical location. The effect of the business practice on such 
defined market is what invites antitrust scrutiny.164 Business practices 
that concern economic or contractual inequalities are somewhat more 
problematic.165 It involves evaluating the objectives of competition law 
to ascertain whether it should be concerned with economic 
imbalances that may exist in contractual relationships. 166  The 
application of competition law to the contractual terms of open and 
freemium music business models and the likely abuses that may arise 
from the economic dependences that they create, is difficult because 
there is a presumption regarding the existence of competition. This 
presumption relates to the efficiency in the distribution of the music 
content and the achievement of consumer welfare in that the 
consumer’s need for access to music content is met at no monetary 
costs to the consumer. 167  It therefore seems unlikely that South 
                                                 
163 Hughes 2009 supra at 389-392. 
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African competition enforcers would find contravention of the 
Competition Act in the copyright terms of the open and freemium 
music business model simply on the basis that the ability of copyright 
owners to continue in business is hampered by the copyright terms set 
by the platform firms as part of their economic activities. 
5.3.2 Nigeria 
As indicated in chapter one, Nigeria has no competition statute and 
therefore, no provisions regarding the prohibition of unilateral conduct 
amounting to abuse of dominance. However, s73(1) of the current 
Draft Competition and Consumer Protection Bill, 2016, provides for 
the prohibition against abuse of dominant position similar to the 
position in South Africa and in the EU.  
The criteria for ascribing dominance to any undertaking are 
stated in general terms. Section 71(1) provides that a firm is 
“considered to be in a dominant position if it is able to act without 
taking account of the reaction of its customers, consumers or 
competitors”. It seems that similar to the South African approach, this 
criterion does not exclude the possibility of recognising the dominant 
position of the platform firm in relation to the copyright owner. In 
addition to the general criteria for assessing dominance, the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Bill admits other criteria for 
assessing dominance. Such criteria as stated in s73(2)(a) to (h) of the 
Bill include the alleged dominant firm’s links with other firms, legal 
barriers to market entry experienced by other firms and even the 
ability of “opposite markets” to shift to other firms. Again, it is possible 
to consider platform firms in the context of the open and freemium 
music business model as being in a dominant position in view of their 
effect on the ability of copyright owners to shift to other platform firms. 
This consideration may be extended to the financial power of the 




rule. The language of s73(2)(b) to (h) of the Bill seems to suggest that 
the prohibition against abuse of dominance under the Bill may apply to 
the copyright terms under the open and freemium music business 
model especially where the terms affect competition as protected by 
the Copyright Act.168  
In delineating what conduct may amount to an abuse of 
dominant position, the Bill differs from South Africa and is similar to 
the EU in employing an open-ended approach which accepts the 
possibility of recognising different forms of abusive conduct.169 Section 
71(2) considers any conduct that prevents effective competition as 
abusive when undertaken by a firm that occupies a dominant position 
in a relevant market. 170  Accordingly, the implementation of the 
copyright terms may be considered as abusive under the Bill if it 
prevents “effective competition”. However, the requirement of 
dominance on the part of the platform firm is to be assessed in relation 
to a relevant market. For the purpose of identifying the relevant 
market, the Bill stipulates criteria such as geography, demand-side 
substitutability171 and supply-side substitutability.172 Section 72 of the 
Bill which lists these criteria, employs the expression “includes”, 
suggesting that other criteria outside those listed in the section may be 
                                                 
168  Section 73(2)(f) considers “actual or potential competition by undertakings 
established within or outside the scope of application of” the Bill. 
169 See British Airways v Commission  supra at paras 57‐ 59. 
170 According to that section, “abuse of dominant position in a relevant market occurs 
where an undertaking enjoys a position of economic strength enabling it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market and having the power 
to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of the consumers”. 
171  Demand-side substitutability relates to the extent consumers are able to 
substitute the demand for goods and services provided by other firms for those 
provided by anpther firm. See Regulation 19(2)(b) of the Competition Practices 
Regulations 2007.  
172 See Section 72 of the Bill. Supply-side substitutability deals with the extent to 
which suppliers are able to supply goods and services that provide an alternative to 




considered in delineating the relevant market.173 In this regard, it is 
argued that the production and distribution of music content in the 
context of the open and freemium music business model may be 
considered a relevant market in which the platform firm may be 
dominant. Similarly, the relationship between the platform firm and the 
copyright owner in the case of the gratis licensing term may, even 
though non-monetary, constitute a relevant market. The fact that a 
product or service is provided for free does not preclude the 
assumption of a market.174 
But, similar to the position in South Africa, the alleged conduct 
must prevent effective competition before it falls within the prohibited 
abuse of dominant market position. 175  The Bill does not define 
“effective competition”. However, s 73(3) will not consider conduct that 
may have efficiency, and/or technological benefits as prohibited 
abusive conduct. Nor will conduct that does not lead to substantial 
elimination of competition be considered as abusive. By excusing 
conduct that “contributes to the improvement of production or 
distribution of goods or services or the promotion of technological or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit”176 and prohibiting conduct that “impede the transfer 
or dissemination of technology”, 177  the Bill seems to provide an 
indication of what it considers substantial elimination of competition. 
This provision is quite similar to the position in the case of s8(c) of the 
                                                 
173 See Section 72 of the Bill. It provides that “for the purpose of delineating the 
relevant market under this Act, the criteria that shall be taken into account include:” 
174 See Gal and Rubinfeld 2015 supra at 3.  
175 According to Section 73(3), “An undertaking shall not be treated as abusing a 
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South African Competition Act, as both provisions require a weighing 
of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effect. The existing 
competition framework in Nigeria’s telecommunications sector as 
evident from the Competition Practices Regulations, 2007, lend 
credence to this position. 178  The application of the “jurisprudence” 
available from the Competition Practices Regulations, 2007 (“the 
Regulations”) suggests that Nigeria may lean towards the EU and 
South African approach to enforcing competition law in the open and 
freemium music business model. Similar to these jurisdictions179, the 
Regulations define dominance in terms of a relevant market clearly 
stipulating that “the evaluation of dominant position shall begin with 
the definition of the relevant communications market or markets”. 
Also, similar to the position in South Africa, it is required that the 
alleged conduct must affect competition in terms of efficiency before it 
falls within the prohibited conduct.180 Accordingly, the difficulties and 
opportunities applicable in the South African context may be 
experienced in the case of Nigeria.  
This notwithstanding, it is not certain how this provision may be 
applied in practical terms. The proposed legislation will make Nigeria a 
young, amateur competition law jurisdiction, which would require 
guidance and flexibilities to properly apply and enforce the Bill if it 
becomes law.181  
                                                 
178 While the provisions of the Competition Practices Regulations, 2007 do not apply 
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5.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, it has been shown that there are specific problems in 
applying competition law on platform firms that rely on copyright-
protected music content to provide their services to a specific 
customer segment. Platform firms are “content-oriented” rather than 
based on trading (in the e-commerce sense) per se. Many of the 
applicable competition law rules are inferred from s8 of the South 
African Competition Act which in many respects is similar to s73 of the 
Nigerian Competition and Consumer Protection Bill. These statutory 
provisions prohibit abuse of dominant position. They require the erring 
firm to be dominant in a relevant market and more significantly, for 
their conduct to have a high degree of anticompetitive effect. Where 
the conduct of the allegedly erring firm only leads to the exit of a small 
firm, the prohibition may not apply. In South Africa, the lack of decided 
cases upholding such weaker firms’ interests in antitrust interventions 
bears testimony to the apparent disregard of the enforcers in favour of 
the continued application of the ‘anticompetitive effect” approach. It 
has also been shown that the institutionalisation of similar requirement 
by Part II of the Nigerian Competition Practices Regulations of 2007, 
following the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector, may put 
Nigeria on the same pane as its South African counterpart, since it 
points the way for future competition law enforcement. In terms of 
differences between South Africa’s position and the Nigerian position 
considered in this chapter, what is clearly lacking in the case of 
Nigeria, but which is clearly present under s2(e) of the South African 
Competition Act, 1998, is the requirement to consider the continued 
ability of small businesses to participate in the economy. 
Yet, this chapter has also demonstrated that competition is 
affected when platform firms, which deploy the open and freemium 
music business model, create economic dependences that threaten 




because platform firms control the revenue flow and revenue share 
and may exercise termination rights without justification, the 
contractual terms set by these platforms may adversely affect 
competition in the marketplace for the distribution of music content 
and may lead to decreased incentive to produce. The current 
approach that considers only harm to consumer welfare or harm to 
competition in terms of market efficiency may result in the unhealthy 
assumption that the copyright market is competitive when the reverse 
may well be the case. In these circumstances, it is argued that there is 
a need for prohibition of abusive conduct for non-dominant platform 
firms and in cases where the freedom to compete is unduly fettered. 
This is especially so when the protection sought for the freedom of the 
copyright owners to compete is not a protection of their right to profit. 
Rather, the antitrust scrutiny is expected to ensure that protection is 
guaranteed for efficient, competitive copyright owners who can 
compete effectively in the market and whose freedom are restricted by 
dominant platform firms. 182  Under such regulatory framework, the 
implementation of the copyright terms of the open and freemium 
music business model is expected to promote the freedom of the 
copyright owners to compete. As such, platform firms will be 
prevented from abusing their superior position as firms upon whom 
copyright owners are dependent. Indeed, there can be no competition 
without competitors. 183  In the open and freemium music business 
model where copyright owners are akin to both suppliers and 
customers, protection of the competition process would allow them to 
avoid exploitative as well as exclusionary practices that originate from 
dominant or relatively dominant firms.184 Their protection as market 
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participants in this case may be more important than their protection 
as end consumers.185 Protecting the competition process guarantees 
the protection of all actors, be they big or small. 
In the circumstances, the presumption that in providing wider 
access to music content, the open and freemium music business 
model offers a competitive and efficient market for those music 
content, may be problematic. Corollary to the foregoing, the argument 
is that there is no need to bring the business practices related to the 
business models under competition law scrutiny or to enquire if the 
business models achieve the cardinal purposes (encouraging the 
creation and distribution of copyright works) of copyright law. Such 
presumption, it is argued, does not take cognizance of the effect that 
the open and freemium business model may have on the market for 
music content, that is: the position of and the interaction between the 
participants in open and freemium music business model processes.  
In brief, it is undoubted that the competition law framework 
develops interesting concepts and provides some helpful ideas. 
However, in comparison to the stated concerns, a stronger need for 
more protective regulatory framework is highlighted. Thus, it is to be 
recommended that the regulatory framework follow the principle of 
“prevention is better than cure”. 
 
                                                                                                                              
Gal, M. Bakhoum, J. Drexl, E. Fox and D. Gerber, ed., The economic characteristics 
of developing jurisdictions: Their implications for competition law, 1st ed. 
Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 289-290 (hereafter, Drexl 2015). 




Chapter Six: Conclusion: Regulating the open and 
freemium music business model 
6.1 Introduction 
This study aims at proposing ways in which South Africa and Nigeria 
may apply copyright law and the complementary legal framework of 
competition law to regulate the open and freemium music business 
model. The question is one that requires an understanding of how the 
platform firms deploying the business model uses copyright-protected 
music content and the import of such uses. This understanding is 
crucial to the application of the copyright law framework, which 
protects the music content used in the business model, and to the 
application of competition law, which regulates the economic activities 
of firms. 
This final chapter summarises the arguments made in 
preceding chapters (at section 6.2) and then sets out suggestions on 
how South Africa and Nigeria may apply copyright law and 
competition law respectively, to regulate the open and freemium music 
business model (at section 6.3). Section 6.4 concludes the thesis. 
6.2 Summative evaluation of the copyright and competition 
consequences 
6.2.1 Copyright and competition 
Following the introduction of the thesis in Chapter one, the arguments 
developed in Chapter two focused inter alia on the role and objectives 
of copyright law particularly in the business model context. The 
chapter was based on the premise that to apply copyright and 
competition law to regulate the open and freemium music business 
model in South Africa and Nigeria, it is important to first establish a 
link between copyright and competition law. In this regard, the 




Nigeria in promoting competition through exclusive rights. 1  It was 
shown that one of the aims of the exclusive rights guaranteed by 
copyright law in the online context, is to provide opportunities for 
revenue generation. It was argued that the benefits of exclusivity lead 
firms to strive to create their own works to enjoy similar opportunities 
for revenue generation. Further, the nature of exclusivity eschews 
competition by imitation. 
The analysis subsequently moved on to examine the various 
limitations and exceptions to copyright protection as well as other 
provisions that constrain the boundaries of the exclusive rights. In both 
South Africa and Nigeria, provision is made for the duration of 
copyright protection to ensure that at some point, users may access 
and make use of creative works without needing the license of the 
copyright owner. 2  Further, the eligibility requirements for copyright 
protection such as originality and the protection of expression of ideas 
rather than ideas themselves are parts of the copyright system that 
also encourage competition through creativity and substitution and 
eschew competition by imitation. In this context, South African and 
Nigerian copyright laws aim at promoting competition in copyright 
markets.  
Chapter two also established the applicability of competition 
law to complement the goals of copyright and ensure that copyright 
owners have the opportunity to receive rewards for their creative 
efforts and that there is ample dissemination of copyright products.3 It 
was shown that competition law provisions, which prohibit restrictive 
agreements and unilateral abusive conduct may be applied in 
appropriate circumstances to protect copyrights and other IPRs.  
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6.2.2 The open and freemium music business model 
The arguments in Chapter two, which surveyed the copyright regime 
in South Africa and Nigeria and how competition law complements the 
efforts of copyright law in achieving its objectives, foreshadowed the 
analysis in Chapter three. In such context, the open and freemium 
music business model environment was considered from both South 
African and Nigerian perspectives. Regarding the open and freemium 
music business model, its significance and potential to both 
economies cannot be over-emphasized. This is evidenced by its 
contributions to the music industry in terms of revenue generation and 
spread of African music content.4 
Copyright plays a central role in today’s global economy and is 
a significant part of the open and freemium music business model. 
The core copyright-based terms in the open and freemium music 
business model are those relating to licensing, access and usage of 
the music content. Licensing terms relate to both the gratis, non-
exclusive license procured by the platform firms and the revenue-
based licensing agreement imposed by platform firms to use the 
copyright-protected music content. These terms form part of the 
unilateral Terms of use presented by the platform firms and which, 
users agree to, or are deemed to assent to upon use of the platform. 
Access terms consist of the nature of control which the platform firms 
permit over the music content available on the open and freemium 
music platform. On the other hand, usage terms involve the 
permissible uses, which both the platform firms, copyright owners and 
the public may make of the copyright-protected music content within 
the open and freemium music platforms.  
                                                 




In each case, the import of these rules is to protect the platform 
firm from liability for copyright infringement and to enhance its 
competitiveness. It was further shown that there are several 
stakeholders with different interests within the context of the copyright 
terms of the open and freemium music business model. These include 
the platform firms deploying the business model, the copyright owners 
who are predominantly independent record companies and music 
publishers, the users of the platform and advertisers. A key feature of 
firms, which are copyright owners in South Africa and Nigeria, was 
shown to be that they are small businesses/SMEs with their attendant 
growth potential and concerns. Each stakeholder’s interests are both 
distinct and at the same time conflate in significant respects. The 
revenue stream in the open and freemium music business model 
comes from the advertisers and this conflates the interests of the 
copyright owners with that of the platform firms because as business 
entities, both are interested in revenue generation. In the face of such 
use, which relies on the advertisers as the value metric, there are 
ample reasons to conclude that the revenue generation from music 
content is crucial to the growth and continued existence of copyright 
owners. Yet, not every copyright owner is accepted in the revenue-
based licensing system and it was argued that the effect of this lack of 
acceptance may be particularly acute in the context of South Africa 
and Nigeria where the copyright owners are predominantly small 
businesses/SMEs with limited resources to vigorously pursue their 
interests. However, it was also shown that the revenue-based 
licensing term also involves the use of aggregators or partners already 
selected by the platform firms, to enable small-sized copyright owners 
participate in the revenue scheme (and the algorithmic copyright 
enforcement scheme).5 
                                                 




6.2.3 Copyright consequences  
The generalities discussed in Chapters two and three dovetailed into 
specifics in Chapter four. The chapter examined the import of the uses 
of copyright-protected music content by platform firms, from a 
copyright law perspective. The platform firms create playlists with 
uploaded music content, provide tags to optimise song searches and 
create a user-friendly platform all connected to the music content and 
aimed at attracting the sort of attention that advertisers will pay for. 
The existence of these new uses led to question the alignment of the 
business model with the copyright law regulatory framework 
particularly its objective to eschew competition by imitation through 
exclusivity and limitations and exceptions to protection. It was found 
that the opportunities for the copyright owners to obtain revenue for 
the use of their works may become severely limited. 
The platform firms’ copyright terms regarding licensing, access 
and usage of the music content were analysed alongside the 
exclusive rights of reproduction and communication to the public, 
these being the most relevant rights in the online context. In this 
regard, relevant provisions in various international copyright treaties 
(the Berne Convention, the TRIPS agreement and the WCT) were 
analysed alongside the copyright terms to provide a benchmark for the 
analysis of the alignment between the business model and the 
regulatory frameworks in South Africa and Nigeria. This analysis led to 
the conclusion that the business model may not be aligned to the 
objectives of the regulatory frameworks regarding the promotion of 
competition through exclusivity and dissemination. It was further 
established that the international treaties offer some opportunities for 
regulating the business model through the exclusive rights framework. 




advantage of these opportunities to respectively provide for and 
expansively interpret the right of communication to the public.6  The 
chapter also discussed the CJEU jurisprudence on the right of 
communication to the public and how it applied the digital 
environment. Specifically, its decision in The Pirate Bay revealed the 
ways in which the right of communication to the public may be held 
applicable to the activities of the platform firms in terms of the 
copyright terms. South Africa and Nigeria’s respective copyright laws 
have not taken advantage of the leeway and guidance provided by the 
treaties. Further, while the proposed reforms in the copyright laws of 
the two countries (the South African Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 
and the Nigerian Draft Copyright Bill 2015) contain provisions that 
may, if adopted, address these deficiencies, they may not be entirely 
successful. The reason was found to be that the provisions do not 
sufficiently define the right of communication to the public in terms that 
may be applied to the open and freemium music business model.7 
This inadequacy is telling as it is argued that while the platform firms 
may not be exploiting the reproduction right, it was possible that they 
were making a communication of the music content to the public.  
Furthermore, it was shown that the import of the terms relating 
to access and usage within the open and freemium music business 
model may involve restrictions on the ability of the platform firms as 
copyright users to make certain uses of the music content and that 
such restrictions may sometimes be outside the scope of the exclusive 
rights available to copyright owners. However, this depends on the 
provision for and interpretation given to the limitations and exceptions 
to copyright protection, particularly the fair dealing exception. The 
jurisprudence emanating from the Canadian Supreme Court on the 
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scope of the fair dealing exceptions was relied on to strengthen the 
argument that the copyright terms and the platform firms’ activities 
may fall within the limitation and/or exception to copyright protection. 
In the case of limitations, the implementation of the copyright terms 
may be permissible under a compulsory licence given the commercial 
or profit-making nature of such uses. These possibilities further 
highlighted the misalignment between the copyright terms and the 
open and freemium music business model. This analysis was 
extended to the South African and Nigerian copyright laws 
respectively where it was shown that the existing limitations and 
exceptions may not be expansive enough to accommodate the 
activities of the platform firms and the copyright terms. Again, given 
the role of limitations and exceptions in stipulating the range of users’ 
rights, the inadequacy in these frameworks robs the platform firm of 
legal certainty regarding their use of copyright-protected content.8 
The chapter also considered the solutions proposed by the 
copyright law literature to regulate the business model and align it with 
the copyright law objectives. These include the so-called value gap 
proposal currently championed by the EU under the Digital Single 
Market Directive and the suggestions regarding the reform of the safe 
harbour regime applicable to hosting and storage providers. 9  The 
importation of the value gap proposal into South Africa and Nigeria 
was found to be problematic and superfluous in varying degrees. In 
this regard, it was argued that the proposal is reliant on the uses to 
which users of the platform (not the platform firms themselves) may 
put the music content. Such uses and obligations on the platform firms 
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flowing therefrom relate more to secondary liability, which is more 
particularly regulated by the safe harbour regime.10 
Chapter four also argued against the acceptance of the views 
of those scholars and industry experts calling for such modification of 
the safe harbour regime.11 The main problem, as was noted, concerns 
the very rationale for the safe harbour regime, which both courts and 
statutory instruments have shown to be the protection of an open 
internet. 12   Further, the focus of the safe harbour regime on 
circumstances in which the platform firms may be held responsible for 
the actions of their users, mean that the safe harbour regime may be 
unsuitable in the instances where the activities of the platform owner 
is the very issue in contention.13 More importantly, it was argued that 
the focus of the EU value gap proposal on the safe harbour regime 
seems to indicate a visceral but misguided attachment to the right of 
reproduction as the revenue stream in the open and freemium music 
business model context. Having shown that the revenue stream in the 
business model is more tied to consumer access and as such 
communication to the public, it was argued that the focus on the safe 
harbour regime may not be an appropriate means for the application 
of copyright law in regulation of the open and freemium music 
business model.  
The analysis underscored the significance of clearly defined 
exclusive rights for the regulation of the appropriate scope of business 
models such as the open and freemium music business model that 
involve the use of copyright-protected products. Without certainty 
regarding the definition of the exclusive rights, it might be difficult to 
                                                 







apply copyright law to the regulation of the open and freemium music 
business model through the application of copyright law. In this 
regard, attempts at clarifying the parameters of the right of 
communication to the public provide further proof of the significance of 
the right in the open and freemium business model context as well as 
the importance of clarity itself. Consequently, a structured substantive 
regulatory framework governing business models that involve new 
uses of copyright-protected products is currently lacking in South 
Africa and Nigeria, so that concerns for the regulation of the open and 
freemium music business model continue to abound. It was shown 
that the proposed amendments to the copyright law by South Africa 
and Nigeria as a way to mitigate this problem, have not provided the 
expected succour given that the guidance and/or leeway offered by 
the international treaties have not been adequately explored. These 
treaties address the notion of the relevant exclusive rights in a loose 
manner as to enable Member States adopt them in a manner that 
suits their individual circumstances within the spirit and intendment of 
the treaties. They also provide the three-step test that offer Member 
States freedom to stipulate expansive limitations and exceptions to 
copyright protection, subject to compliance with the test. Yet, South 
Africa and Nigeria are yet to sufficiently leverage on these available 
flexibilities.  
6.2.4 Competition consequences  
The generalities discussed in Chapters two and three were also 
specifically discussed in Chapter five from a competition law 
perspective. In this regard, relevant provisions of the South African 
Competition Act and the Nigerian Competition and Consumer 
Protection Bill were considered. However, because competition law 
addresses only economic activities, the analysis of the copyright terms 
was conducted from that perspective. In particular, the chapter 




on relationship between copyright owners as firms or business entities 
and the platform firms. It was explained how the implementation of the 
copyright terms may combine to place platform firms in a position 
where they control the distribution of music content and the revenue 
that may flow from such distribution. Using case law examples from 
Germany, Italy and the EU, generally,14 it was found that such position 
of economic power within the open and freemium music business 
model might lead platform firms to unduly exert their unique position, 
to the detriment of competition in the music copyright industry.  
Other areas of misalignment was found that in the gratis 
licensing rule that had the potential to adversely affect the viability of 
the copyright owner as a small business/SME given that despite 
commercial use of music content, no revenue may accrue from the 
platform firm. Here, due to the control that the platform firm exerts 
over the revenue stream as well as the distribution of the music 
content, the viability of the copyright owner as a business entity is 
largely dependent on the platform firm. 15  In the case of the revenue-
based licensing scheme, it was shown that the criteria for selection of 
copyright owners leads to the exclusion of other copyright owners 
from the revenue system based on their size. Again, such exclusion 
may pose a challenge to the financial incentive that should or may 
otherwise accrue to the copyright owner. While excluded copyright 
owners have the option of participating in the revenue-based licensing 
scheme through the use of aggregators that have a direct agreement 
with the platform firm as described in Chapter three, it was argued that 
such arrangement even with its attendant efficiencies, places the 
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copyright owner at the mercy of such distributors.16 
It was established that while the South African competition 
statute contains an exhaustive list of conduct that may be considered 
abusive, the Nigerian competition Bill presents an open or non-
exhaustive approach to abusive conduct thereby permitting the 
delineation of diverse conduct as abusive by the courts. It was also 
shown that both jurisdictions require evidence of substantial 
anticompetitive effect that outweighs the pro-competitive gains before 
applying competition law to abusive conduct.17 In this regard, it was 
argued that there is a presumption that any anti-competitive effect 
arising from the exclusion of small-sized copyright owners or from the 
insistence on gratis licence may be outweighed by the pro-competitive 
gains of efficient distribution of music content and algorithm-based 
enforcement of copyright. Also, the enforcement of the competition 
rules prohibiting unilateral exclusionary conduct requires the definition 
of a relevant market in which the platform firm is to be dominant.18 In 
the circumstances, it was found that the open and freemium music 
business model in which the dominance of the platform firm is in 
relation to the copyright owner and not to a defined market per se, and 
where consumers are enjoying music content free-of-charge, it might 
be difficult for the copyright owner to successfully challenge its 
exclusion from commercial uses of its music content. Accordingly, it 
was argued that the benefits of competition law enforcement such as 
exorbitant fines that compel lawful conduct may elude the copyright 
owner. 19  Furthermore, even where a revenue-share arrangement 
exists, the position of the platform firm enables it to terminate the 
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arrangement for any reason and termination in such circumstances 
may lead to the exit of the copyright owner from the copyright 
marketplace.20 Yet, the analysis revealed that competition law rules 
might not consider such exit or exclusion sufficiently anticompetitive 
even when the statute in the case of South Africa, is meant to protect 
small businesses as part of its objectives.21 Accordingly, competition 
law-related challenges and opportunities exist in the open and 
freemium music business model but are not addressed due to the 
nuances and requirements of the existing regulatory framework. 
6.3 Regulating the open and freemium music business model 
“Attempting to impose rules which clash with strongly established norms, or 
making law in such detail that the … user is not able to understand or 
comply with it, are not the only ways in which laws can be rendered 
meaningless. Law needs to regulate the reality which is faced by those who 
are subject to the law”.22 
In view of the challenges posed by the implementation of the copyright 
terms in the context of the open and freemium music business model 
and the present inadequacies of the regulatory framework, it is 
imperative to consider how South Africa and Nigeria may apply 
copyright law and competition law towards regulating the business 
model. Two possibilities arise here, namely: legislative changes and 
appropriate judicial interpretation of the legislative framework. Each 
solution is discussed below. 
6.3.1 Legislative changes  
It is important to consider legislative reforms within the copyright and 
competition law framework that may make these regulatory 
frameworks amenable to appropriately regulating the open and 
freemium music business model. Three key possibilities arise here, 
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(i) the introduction of a duly clarified exclusive right of communication 
to the public within the current copyright protection system; 
(ii) the expansion of the current bouquet of copyright limitations and 
exceptions; and 
(iii) provision for addressing anti-competitive effects of relative 
dominance within South Africa’s existing competition framework and 
Nigeria’s proposed competition law. 
Each of these options is surveyed below. 
(i) Clarified right of communication to the public 
From the arguments developed in the previous chapters, it should be 
clear that one of the copyright challenges presented by the open and 
freemium music business model is closely related to the exclusive 
rights underlying the copyright terms. The understanding or the 
perspective taken regarding the regulatory framework may either 
encourage or discourage platform firms from adopting problematic 
copyright terms. Therefore, to address the highlighted concerns, it 
becomes imperative to provide a robust copyright regulatory 
framework that may serve as an ex ante tool for the regulation of the 
open and freemium music business model. 
Besides the much debated value gap proposal and the calls for 
the reform of the safe harbour-based regime as it pertains to the 
platform firms, the literature makes subtle mention of a third option 
that may provide an avenue for the application of copyright law in 
regulating the open and freemium music business model. This 
framework is based on the clarification of the right of communication 
to the public as part of the copyright system in South Africa and 
Nigeria. As established in Chapter four, above, the expression, 




definitions as to require clarification, but there is no provision in the 
copyright legislation of South Africa and Nigeria explicitly defining the 
scope of the right. 23 The CJEU jurisprudence on the definition of the 
contours of the right of communication to the public offers a 
foundational basis for the formulation of this framework.24  According 
to this framework, platform firms in using the music content to 
generate revenue from advertising may be making a “communication 
to the public” and would, therefore, be obliged to agree licensing terms 
with the relevant copyright owners of the music content being 
communicated. Such use, as already described in Chapters three and 
four,25 above include the tagging, optimization, advertising and other 
conduct of the platform firm in the context of the licensing terms of the 
open and freemium music business model.26 Clarification of the right 
of communication to the public along these lines will particularly 
influence the copyright terms in the open and freemium music 
business model environment.27 In comparison with the other models, 
such an option seems to have various advantages, and avoids many 
of the concerns raised with respect to the value gap proposal and the 
related safe harbour regime.28  
 First, such approach to the right of communication to the public is 
more likely to overcome the focus on the right of reproduction 
associated with the value gap proposal and safe harbour regime. 
Because of the focus on the reproduction right, platform firms have 
been able to take benefit of the music content without being obligated 
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to share revenue or enter into appropriate licensing arrangements. 
Further, the focus on reproduction right continues a history of 
copyright owners expecting revenue from commercial, non-
commercial and incidental uses of their works. The provision for 
and/or clarification of the right of communication to the public in South 
African and Nigerian respective copyright systems would eliminate 
these issues, as the recommendation focuses on uses of music 
content in the business model context. By specifically clarifying the 
scope of the act of communication to include the activities of the 
platform firms in the context of the open and freemium music business 
model, copyright law may be applied to regulate the business model.  
Secondly, a system based on a clarified right of communication 
to the public would seldom raise concerns about potential copyright 
infringement or anticompetitive usage or algorithmic restraints.29 Due 
to the certainties provided by such system, platform firms would be 
even less likely, to risk being involved in copyright infringement suits 
on account of what serves as the hub of its business model.30 As 
evidenced by revenue-based licensing arrangements, many platform 
firms have elected to enter into duly negotiated licensing 
arrangements with some copyright owners, particularly in Europe and 
in the US. For instance, post the PRS v Soundcloud suit, Soundcloud 
has become licensed with major copyright owners. 31  Similarly, 
YouTube negotiated licensing arrangements with Viacom and GEMA, 
post their respective suits. In this regard, the platform firms undertake 
to account for advertising revenue received in respect of the 
copyrighted content owned by selected copyright owners and to share 
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the revenue with them based on an agreed sharing formula. Although 
these arrangements have met with criticisms regarding the pre-
selection criteria, which results in the exclusion of most copyright 
owners in South Africa and Nigeria who are small businesses/SMEs 
as highlighted in Chapters four and five, above32; the basis for pre-
selection itself and the revenue-sharing formula, they may also be 
interpreted as important steps towards the recognition and adoption of 
an open and freemium music business model based on the right of 
communication to the public.  
Thirdly, the proposal to clarify the boundaries of the exclusive 
rights to recognise the conduct of the platform firms as falling within 
the communication to the public right should be beneficial towards 
ensuring continued participation by platform firms. Already, licensing 
arrangements in the US and EU with major labels and right-holders 
show that these platform firms are cottoning on to the idea that value 
should flow to copyright owners when the platforms derive financial 
benefit from their copyright-protected music content. Encouraging the 
continued deployment of the open and freemium music business 
model is particularly crucial when it is considered that non-
continuation may considerably reduce the viability of the music 
copyright industry. Indeed, as was made clear in Chapter two, 
dissemination of copyright works is crucial to a competitive copyright 
industry. By providing legal certainty (through a clearly defined 
bouquet of rights), the risks of non-participation and abuses would be 
substantially reduced. 
The dividends of the suggested framework make even more 
sense when the PRS v SoundCloud suit and the subsequent out-of-
court settlement are considered. The claims made by the PRS have 
                                                 




been shown to be of global application. Having the suggested 
framework in place would mean that platform firms would be unlikely 
to deploy the open and freemium music business model without 
considering the economic interests of the copyright owners. Rather, 
they would have been compelled to conclude licensing arrangements 
that ensured the continuation of their business model. Furthermore, by 
clarifying the boundaries of the exclusive rights, policymakers and 
lawmakers would better position the music copyright industry for more 
economic growth.  Consequently, platform firms would not be virtually 
left to their devices at the risk of growth in the music copyright 
industry.  
 Fourthly, due to its focus on the very activities of the platform 
firms (as against the activities of the users of the platform) and its 
consideration of the profit-making nature of the activities, a duly 
clarified communication to the public regime may be potentially easier 
to enforce before a court than an undefined copyright usage 
framework or one, which widely interprets the reproduction right. It 
would also minimise or remove the focus on reproduction right as the 
source of value or revenue for copyright owners.33 
 Finally, the described regulatory framework would ensure that 
both copyright owners and platform firms capture value from the 
deployment of the open and freemium music business model.  This 
would hold true from an ex ante perspective, in the first place. It would 
also hold true ex post, since copyright and ancillary frameworks may 
both have roles to play in ensuring protection against market-wide 
harm resulting from contravening the regulatory provisions.  Copyright 
infringement suits may be instituted on the basis of such clarified right 
of communication to the public, where appropriate. 
                                                 




It must be pointed out that the communication to the public 
approach may be in theory criticized, due to the allegation that it 
represents yet another attempt to widen the scope of copyright 
protection in the face of digital advancements.34 The criticism lies in 
the fact that the components of the new definition may not take 
cognisance of the import of the usage terms in the open and freemium 
music business model's copyright terms as discussed in Chapter four, 
above.35 Nevertheless, this appears to be a minor issue, especially 
when compared with the concerns raised regarding the EU value gap 
proposal and the focus on the safe harbour regime and given that this 
right already exists in international copyright treaties.36 As identified in 
Chapters two and four, there is ample indication that both South Africa 
and Nigeria as signatories to the international copyright treaties; have 
the legislative leeway to apply this option. Indeed, in the case of South 
Africa, the Copyright Review Commission Report recommends this 
approach.37 Calls for more detailed regulation of the area have been 
persistent in the relevant consultations and scholarly output. 38  As 
mentioned in Chapter one and considered in Chapter four, in January 
2015, in their respective Government Communications, both South 
Africa and Nigeria commenced steps to amend their respective 
copyright law to make it fit for the digital age.   While the process is 
still ongoing even at the time of writing this thesis, vigorous 
engagements from both government and industry stakeholders 
indicate the existence of higher chances that the result of the 
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amendment process may well provide some relevant solutions to the 
application of copyright law to regulate the open and freemium music 
business model. In all these, care must be taken to ensure that 
delineation of the parameters of the exclusive rights does not end up 
over-expanding the scope of the relevant rights. As earlier argued, 
setting the right of communication to the public squarely in the 
business model context and excluding personal use and/or mere 
reproduction may resolve the issue. Moreover, by providing for 
revenue share only in the case of business model, copyright law may 
be more suitably applied in the regulation of the open and freemium 
music business model as no one could argue that the copyright terms 
restricts creativity, access or usage.39  
Having highlighted the advantages of the communication to the 
public regime and rebutted likely criticism of the approach, it is 
necessary to evaluate its practical enforcement, the issue of 
implementation being up to the platform firms. Ideally, the codification 
of an appropriately clarified right of communication to the public will 
provide a copyright regulatory framework that may engender more 
acceptable copyright terms for the open and freemium music business 
model. However, bearing in mind that the law does not set or design 
business models for firms but rather provides an over-arching 
framework within which business models may be established, it is 
pertinent to consider how the suggested model may be enforced. The 
premise here is that platform firms may, if unchecked, still be able to 
work around those frameworks to thwart their principles. While the 
modification of the access and usage terms within the context of the 
suggested framework may be an easy pill for platform firms to 
swallow, it is likely that the modification of the licensing terms to permit 
a paid licensing regime may not enjoy a similar easy ride. As 
                                                 




demonstrated in Chapter four using the German Press Publishers’ 
case, the creation or clarification of a new right may be inadequate. In 
that chapter, it was shown that in Italy, Spain and Germany, creating a 
new Press Publishers’ right did not result in the licensing revenue 
sought for the Press Publishers as they were compelled to either 
license for free or risk the freemium service being discontinued in the 
territory.40 
Therefore, it is suggested that a middle ground may be to 
express the right of communication to the public in terms of copyright 
limitation imposed by a statutory or compulsory licence as discussed 
in the next paragraph. As the next paragraph shows, this suggestion is 
influenced by a consideration of the tests proposed in the EU cases of 
Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft respectively discussed in Chapter 
two of this thesis.41 
(ii) Expanding the scope of limitations and exceptions  
Providing for and/or clarifying the right of communication to the public 
mechanism alone would be of limited help in applying copyright law 
and competition law to regulate the open and freemium music 
business model. To apply copyright law to regulate the open and 
freemium music business model, it is also crucial to deal with the 
issue identified in Chapter four, above regarding the role of copyright 
limitations and exceptions in delineating rights of copyright users.42 
This addresses the issues regarding whether the platform firms’ use of 
the music content and their activities qualify as permissible uses of 
copyright products.  
 From the arguments developed in the previous chapters, it is to 
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be noted that the activities of the platform firms in deploying the open 
and freemium music business model result in the free distribution and 
access to music content. Accordingly, given the objective of copyright 
and competition law in promoting wider dissemination of copyright 
products to consumers, there is need for caution in circumscribing the 
activities of the platform firms. However, given the profit-making 
intention of the platform firms in implementing the copyright terms, 
there is need for balance in addressing these two significant interests. 
In this regard, the bouquet of limitations and exceptions may, as 
highlighted in Chapter four, above play a role in regulating the 
business model.  
 Rather than leave the regulation of the open and freemium music 
business model solely to the clarification of the right of communication 
to the public, it is suggested that the canopy of copyright limitations 
and exceptions be applied to the activities of the platform firms and by 
extension, the implementation of the copyright terms. Specifically, the 
deployment of the open and freemium music business model should 
be considered as falling within the scope of the right of communication 
to the public but such right should be limited by permitting its 
exploitation upon the payment of an established licensing rate. Under 
this scheme, platform firms would be obligated to pay established 
licensing rates to copyright owners when they deploy the open and 
freemium music business model. Further, copyright owners will be 
unable to hold platform firms to ransom under this scheme. This 
serves the benefit of providing the platform firms, as copyright users 
with the clear legitimacy needed to make use of the music content in 
the business model context. It also continues the business model’s 
“legacy” of providing music content to consumers free-of-charge.43  
                                                 




As pointed out in Chapter four of this thesis, the Nigerian 
Copyright Bill 2015 provides for a compulsory licensing scheme for 
copyright users that exercise the right of communication to the public 
in certain instances. 44  However, this is limited to producers and 
performers of sound recording. The suggestion is that the licensing 
scheme should be extended to other categories of authors and 
copyright owners with respect to music content. Further, rather than 
have the collecting societies set the rates with the attendant issues 
(already highlighted in Chapter four) regarding the monopoly of 
collecting societies and its abuse,45 it may be best to set the rates 
through a rate-setting tribunal established by statute.46  
 It is proposed that South Africa and Nigeria applying copyright 
law in this manner to regulate the open and freemium music business 
model would ensure that the law does not preclude the establishment 
and continuity of business models that make innovative uses of 
copyright content. The law will also not preclude increased access to 
music content afforded by the Internet through a restrictive application 
of the exclusive rights framework. Even though the Magill, IMS Health 
and Microsoft cases discussed in Chapter two were based on 
competition law, it is argued that the suggestion of adopting a 
compulsory licence approach to the open and freemium music 
business model under copyright law, aligns with the tests proposed in 
those cases.47  
The “innovation balance test” which seeks to balance the 
copyright owner’s incentives to create with the level of innovation in a 
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given industry may be applied in considering the copyright owners’ 
interests vis-à-vis the creativity represented in the use of music 
content in the open and freemium music business context. In line with 
those EU cases, the need to protect the copyright owner’s incentives 
to create should not constitute an objective justification to the issuance 
of the compulsory licence. 48  Similarly, it is argued that the “new 
product test” which supports the issuance of a compulsory licence 
where the refusal to license by a copyright owner may prevent the 
appearance of a new product for which there is consumer demand, 
equally supports a compulsory licence under copyright law. 
 Accordingly, the “new product” and “innovation balance” tests 
have been adapted to support a “competition impact” approach to the 
application of copyright law in regulating the open and freemium music 
business model.  
(iii) Addressing the effects of relative dominance  
From the arguments proffered in Chapter two, the application of 
competition law rules prohibiting both restrictive agreements and 
unilateral abuse of market power can complement the copyright law 
regime in the achievement of its objectives.  
As already discussed in Chapter five, the relative dominance of 
platform firms may affect the individual freedom of copyright owners, 
in the case of open and freemium music business models where, the 
copyright owner as a supplier or a customer depends “exclusively” on 
the platform firms as a distributor or a buyer and does not have 
equivalent alternatives. 49  Such dependence may also affect the 
freedom or ability of the copyright owner and other platform firms to 
compete in the distribution of music content. In such cases, the 
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individual economic freedoms of the copyright owner where it is a firm, 
may be restricted. Indeed, access to the services of the platform firm 
may be a prerequisite for effective competition in the market for the 
provision of music content in Nigeria and South Africa. In such 
situation, there is evidently cause for worry for competition in such 
copyright markets. To address the identified effects of the undue 
exercise of the relative dominance and apply competition law towards 
the regulation of the open and freemium music business model, it is 
suggested to conceptualise the competition concerns as a situation of 
economic dependence whose abuse is prohibited. Accordingly, 
statutory provisions should be adopted against abuse of economic 
dependence either as a separate prohibition or where the statute 
adopts an open approach to prohibition of unilateral abusive conduct, 
within the prohibition against abuse of dominance. The work of the 
ICN in the approach to and implementation of prohibitions against 
abuse of economic dependence may be helpful in this regard.50 
The concept of economic dependence and its abuse is a creation 
of competition law in several jurisdictions. 51  Specific statutory 
provision is present in Germany 52  and France 53 . In some other 
jurisdictions, the notion is represented in the interpretation of abuse of 
dominance provisions within competition law or in the provisions 
prohibiting unfair business practices or contractual arrangements.54 
The availability of diverse legal instruments for the regulation of 
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economic dependence and its abuse highlights divergences in 
domestic legislative approaches to the recognised criteria for the 
conduct, recognised effects of the conduct and available remedies.55  
However, for the present purposes, the recommendation is based on 
the prevalent general criteria of a situation of economic dependence. 
The major prerequisite for a finding of the existence of economic 
dependence is the absence or costs, for the dependent firm, of 
alternative firms or solutions to sell or to purchase its products or 
services in the market.56 In such cases, the economic dependence 
stems either from the fact that the market is highly concentrated or 
from the nature of the relationship between the dependent firm and 
the independent firm. 57  A firm (dependent firm) is said to be 
economically dependent on another (independent firm) if the 
dependent firm is reasonably unable to or lacks sufficient means of 
switching to other firms, in order to continue its business.58 In fact, 
whereas the independent firm can end the relationship without 
incurring a loss, such can engender significant economic damage for 
the dependent firm.59  
Such inability to switch may be present when the dependent firm: 
(a) is a small or medium size enterprise and regularly obtains from 
the dependent firm, “in addition to discounts customary in the 
trade or other remuneration, special benefits which are not 
granted to similar purchasers”60; 
(b) is a retailer of branded or high-quality products produced by the 
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independent firm and the former cannot afford not to have and 
sell the items in its shops;  
(c) is in a “long-standing relations” with the independent firm who is 
largely its major or only other business partner; 
(d) is involved in the distribution, purchase or sale of a product that is 
usually scarce;  
(e) is dependent on the independent firm for specific technical 
products.  
The rationale underlying the prohibition against the abuse of economic 
dependence was the belief that the structure of the market and 
competition therein may be protected by providing protection to 
efficient61 but smaller (weaker) market operators from the incidence of 
dependence on bigger (stronger) operators.62 In this regard, an abuse 
of economic dependence occurs when a business operator upon 
which another operator depends, applies that dependence in a 
transaction or transactions to the detriment of the continued operation 
or existence of the dependent party. 63 
The implementation of copyright terms in the open and 
freemium music business model context clearly provide a market for 
the distribution of music content. However, for copyright owners of the 
music content, the copyright terms may limit their freedom to compete 
in that market to the detriment of the continued operation or existence 
of the copyright owner.64 Therefore, it is worth considering avenues to 
apply competition law in regulating the open and freemium music 
business model by addressing such restraints of economic freedom. 
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The copyright terms of the open and freemium music business model 
operate in such manner as to “exploit” the copyright-protected music 
content while only offering revenue for a select few chosen based on 
criteria set by the platform firms. It is suggested that the delineation of 
copyright terms with no revenue share attached to it despite use of 
copyright content to generate revenue can fall under the provision 
relating to abuse of economic dependence through a contextualized 
definition of the notion of dependence. 
In neglecting to clarify the scope of the exclusive rights 
generally and, to explicitly involve financial benefit, lawmakers have 
provided leeway for the platform firms to use copyright content in 
deploying business models without needing to pay corresponding 
revenue to the copyright owners, thus promoting the dissemination of 
copyright products at the expense of other market participants such as 
the copyright owner. Conceiving of such scenario as creating a form of 
economic dependence would solve this problem and regulate the 
business model, at least in part, because it would focus the inquiry on 
the marketplace (that is where the money flows) and all market 
participants rather than on the act of reproduction which with digital 
technology is par for the course. More importantly, the rule against 
abuse of economic dependence would assist in addressing ex ante 
the issue of the creation of economic dependence, typically arising 
under the copyright terms. The remedies applicable to a finding of 
abuse of economic dependence will involve a positive order to stop 
the abuse as well as directives regarding what the abusive firm is 
required to do.65  
An additional consideration in the notion of economic 
dependence concerns the question of appropriate approach or 
                                                 




enforcement test. Again, different jurisdictions apply different tests, 
which may, in some cases, lead to a finding of no abuse, even when a 
situation of economic dependence exists and has adverse effects. For 
instance, under the French Commercial Code, a finding of abuse of 
economic dependence may only be made where, in addition to the 
requirement of absence of alternative solution, there is an adverse 
effect on the relevant market. This enforcement test (also known as 
“equally efficient competitor test” 66 ) will only classify exclusionary 
conduct as abusive and prohibited if such conduct can exclude an 
equally efficient competitor in the same market rather than or in 
addition to an efficient market participant who may not necessarily be 
a competitor.67 In applying the test, there is a comparison between the 
efficiency of the independent firm and that of the alleged dependent 
firm.  
Such tests fall into the same difficulties as that experienced 
within “efficiency-based” competition rules highlighted in Chapter five, 
above. Accordingly, it will be difficult to apply such test to the open 
and freemium music business context, which involves vertically-
related firms (copyright owners and platform firms), which operate in 
different market stages. Bakhoum explains the requirement of this test 
and its inherent difficulties68: 
This requirement goes beyond the vertical relationships to consider the 
horizontal effect of a situation of economic dependence in a given market, 
from a horizontal and macroeconomic perspective. This combination of 
contractual (analysis of the dependence from the bilateral point of view) and 
competition (taking the market as a benchmark for a finding of abuse) 
related requirements made difficult the enforcement of the provision in 
practice… Such requirement expresses the difficulties in dealing with abuse 
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of economic dependence with the traditional competition law approach, 
which requires that the market be affected. 
Such test is however, not of universal application as exemplified in the 
case of countries such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, which do not 
require the market be affected or compare efficiencies of competitors 
in such market for a finding of an abuse of economic dependence. In 
these jurisdictions, a finding of abuse of economic dependence may 
be made where the freedom of choice of markets participants is 
unduly circumscribed because of the dependence of such participant 
on an economically stronger market participant. In such cases, the law 
is applied to restore the economic freedom of such economically 
weaker firms and protect the competition process.69 For this reason, 
this enforcement criteria is suggested as better-suited to the regulation 
of the open and freemium music business model in the South African 
and Nigerian context. 
Corollary to the foregoing is the issue of how the prohibition 
against abuse of economic dependence may become part of the law 
in South Africa and Nigeria. For South Africa, the proposed 
amendments to the Competition Act provides ample opportunity to 
recognise the notion of abuse of economic dependence. Indeed, it is 
argued that the notion of abuse of economic dependence may provide 
the much-sought balance between protecting the interests of small 
businesses and protecting the interests of platform firms as investors 
and innovators. As highlighted in Chapter three, above, platform firms 
make significant investments in designing the platforms, algorithms 
and “advertisement-enabling” features.70  
The South African competition enforcers have been quite 
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insistent on applying the market-efficiency test in competition law 
enforcement and have resisted the recognition of conduct similar to 
the abuse of economic dependence described above, within the list of 
recognised competition law infractions. 71  However, the proposed 
amendment to the Act can provide an avenue for a dual approach to 
competition law regulation, which may apply to the open and freemium 
music business model. Indeed, given that the same conduct may in 
some cases amount to both abuse of economic dependence and 
abuse of dominance, such dual approach is to be recommended.72  
In the case of Nigeria, the notion of economic dependence and 
prohibition against its abuse may be more easily incorporated within 
the Competition and Consumer Protection Bill as it is yet to be passed 
into law. As scholars such as Al Ameen suggest, competition law in 
developing countries and young competition law jurisdictions may be 
better served by the more appropriate abuse of economic dependence 
principles than by the prevalent “effects-based” competition law 
approach.73 
Regulating the open and freemium music business model 
through the competition law notion of restriction of abuse of economic 
dependence also has the benefit of engendering soft law initiatives 
such as an industry code of practice involving relevant stakeholders. 
Such code of practice may require that access terms should explain or 
delineate procedures for denial/refusal of access to platforms. For 
instance, platform firms may suspend the counting of views but retain 
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previous view count by showing still images of such music content 
with the most recent view count. Given the present feature of 
permitting partners to mute videos containing their copyright-protected 
music content, there is a strong possibility that this option is feasible. 
Such procedure may enable the copyright owners continue to “trade” 
on their publicity through view counts and ensuing social media and 
brand ambassador relationship, even when their music content no 
longer has access to the platform.74  
The provision for the notion of abuse of economic dependence 
can also engender stakeholder dialogues to define best practices for 
matters such as content recognition technologies. These standards or 
code of practice may contain:  
(a) Certifiable popularity index – Platform firms may be required to 
issue copyright owners with a document or “badge” that 
provide an accurate and verifiable record of matters such as 
view counts, number of “likes”, number of “followers” and the 
like. 
(b)  Requirement of payment of undisputed sums prior to 
termination or takedown – Platform firms may be required 
under the code to adopt contractual provisions that ensure that 
they pay copyright owners all undisputed sums accumulated 
on the platform in the event that the platform firm intends to 
terminate its agreement with the copyright owner. 
Such code of practice may eventually become a regional or 
international standard if properly drafted. The premise for this 
suggestion is that such industry code only addresses the pertinent 
areas of the open and freemium music business model that have 
been shown to be unaligned with competition law goals, while 
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leaving problem-free areas to market forces. 
6.3.2 Application of judicial mechanisms  
As a further alternative, the courts are not left out. Judicial 
interpretation, which takes cognisance of the identified effects of the 
copyright terms of the open and freemium music business model and 
their underlying causes, would boost the implementation of the 
suggested regulatory approach. This also has the advantage of 
applying regulation only in those particularly problematic areas where 
it is most needed (such cases naturally being more likely to make it 
before the court), while avoiding pushing the issue too aggressively in 
individual transactions.  
If statutory provision is not made for defining the scope of the 
exclusive rights or expanding the limitations and exceptions, it is still 
open to courts to use their discretion to delineate such clarification as 
to regulate the business model. In this regard, an interpretation that 
fits with the reality of the value metric in the digital copyright market 
will offer a better approach to applying copyright and competition law 
in regulating the business model. As demonstrated in Chapters three 
and four, the new value metric of access to consumer and consumer’s 
data, including advertisement-based revenue can be understood as a 
call to approach the perception of the copyright terms of open and 
freemium music business models, differently. Similarly, competition 
enforcers may interpret the effects of the copyright terms as an abuse 
of dominance in appropriate circumstances using the 
“unconscionability” test as opposed to the efficiency-based approach 
currently applied.75 
Speedy judicial enforcement of the suggestions made in this 
chapter may be aided by the use of a small claims court and/or 
                                                 




copyright tribunals such as are already provided for under the existing 
respective copyright laws of South Africa and Nigeria. The proposed 
amendments to the copyright laws in both South Africa and Nigeria, 
have further expanded the utility of copyright tribunals in this regard.76 
In this regard, the criticisms regarding the expansion of the scope of 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Amendment may be 
addressed by providing an appropriate review system within the courts 
and/or strengthening the constitution of the tribunals by appointing 
copyright experts as members.77 
Of course, there is the risk that judicial interpretation may not 
provide the expected relief while it would also possibly result in 
precedents that perpetuates the status quo. 78 However, such risks are 
minimal particularly in the face of explicitly stated rules and 
enforcement approaches. More significantly, it is to be noted that very 
few copyright cases make it to court and the suggested regulatory 
approach will require litigation in order to activate judicial action. 
In the case of competition law regulation, the commencement 
of investigation by the relevant competition enforcer may be all that is 
required to engender proper conduct by the platform firm. As 
highlighted in Chapter five, the threat of exorbitant fines may cause 
the platform firm to enter into commitments that will rectify the 
anticompetitive conduct.79 
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6.4 Concluding remarks 
Copyright serves the purpose of promoting competition. Properly 
applied, copyright protection provides the competitive environment 
required to enable firms to profit from their creative works. This 
encourages innovation effort and improves dynamic efficiency, to the 
ultimate benefit of consumer and societal welfare.  Thus, copyright 
laws should be seen as encouraging firms to engage in competition, 
and in particular competition that involves risks and long-term 
investments. Corollary to the foregoing, it seems imperative that 
business models, which are founded on (dynamic) uses of copyrights, 
take cognisance of this competition-based objective. Indeed, any 
copyright-based terms used in the business model that fails to 
measure up to this objective is likely to affect the music copyright 
industry adversely. At the same time, any form of regulation of such 
copyright-based terms should recognise the ways in which the 
copyright-protected product is used and preserve the firms’ incentives 
to invest in the market. The imperative is to ensure that business 
models operate in a manner as to benefit the society. To this end, 
South Africa and Nigeria should enforce a legal regime that ensures 
that commercial users of copyright-protected products work within the 
objectives of the copyright regime and the complementary competition 
law regime. 
This being premised, the open and freemium music business 
model clearly represents a context where the use of copyrights may 
preclude competition in the copyright market. Abuse of economic 
dependence represents the most serious risk for copyright owners in 
the context of the open and freemium music business model, and 
offers a solid basis for concerns regarding competition in the music 
copyright industry. This opportunistic conduct may lead platform firms 
to gain undue economic advantages, at the expense of the copyright 




identified in the copyright terms widely adopted so far by the open and 
freemium music platform firms.  Such copyright terms raise several 
questions as to the best approach to reducing the risks to competition 
in the copyright industry whilst ensuring continued dissemination of 
music content.  South Africa and Nigeria are representative of 
developing countries in Africa in this regard given their unique 
economic positions. South Africa possess significant elements of both 
developed and developing economies while Nigeria has striking 
features of both developing and least-developed economies. Both 
countries’ music copyright industry is rife with copyright owners who 
as independent record companies and publishers qualify as small 
businesses/SMEs requiring the protection of competition to ensure a 
viable music copyright industry. In an industry characterised by 
“ubiquitous intermediation” 80  and prevalence of user-upload digital 
distribution platforms, where platform firms are crucial to ensuring that 
music content owned or produced by small businesses/SMEs reach 
consumers, where access to the consumer is the new way to 
monetize copyright and where platform firms are also equipped with 
more far-reaching technical powers in comparison to their older, 
analogue counterparts, it is imperative to secure the fate of the music 
copyright industry.  
This thesis has made clear that, to apply copyright and 
competition law to regulate the open and freemium music business 
model, an improved legal regime should be put in place. Such a 
regime should be based on the ex ante clarification of the parameters 
of the relevant exclusive rights under copyright law and a balancing 
expansion of the scope of limitations and exceptions. Further rules on 
reducing and/or eradicating abuse of economic dependence should be 
included, as a means of influencing the implementation of the 
                                                 




copyright terms of the open and freemium music business model. 
Influencing the implementation of copyright terms, however, also 
means that undue restrictions on platform firms should be eschewed. 
Consequently, platform firms need not feel constrained in the manner 
they deploy their business model, particularly when this would lead to 
weaken or even destroy their business. The adoption of an improved 
legal regime based on protecting economic dependencies may also 
prove effective when considered from an ex post standpoint. A regime 
focused on addressing business practices, indeed, would better 
regulate the business model in the event of any opportunistic conduct. 
In this regard, this concluding chapter has developed an in-depth 
examination of the different approaches to copyright and competition 
law regulation, which could be potentially applied. Relief against 
abuse of economic dependence is certainly one effective regulatory 
approach.   
Present and future challenges call for a deeper reflection on the 
scope and the role of the open and freemium music business model in 
the emerging global context. As this becomes the go-to business 
model in the music copyright industry and their activities are 
increasingly global, both copyright owners and platform firms will need 
to pay more attention to the legal frameworks and enforcement 
systems that may apply to them. This thesis has developed a 
thorough examination of the main risks to competition in the copyright 
industry arising in the context of the open and freemium music 
business model. The path proposed to apply copyright and 
competition law to regulate the implementation of its current copyright-
based terms and protect competition will hopefully help the music 
copyright industry to navigate through this new business model. 
 Finally, it is worthy to note that even if none of these solutions 
is adopted, the copyright terms, their effects and underlying causes as 




improvement of the business model and may possibly attract healthy 
scrutiny for the business model. In that context, regulatory and 
industry scrutiny can induce “good behaviour” and best practices. 
From this perspective, a “bottom-up” approach to regulation might, at 
the end of the day, be as effective as – and encounter less resistance 
than – a “top-down” approach. Either way, exploratory and doctrinal 
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